Jemima Fawr's Miniature Wargames Blog

The continuing ramblings of the Butterfly Wargamer…

My surviving reader might remember back to the alcohol-fueled Lockdown Days of 2000, when I was last burning through Wellingtonics like a man possessed.  Back then I was looking forward to the wargames I was going to have when the various UK Lockdowns (and a slack handful added by the Cardiff Parish Council to keep us out of the pubs and make Wales feel extra miserable for tradition’s sake) finally ended.  At the time I blitzed my way through the Army of the Duchy of Warsaw, I finally finished a pile of units that had been languishing in the Russian Wing of the Lead Dungeon for twenty years and I expanded my Austrian army fivefold.

My plan at the time was to play the 1809 Battle of Aspern-Essling and the 1813 Battle of Liebertwolkwitz.  However, as you may have noticed, I haven’t yet done either game (though in my defence, Liebertwolkwitz was actually our very first game (about 35 years ago) using the Napoleon’s Battles system and my dearly-departed hordes of Minfigs, Heritage, TTG, Chariot and Battle Honours figures).

Nevertheless, these games are most definitely afoot!  I have now almost completed the order of battle for Aspern-Essling and I’ve already got everything we need for Liebertwolkwitz, so I’m hoping that we can play both this year if I can find a spare weekend for each game (these will definitely be two-day affairs!).

In the meantime, I may as well post the scenarios, starting with this’un.  This is the massive cavalry-battle of Liebertwolkwitz, which was fought on 14th October 1813, two days before the start of the ‘Battle of Nations’, the titanic Battle of Leipzig (16th to 19th October 1813).  Part of the Battle of Leipzig was then fought over the exact-same ground.

I’d like to apologise for this being a bit of a long’un… Well, I’d like to, but I won’t… 😉

The Autumn Campaign of 1813

Despite Napoleon’s catastrophic defeat in Russia, in the Spring of 1813 he nevertheless managed to pull off arguably one of the greatest organisational feats of the entire era; the recreation of the Grande Armée from practically nothing.  This brand-new army, woefully inexperienced and cripplingly short of horseflesh, then somehow managed to defeat the combined armies of Russia and the resurgent Prussia during the Spring Campaign of 1813, at the battles of Lützen and Bautzen.  However, despite these victories, Napoleon proved unable to land the knockout blow and was forced in June to agree to an armistice.

The war stopped for a couple of months as both sides paused to build up their forces and re-draw their plans.  The embryonic new Prussian Army was massively expanded with the addition of the Landwehr militia, but most significantly, the Allied cause was boosted in August by the addition of Austria to the 6th Coalition, along with her massive army.

Still welcome, but somewhat less significantly, was the addition of a Swedish Corps and the creation of a multi-national corps in Northern Germany, consisting of British regulars, the newly-reformed Hanoverian, Mecklenburg and Hanseatic Armies, Prussian and German Freikorps, Russian Cossacks and Swedish units.

The Allies were now split into three main parts; the Army of the North under Crown Prince Charles John of Sweden (i.e. the former French Marshal Bernadotte), the Army of Silesia under the Prussian Field Marshal Blücher and the Army of Bohemia under the Austrian Field Marshal Schwarzenberg.  The three monarchs (of Russia, Prussia and Austria) would accompany the Army of Bohemia, which was by far the largest of the three armies.

Each Allied army had a large Russian contingent and at least one Prussian army corps (the Army of the North had two Prussian army corps and the Army of Bohemia had the Prussian Royal Guard Division attached to the Russian Imperial Guard).  The Swedish Corps was assigned to the Army of the North, while the Austrian Army formed a very large part of the Army of Bohemia.  In addition to the three main armies were General Wallmoden’s multi-national corps in North Germany and the all-Russian Polish Reserve Army under General Benningsen, which was conducting siege and lines-of-communication duties in the rear, but which would also eventually join operations in Germany.

Riven by disagreement over their overall war-aims, the Allies nevertheless managed to thrash out a strategy, based on the (accurate) assumption that Napoleon would attack them first.  The ‘Trachenberg-Reichenbach Plan’ had six key points:

1. Any fortresses occupied by the enemy are not to be besieged, but merely observed.
2. The main effort is to be directed against the enemy’s flanks and lines of operation.
3. To cut the enemy’s lines of communication, forcing him to detach troops to clear them or move his main forces against them.
4. To accept battle only against part of the enemy’s forces and only if that part is outnumbered, but to avoid battle against his combined forces, especially if these are directed against the Allies’ weak points.
5. In the event of the enemy moving in force against one of the Allied armies, this army is to retire while the others will advance with vigour.
6. The point of union of the Allied armies is to be the enemy’s headquarters.

This essentially boiled down to one simple concept: “Fight where Napoleon is absent.  Retreat where he is present.”

Napoleon for his part planned to use his advantage of interior lines in Saxony to strike at one of the Allied armies at a time, while holding off the others with smaller forces.  Marshal Davout’s XIII Corps would continue to hold Hamburg and the line of the Lower Elbe in the north (in concert with the tiny Danish Army in Schleswig-Holstein), while Marshal Oudinot’s Army of Berlin (IV, VII & XII Corps & III Reserve Cavalry Corps) would advance from Saxony to take Berlin, thereby causing political trouble for the Prussians, to draw the army of the North upon himself and to draw Prussian forces away from the other Allied armies (Napoleon seems to have forgotten that threatening Berlin only three months earlier to draw the Prussians away from the Russians didn’t work prior to the Battle of Bautzen).

Marshal Ney’s Army of the Bober (III, V, VI & XI Corps & II Reserve Cavalry Corps) meanwhile, would hold the line of that river against the Army of Silesia, while General Poniatowski’s Poles (VIII Corps and IV Reserve Cavalry Corps) and Marshal Victor’s II Corps would screen the passes of the Bohemian Mountains for any sign of an advance by Schwarzenberg.  Marshal Augerau’s still-forming IX Corps would cover the lines of communication to Bavaria.  Marshal Saint-Cyr’s XIV Corps would hold the base of operations at Dresden, where Napoleon was positioned with his operational reserve (The Imperial Guard, I Corps and I & V Reserve Cavalry Corps).

(If you’re counting, the X Corps slot was taken by General Rapp’s garrison of Danzig, who had been besieged since the Spring)

With the armistice coming to its pre-arranged end on 13th August, Napoleon’s offensive first struck eastward from his base of operations at Dresden, aiming to join Ney’s Army of the Bober and knock out Blücher’s Army of Silesia, which faulty intelligence had led Napoleon to believe was the largest of the three main Allied armies (while Napoleon had massively built up his cavalry arm during the armistice, it was still significantly inferior in terms of numbers and quality and with bands of Cossacks seemingly everywhere, the Allies had a considerable reconnaissance advantage).  Realising that he was facing the Emperor and in accordance with the agreed Allied plan, Blücher withdrew his army, leaving Napoleon punching into thin air.

The Battle of Grossbeeren, 23rd August

With Napoleon known to be in front of Blücher, the Allies were quick to take advantage; Bernadotte’s Army of the North moved to engage Oudinot’s Army of Berlin, while the Army of Bohemia crossed over the Bohemian Mountains and descended upon Dresden.  The first major clash of the campaign took place on 23rd August, at the town of Grossbeeren near Berlin, where Marshal Oudinot’s 70,000 men found themselves facing the Crown Prince of Sweden’s 93,000.  Oudinot was decisively defeated and was forced to retreat back to the Elbe.

Napoleon meanwhile, alerted to the threat to his base at Dresden, immediately marched back to the city with his reserves, arriving there on 25th August.  Marshal Ney was also ordered to Dresden with orders to leave Marshal MacDonald in command of the Army of the Bober.  However, thanks to his imprecise orders, Ney also ordered his own III Corps (the strongest formation, now commanded by General Souham) to also march to Dresden, leaving MacDonald’s army dangerously weakened.

The Battle of Dresden, 26th-27th August

Moving characteristically slowly thanks to multi-national ‘Command by Committee’, Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia finally assaulted the city on 26th August and made significant gains during the first day of fighting, but was unable to break the resistance shown by the defenders.  Shouts of “Vive l’Empéreur!” coming from the defenders made the Allies suspicious, but they were certain that Napoleon was miles away, in front of Blücher.  After much discussion, they finally agreed to continue their assault and by 5pm they were at the very walls of Dresden.

Then it all started to unravel for the Allies… Napoleon now unleashed the 70,000 men of his reserve and the Allies were immediately thrown back, with fighting continuing until midnight and the Allies being pushed almost back to their start-line in many areas.  During the night, each flank of Napoleon’s army was massively reinforced under the cover of darkness and heavy rain.

At dawn on the 27th, the French left wing, led by Marshal Ney and spearheaded by the Young Guard, launched a counter-attack which quickly drove back Wittgenstein’s Russians, but eventually got bogged down in the heavy mud.  Marshal St-Cyr’s centre also made gains against Kleist’s Prussians and rebuffed a counter-attack, while Marshal Murat’s right wing also began to gain ground against the Austrians.  The Russians planned a counter-attack against Ney’s left wing, but this also quickly bogged down in the mud.

Then in the afternoon, Marshal Victor’s French II Corps finally broke through the Austrians and this advantage was soon exploited by Murat with the massed reserve cavalry.  The Austrian wing, partly penned against the flooded River Weisseritz, was completely smashed, with three whole divisions surrendering outright to the French.  This disaster was compounded by the news that Vandamme’s French I Corps had arrived at Pirna, thereby cutting the Allies’ line of communication to Prague via the valley of the Elbe.

The Battle of the Katzbach, 26th August

In the meantime, the wily Blücher, realising that the pressure in front of him had eased considerably, decided to go onto the offensive.  His four corps; the Russian corps of Sacken, St Priest and Langeron and Yorck’s Prussian I Corps totalled around 96,000 men, which was roughly on a par with MacDonald’s total of around 91,000.  However, the withdrawal of Souham’s III Corps had just taken 28,000 from the French total!

The resultant Battle of the Katzbach was a confused encounter-battle in appalling weather, marked by heavy rain, thick mud, flooded rivers and broken bridges which trapped thousands of French troops, forcing them to surrender.  Both sides fought each other to exhaustion, but even the late return of Souham’s III Corps couldn’t save the day for the Army of the Bober.

A further victory by Langeron’s Corps at Löwenberg on 29th August netted thousands more prisoners.  The Army of the Bober was completely routed, having lost in excess of 30,000 men and 100 guns.  However, Blücher’s victory was not without considerable cost; the Army of Silesia had lost 22,000 men, though their victory had won them a considerable morale-advantage over the French.

Worse was to come for Napoleon.  Having pursued the defeated Army of Bohemia as far as Pirna, he now received news of Oudinot’s defeat at Grossbeeren and MacDonald’s defeat on the Katzbach.  As Vandamme’s I Corps had not been engaged, he was tasked with continuing the pursuit of the defeated Allied army into Bohemia, while Napoleon regrouped back at Dresden and marched north, intending to resume the advance on Berlin and to crush the Crown Prince of Sweden’s Army of the North.

The Battle of Kulm, 29th-30th August

However, on 29th August, a Russian force of around 10,000 men under Ostermann-Tolstoy mounted a successful rearguard action, checking Vandamme’s pursuit at the village of Priesten.  Although Vandamme outnumbered the Russians by more than 3:1, the action was fought in a narrow valley, bordered by mountains and thick forests, so the French were unable to outflank the enemy rearguard or bring their greater numbers to bear.  Thus rebuffed, Vandamme fell back to the village of Kulm to reconsider his options.  On the 30th, Vandamme resumed the attack on the Russians, who had now been reinforced by further Russian and Austrian units under Barclay de Tolly and Colloredo-Mansfeld respectively, bringing the odds to roughly 3:2 (34,000 French versus 20,000 Allies).

However, Vandamme had lost track of one enemy formation during the pursuit; Kleist’s Prussian II Corps.  Kleist became aware that he had been passed by the French pursuit and now, at some considerable risk to his own corps, marched to attack Vandamme’s rear.  A sudden cannonade to the north alerted Vandamme to the terrible situation he now found himself trapped in!  This situation then became worse as the Russians and Austrians mounted their own frontal attack.  The Battle of Kulm was a complete disaster for the French.  Estimates of losses vary wildly from 13,000 to 25,000, but the outcome was that I Corps was completely destroyed, with Vandamme himself being captured and every gun being lost.  The defeats at Grossbeeren and the Katzbach had been mere setbacks for Napoleon, but the removal of an entire corps from the order of battle had now undone everything that he had achieved at Dresden.

Already on his way to take command of the Army of Berlin, Napoleon realised that he now had to turn his attention back to the south and east, so ordered Ney to take over command from Oudinot and resume the offensive in the north.  Blücher in the meantime was advancing, so Napoleon once again marched to face him.  However, just as before, Blücher withdrew when he realised that he was facing Napoleon.  Finally appreciating the Allied strategy, Napoleon decided not to pursue Blücher and sure enough, soon received word that Schwarzenberg was again threatening Dresden, forcing him once again to rush his reserves to that point.  This time however, the cautious Allies managed to avoid a battle against the Emperor.

The Battle of Dennewitz, 6th September

This however, was not the case in the north, where the Allies were very much seeking another battle.  Marshal Ney, determined to avoid what he perceived to be Oudinot’s mistake of advancing in multiple columns, decided to advance on Berlin in a single column.  However, on 6th September this column was checked outside the town of Juterbogk, where Tauentzein’s Prussian IV Corps (a weak formation consisting almost entirely of Landwehr units) successfully halted the advance of Bertrand’s French IV Corps (although nominally French, it was actually a mix of French, Italian and Württemberg troops, as well as some attached Polish cavalry).

Both sides had reinforcements marching to the scene, but Bülow’s powerful Prussian III Corps were first to arrive, relieving Tauentzein’s battered command and driving back Bertrand.  However, Morand’s excellent French 12th Division eventually checked the Prussians, who were then driven back by the Saxons of Reynier’s freshly-arrived VII Corps.

Bülow, now supported by Swedish cavalry and horse artillery and assured by the Crown Prince’s promises of support from Winzingerode’s Russian Corps and Stedingk’s Swedish Corps, now threw all of his reserves into a fresh attack and drove back Reynier’s Saxons.  However, the arrival of arrival of Oudinot’s XII Corps with yet more fresh French, Polish and Bavarian divisions turned the tide of battle yet again!

The Prussians, now fully-engaged against three French army corps and a reserve cavalry corps, were now close to breaking.  However, their salvation came in the form of Marshal Ney himself, who ordered Oudinot to move his corps to support Bertrand’s struggling right flank, thereby relieving pressure on Bülow’s centre, just as it was about to collapse.

At last, Winzingerode’s Russians arrived and the great weight of Russian artillery soon completed the defeat of Bertrand on the French right.  As more Russian and Swedish troops began to pour onto the field, Ney’s army collapsed.

With the score now at 4-1 to the Allies, Ney retreated all the way back to the Elbe, having lost over 20,000 men and 50 guns.  Perhaps most importantly, the various contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine had suffered terribly during the battle and their confidence (both from the point of view of their monarchs and the ordinary soldier) in Napoleon and his cause were irretrievably broken.  The Württembergers, who had long been among the best allied troops, had been utterly shattered, with only a tiny remnant remaining under their colours.  The Saxons, already very reluctant allies, had also suffered very badly during the battle.  The Bavarians, although only lightly engaged during the battle, would soon be ordered by their King to march back to Bavaria and would take no further part in the campaign…  Well, not on Napoleon’s side, anyway…

[If you’re interested, I have a scenario for the Battle of Dennewitz here.]

Following the Battle of Dennewitz, Napoleon’s Grande Armée remained at bay, temporarily safe behind the considerable military obstacles of the River Elbe to the east and north, and the Bohemian Mountains to the south.  These natural obstacles acted as a defensive wall around Napoleon’s army which would prove difficult to penetrate, particularly as Napoleon held all of the fortified crossings on the Elbe; namely Dresden, Torgau, Meissen, Wittenberg, Magdeburg and Hamburg.  However, Napoleon’s ability to conduct reconnaissance beyond these barriers was virtually nil, so he had little idea of where the enemy might be massing for an attack.

Napoleon’s army in Saxony was also now running critically short of supplies and while he could retreat to shorten his supply lines, this would mean abandoning the Confederation of the Rhine, which was politically unacceptable.  He therefore had to make his stand in Saxony if he wanted to keep the Confederation intact.  Of course, the Allies were also seriously suffering from supply issues, but hungry men are more likely to keep fighting when they are winning.  And the Allies were most definitely winning.

The Battle of Wartenburg, 3rd October

After several weeks, the stalemate was finally broken when Blücher, spotting an opportunity and using his own initiative, launched a highly risky assault-crossing of the Elbe.  Early in the foggy morning of 3rd October, Yorck’s Prussian I Corps threw two pontoon bridges across the Elbe at the village of Elster and then, in the face of stiff resistance from French skirmishers, his infantry fought their way through the bogs and woods to reach the town of Wartenburg and the open ground beyond.  However, Bertrand’s IV Corps was waiting to receive them.

As the fog lifted, the Prussians could see that the French had turned Wartenburg into a fortress.  The Prince of Mecklenburg’s advance guard was already suffering heavy casualties from fire coming from the town and it was therefore judged that a frontal assault through the streams, bogs and ox-bow lakes surrounding it would be impossible.

The village of Bleddin, about 3km to the south and on the right flank of the French line, offered a more practicable alternative; it had also been garrisoned and fortified by Bertrand, but the approach along the bank of the Elbe was far more accessible.  The village was held by Franquemont’s Württembergers who, while excellent troops, were now sorely depleted in number and demoralised, following their rough handling at Dennewitz.

As Steinmetz brought his brigade up to screen the movement, Mecklenburg took his brigade to the left with Horn’s brigade in support.  In bitter fighting, the Prussians eventually ejected the Württembergers from the village, allowing Horn’s brigade to wheel right and engage Fontanelli’s Italians.  Horn’s assault went in with maximum aggression, with the 2nd Battalion of the Leibregiment alone breaking four battalions at bayonet-point!  As the Prussians broke through into the south side of Wartenburg, Bertrand knew that his position was untenable and conceding defeat, ordered his corps to retreat.

With their hard-won victory at Wartenburg, Blücher’s Army of Silesia now had a firm bridgehead and poured over onto the east bank of the Elbe.  The Crown Prince’s Army of the North followed suit further downstream only a day later.

With both the Army of Silesia and the Army of the North now across the Elbe and the army of Bohemia threatening to emerge once again from the mountains to the south, Napoleon now had a difficult choice to make as to which enemy army to face first.  With the enemy now firmly across the Elbe, Dresden was no longer the critical hub of manoeuvre it once was and Napoleon’s main depot was now placed further back at Leipzig.  With the Crown Prince of Sweden and Blücher now only a few days’ march from Leipzig, they were clearly the greater threat.  Added to which, Blücher would struggle to withdraw his entire army across the Elbe, so would struggle to avoid battle as he had done twice before in this campaign.  Blücher would therefore be Napoleon’s next target.

As Napoleon marched on Blücher, the wily old general avoided being forced into a battle at Düben and crossed over the River Mulde, thereby moving closer to the Crown Prince’s position.  Favouring an aggressive strike against Napoleon’s lines of communication, Blücher proposed a joint move over the River Saale, cutting Leipzig off from the west and to that end captured the Saale crossing-point of Halle.  However, the Crown Prince disagreed, opting instead to stay close to his line of retreat back over the Elbe.  By this time, Napoleon’s army was dangerously close and both Allied armies would soon be forced to fight a battle of Napoleon’s choosing.

However, with Marshal Saint-Cyr having abandoned Dresden and with the news being received that Bavaria had switched sides, the Army of Bohemia passed through the Bohemian Mountains and steadily began advancing on Napoleon’s base at Leipzig.  Marshal Ney was ordered to secure Leipzig, while Marshal Joachim Murat, the King of Naples, now outnumbered roughly 4:1, conducted a rearguard against Schwarzenberg as he withdrew toward Leipzig.

With Schwarzenberg advancing on Leipzig, Blücher having taken Halle and with the Bavarians threatening his lines of communication, Napoleon now had no choice but to concentrate his forces at Leipzig, massively shorten his interior lines and fight all three enemy armies there (hopefully one at a time).  The stage was set for what was to be the greatest battle in history.  However, as the armies marched inexorably toward that single point, there was to be one more battle before the Big One…

The Cavalry Battle of Liebertwolkwitz, 14th October 1813

Murat’s rearguard consisted of Marshal Victor’s II Corps (3 divisions), Lauriston’s V Corps (3 divisions and a cavalry brigade), Prince Poniatowski’s VIII (Polish) Corps (1 division and a weak cavalry brigade), Marshal Augerau’s IX Corps (two weak and inexperienced divisions), Kellermann’s IV (Polish) Reserve Cavalry Corps (2 divisions, minus one brigade), Pajol’s V Reserve Cavalry Corps (4 divisions) and a division of Young Guard.  All corps except Augerau’s and Pajol’s were very well served with artillery, for a combined total of 156 guns, including four heavy batteries of 12-pounders and eight horse batteries.  This force totalled around 49,000 men.

With Napoleon initially hoping to deal first with Blücher’s Army of Silesia, but now agreeing to join Murat against Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia, he ordered Murat to make a stand south of Leipzig, along the line Mark-Kleeberg – Wachau – Liebertwolkwitz, with the intention of holding off the Army of Bohemia until he could bring his reserves to bear.  Under no circumstances was he to become over-engaged in heavy combat.

The landscape over which Murat made his stand is gently rolling, with wide, flat-topped hills that made ideal artillery platforms.  The largest feature is a hill known as the ‘Galgenberg’ (Gallows Hill), which stands between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz.  On this hill, Murat placed the majority of Victor’s and Lauriston’s artillery, flanked by Lauriston’s infantry.  Hidden to the rear of the hill he placed Pajol’s cavalry in an enormous column.  Victor’s infantry held Wachau, while Poniatowski held Mark-Kleeberg, with Kellermann’s cavalry in support.  One of Lauriston’s divisions was placed at a right-angle with a large battery to cover the left flank, with their flank in turn protected by the Young Guard division at Holzhausen.  Augerau’s infantry were kept back in reserve, covering the line of withdrawal.

On the opposite side, the advance guard of the Army of Bohemia was commanded by the German-born Russian General of Cavalry Peter Wittgenstein, the ‘Saviour of St Petersburg’.  Wittgenstein had replaced Kutuzov as commander of the Russian army during the previous April and had therefore been the commanding general of the allied Russian and Prussian Armies during the Spring Campaign.  However, following his defeats at Lützen and Bautzen he had stepped down to a more junior role.  Wittgenstein was now tasked with pushing back Murat’s rearguards, reconnoitering Napoleon’s likely chosen battlefield around Leipzig and countering enemy reconnaissance.

At the point of Wittgenstein’s advance were Pahlen’s Russian Cavalry Corps (actually a strong division of four brigades), Prince Gorchakov’s Russian I Corps (2 divisions), Duke Eugène of Württemberg’s Russian II Corps (2 divisions), Röder’s Prussian Reserve Cavalry Brigade (a divisional-sized formation of Kleist’s Prussian II Corps) and Duka’s Russian 3rd Cuirassier Division.  These forces were placed under the command of Prince Gorchakov.  Marching on a parallel route to the east was Klenau’s Austrian IV Corps (actually referred to in 1813 as an ‘Armee-Abteilung’), consisting of 3 divisions with organic light cavalry and an attached heavy cavalry brigade).

In reserve and under Wittgenstein’s direct control were the balance of Kleist’s Prussian II Corps and Raevsky’s Russian III (Grenadier) Corps.  Wittgenstein’s entire advance guard totalled around 70,000 men and roughly 300 guns; a considerable number for a mere reconnaissance force!

Convinced that the French were in full retreat, Wittgenstein pushed his forces hard, urging them that the enemy was retiring.  However, Klenau’s Austrians were exhausted from their previous exertions and were late departing their bivouacs.  Nevertheless, Pahlen’s cossacks, uhlans and hussars pressed forward, eventually making contact with enemy cavalry vedettes near Wachau.

It rapidly became apparent to Pahlen from the large mass of guns on the Galgenberg and the enemy troops seen massed between Mark-Kleeberg and Wachau, that the enemy was going to make a stand.  However, with Wittgenstein’s forces now strung out on the march with orders to push forward, there was now no chance of properly preparing an attack; they would now just have to do the best with what they had as it arrived on the battlefield.  As the Russian and Prussian cavalry continued to push forward, Helfreich’s Russian 14th Division (from Gorchakov’s I Corps) took control of the vital river-crossing at Cröbern, which had earlier been seized by two Prussian battalions.  In the meantime, Duke Eugène of Württemberg’s Russian II Corps deployed to the south of Gülden-Gossa.

As the Russian Soumy Hussars approached Wachau they were forced to fall back by a sudden cannonade from the Galgenberg.  Murat then launched his attack, sending l’Héritier’s 5th Heavy Cavalry Division and Subervie’s 9th Light Cavalry Division down the hill in a great column.

While this may seem to be a curious tactical formation, the poor level of training of the French cavalry likely led Murat to feel that committing them as a column, one regiment behind another, would be easier to control than deploying them on a broader frontage.  In any case, the first French cavalry regiment was thrown back by the Soumy Hussars, though the Russians were then themselves thrown back by the second French regiment.  A charge by the Prussian Neumärk Dragoons then threw back the next challenger, before they themselves were forced back.

 

By now the Soumy Hussars had rallied and more Prussian cavalry had arrived.  While the head of the French column was disordered by their last combat, they were hit frontally by the East Prussian Cuirassiers and in the flank by the Silesian Uhlans.  This counter-attack threw the French cavalry all the way back to the gun-line on the Galgenberg, but the Prussians were then countered by Murat’s reserves; Berckheim’s 1st Light Cavalry Division and Milhaud’s 6th Heavy Cavalry Division.

With some clashes also occurring between the Grodno Hussars, Illowaisky’s Cossacks and Kellermann’s Polish cavalry, the cavalry battle now settled down to sporadic skirmishing as both sides caught their breath.  It was now around mid-day and Klenau’s Austrian IV Corps, spearheaded by Mohr’s 1st Division, was now starting deploy at Gross-Possna, to the east of Liebertwolkwitz.  Klenau’s task was to capture Liebertwolkwitz, thus making French possession of the Galgenberg untenable.  A mixed detachment of light troops, cavalry, infantry and cavalry-guns under Generalmajor Baumgarten had also been sent on a flanking march via the Kromberg hill, toward Holzhausen, thereby hoping to outflank the French position.

While Baumgarten’s flank-march failed to make any headway toward Holzhausen, due to the presence of Maison’s 16th Division, a large battery and the unidentified Young Guard division, Mohr’s infantry, spearheaded by the ‘Archduke Charles’ Regiment, managed to break into the town.  After two hours of bitter fighting and reinforcement by the ‘Lindenau’ Regiment, the Austrians managed to secure Liebertwolkwitz, but Lauriston’s infantry prevented any further advance beyond the town.

Murat now launched another massive charge down the hill, but was again countered by the Allied cavalry, who had now been reinforced by the rest of Röder’s Prussian Reserve Cavalry Brigade (minus Mutius’ Silesian Landwehr Cavalry, who had been detached to support the Grodno Hussars and Cossacks on the left flank) and two more Russian regiments; the Olviopol Hussars and Tchuguiev Uhlans.  Once again, flank-attacks by the Prussian cavalry broke the attack, with Murat almost being taken prisoner.  Again, the Allied cavalry swarmed up the hill in pursuit and this time managed to sabre a few French gunners, before once again being driven back by Murat’s reserves.  The Silesian Cuirassiers in particular, found themselves completely surrounded and had to hack their way out, suffering heavy casualties in the process.

With the time now at around 1430hrs, Murat, having now completely forgotten his orders about ‘not getting fully engaged’, now threw his last fresh reserves into a third and final attack.  With the Allied cavalry now having been reinforced by Duka’s freshly-arrived Russian 3rd Cuirassier Division and Desfours’ Austrian brigade (the ‘Kaiser’ Cuirassiers and ‘O’Reilly’ Chevaulégers), this last attack fared no better than the last two.  The French cavalry were now utterly routed and Murat was almost captured for a second time.  The Allied cavalry pursued the broken French horse right over the Galgenberg, where the French gunners had now wisely withdrawn their guns to safety, though the large numbers of French infantry in the area would not allow them to take permanent possession of the Galgenberg.

As the exhausted Allied cavalry withdrew to their own lines, low-level infantry fighting and artillery fire continued around Liebertwolkwitz.  However, Wittgenstein didn’t consider the situation there to be critical enough to commit any of his reserves from Kleist’s Prussian II Corps and Raevsky’s Russian III (Grenadier) Corps.  Then at around 1600hrs, Lauriston’s French V Corps, spearheaded by Maison’s 16th Division, launched a counter-attack which threw the Austrians completely out of the town, with many being trapped and slaughtered in the church.

With Liebertwolkwitz recaptured, the French now reoccupied the Galgenberg and both sides were now back where they had started the day, albeit battered, bloodied and exhausted.  This was a battle in which both sides had been drawn into a full-scale battle that neither wanted and it ended rather indecisively as that rarest of things; an actual draw.  It could be argued that Murat had stopped the Allied advance, had held his ground and had frustrated the Allied objective of conducting reconnaissance ‘beyond the hill’, so had achieved a ‘tactical victory’.  However, Murat had disobeyed his orders to avoid a full-scale engagement and his cavalry formations in particular, could scarce afford the butcher’s bill.  The stage was now set for the resumption of full-scale hostilities on 16th October and the start of the Battle of Leipzig (this sector of the larger battle would be known as the Battle of Wachau, which will soon be posted here as another scenario).

Scenario Outline

The scenario will last for 20 turns, starting with the Allied 1000hrs turn and ending with the French 1930hrs turn.  See below for the detailed schedule of reinforcements.

The Allies will win a tactical victory if they can capture the town of Liebertwolkwitz and clear all undisordered enemy units from the Galgenberg by nightfall, thus enabling them to complete their reconnaissance-in-force and observe the landscape beyond.  The French can win a tactical victory merely by frustrating the Allied objective.

As usual, either side can win an outright victory by pushing the enemy army permanently beyond their morale limit.  Note however, that the Allied morale limit will increase as reinforcements arrive (see the scenario schedule below), so they must be pushed beyond their maximum limit of 29M.

Orders of Battle

For the uninitiated, Napoleon’s Battles is a ‘grand tactical’ set, where each unit represents a brigade or large regiment and the man-to-figure ratio is roughly 1:100 (to be exact, it’s 1:120 for infantry and 1:80 for cavalry).  It would however, be relatively easy to convert to similarly-scaled systems such as Age of Eagles or Général d’Armée.

The ‘hieroglyphs’ on the orders of battle show the strength of a unit in figures, their nationality, the troop type and the point at which the unit will ‘disperse’ (i.e. become combat-ineffective).  For example, the code ’16 PrLN [6D]’ means a 16-figure unit of Prussian Line Infantry, which will likely disperse when it reaches a strength of 6 figures.  The stats for Prussian Line Infantry can then be found on the Unit Information Card at the bottom of this article.  I’m sure you can work out the rest.

Generals have a rating (e.g. General Roguet with ‘4″G(7)+1 [2F]’) which shows their command-span expressed in inches, a quality-rating (Poor, Average, Good or Excellent), an initiative rating between 4 and 8 (10 for C-in-Cs), a combat modifier (ranging from -1 to +3) which is added if they are attached to the unit in combat (a ‘D’ indicates that the modifier is only applied in defence) and the formation’s fatigue rating.  The C-in-C also usually has a number with ‘M’; this is the army’s morale rating.

The Southern Wing of the French Grande Armée

Maréchal Murat, King of Naples                                               20”E(10)+2 [22M]
(6 Free Rolls)

Elements, II Young Guard Corps

4th Young Guard Division – Général de Division Roguet                         4”G(7)+1 [2F]
Flamand’s Brigade (Flanqueur-Grenadiers & Chasseurs & 7th Tirailleurs) 24 FrYGD [12D]
Marquet’s Brigade (8th, 9th & 10th Tirailleurs)                                                 24 FrYGD [12D]

II Corps – Maréchal Victor                                                             8”G(5)+1 [3F]

4th Division – Général de Division Dubreton                                                  4”E(7)+1
Ferrière’s Brigade (24e Légère & 19e de Ligne)                                                   20 FrLT [12D]
Brun’s Brigade (37e & 56e de Ligne)                                                                      24 FrLN [14D]

5th Division – Général de Division Dufour                                                       3”P(5)+0
D’Etsko’s Brigade (26e Légère & 93e de Ligne)                                                   16 FrLT [10D]
2nd Brigade (46e & 72e de Ligne)                                                                           16 FrLN [10D]

6th Division – Général de Division Vial                                                              3”A(6)+0
Valory’s Brigade (11e Légère & 4e de Ligne)                                                          20 FrLT [12D]
Bronikowski’s Brigade (2e & 18e de Ligne)                                                            28 FrLN [17D]

II Corps Artillery Reserve
10/6th Foot Artillery Company                                                                                 Fr12#
2/9th Foot Artillery Company                                                                                   Fr12#
1/2nd Horse Artillery Company                                                                                Fr6#

V Corps – Général de Division Lauriston                                        9”G(5)+1 [4F]

10th Division – Général de Division Albert                                                        4”G(7)+1
Bachelet’s Brigade (4e Demi-Brigade Provisoire & 139e de Ligne)                   12 FrLN [7D]
Bertrand’s Brigade (140e & 141e de Ligne)                                                             16 FrLN [10D]

16th Division – Général de Division Maison                                                      4”G(7)+1D
Montenelle’s Brigade (152e & 153e de Ligne)                                                        20 FrLN [12D]
Montesquieu’s Brigade (154e de Ligne)                                                                  20 FrLN [12D]

19th Division – Général de Division Rochambeau                                            4”A(6)+1
Lafitte’s Brigade (135e & 149e de Ligne)                                                                 16 FrLN [10D]
Harlet’s Brigade (150e & 155e de Ligne)                                                                  16 FrLN [10D]

6th Light Cavalry Brigade – Général de Brigade Dermoncourt                  3”A(6)+0
Dermoncourt’s Brigade (2e, 3e & 6e Chasseurs à Cheval)                                  12 FrLC [7D]

V Corps Artillery Reserve
16/1st Foot Artillery Company                                                                                  Fr12#
17/1st Foot Artillery Company                                                                                  Fr12#
2/5th Horse Artillery Company                                                                                Fr6#
7/6th Horse Artillery Company                                                                                Fr6#

VIII (Polish) Corps – Général de Division Prince Poniatowski 10”G(6)+1D [2F]

26th (Polish) Division – Général de Division Kaminiecki                            3”G(5)+1
Sierawski’s Brigade (1st, 16th & Vistula Legion Infantry)                                   16 PdLN [8D]
Malachowski’s Brigade (8th & 15th Infantry)                                                        16 PdLN [8D]
Grabowski’s Brigade (from 27th (Polish) Division) (12th & 14th Infantry)    16 PdLN [8D]

27th (Polish) Light Cavalry Brigade – Général de Brigade Umiński       4”G(6)+1
Uminski’s Brigade (Krakusi & 14th Light Cavalry (ex-14th Cuirassiers))       8 PdLC [4D]

VIII Corps Artillery Reserve
6th Polish Foot Battery                                                                                               Pd12#

Elements, IX Corps

52nd Division – Général de Division Sémélé                                                    3”A(5)+0 [1F]
Bagneris’ Brigade (37e Demi-Brigade Provisoire & 2/39e de Ligne)               16 FrPLN [10D]
Godard’s Brigade (6/121e, 6/122e & 2/86e de Ligne)                                         16 FrPLN [10D]

IV Reserve Cavalry Corps – Général de Division Kellermann  8”E(7)+2 [2F]

7th (Polish) Light Cavalry Division – Général de Division Sokolnicki 4”G(7)+1
Tolinski’s Brigade (1st Chasseurs à Cheval & 3rd Uhlans)                                12 PdLC [6D]
Krukostowiecki’s Brigade (absent – detached to Dabrowski’s 27th Division)
2nd Polish Horse Battery                                                                                         Pd6#

8th (Polish) Light Cavalry Division – Général de Division Sułkowski 3”G(5)+0
Kamizierz’s Brigade (6th & 8th Uhlans)                                                               12 PdLC [6D]
Weissenhof’s Brigade (1st Uhlans & 13th Hussars)                                            12 PdLC [6D]
1st Polish Horse Battery                                                                                            Pd6#

IV Reserve Cavalry Corps Artillery Reserve
4/2nd Horse Artillery Company                                                                             Fr6#
2/6th Horse Artillery Company                                                                              Fr6#

V Reserve Cavalry Corps – Général de Division Pajol            7”G(6)+1 [4F]

1st Light Cavalry Division – Général de Division Berckheim (attached)    4”A(5)+0
Montmarie’s Brigade (12e Chasseurs and 1er & 3e Chevaulégers-Lanciers)     8 FrLC [5D]
Picquet’s Brigade (5e & 8e Chevaulégers-Lanciers and 1st Italian Chasseurs) 8 ItLC [4D]

9th Light Cavalry Division – Général de Brigade Subervie                      3”G(5)+1
Klicki’s Brigade (3e Hussards and 27e Chasseurs à Cheval)                           12 FrLC [7D]
Vial’s Brugade (14e & 26e Chasseurs à Cheval)                                                  12 FrLC [7D]

5th Heavy Cavalry Division – Général de Division l’Héritier                  4”G(6)+1
Quinnet’s Brigade (2e, 6e & 11e Dragons)                                                           12 FrVLC [6D]
Collard’s Brigade (13e & 15e Dragons)                                                                 16 FrVLC [8D]

6th Heavy Cavalry Division – Général de Division Milhaud                   4”G(7)+1
Lamotte’s Brigade (18e, 19e & 20e Dragons)                                                     12 FrVLC [6D]
Montelegier’s Brigade (22e & 25e Dragons)                                                       12 FrVLC [6D]

V Reserve Cavalry Corps Artillery Reserve
5/3rd Horse Artillery Company                                                                            Fr6#

French Order of Battle Notes

1.  Murat’s orders were to defend and resist enemy attempts at reconnaissance and under no circumstances was he to mount a large-scale attack.  Murat is therefore required to maintain garrisons in the villages of Mark-Kleeberg, Wachau, Liebertwolkwitz, Holzhausen and Zuckelhausen (detailed below).  This will therefore tie down a considerable portion of Murat’s infantry and should discourage offensive action.

2.  Poniatowski may act as a wing commander, commanding Kellermann’s IV Reserve Cavalry Corps, in addition to his own VIII Corps.

3.  Poniatowski’s VIII Corps is responsible for holding the river crossing at Mark-Kleeberg and must therefore maintain a garrison of at least one complete infantry brigade in the village at all times.

4.  The town of Wachau must be garrisoned at all times by at least one complete infantry brigade from Victor’s II Corps.

5.  The town of Liebertwolkwitz must be garrisoned at all times by at least one complete infantry brigade from Lauriston’s V Corps.

6.  It is not actually known which Young Guard division was involved in the battle, though looking at the Young Guard’s known dispositions on 16th October, it would almost certainly have been a division from Marshal Mortier’s II Young Guard Corps.  I’ve therefore arbitrarily included Roguet’s 4th Young Guard Division.  The Young Guard must garrison Holzhausen with at least one complete brigade at all times.

7.  Rochambeau’s 19th Division and Dermoncourt’s 6th Light Cavalry Brigade (of Lauriston’s V Corps) are not mentioned in the accounts.  However, I’m fairly sure that it must have been Rochambeau’s division who had fortified and who were defending Liebertwolkwitz itself, as the other two infantry divisions are shown deployed on each flank of the town.  They were certainly the town’s garrison during the battle of 16th October.  Dermoncourt doesn’t seem to have been involved in the cavalry battle, so I have arbitrarily placed him on the left flank of V Corps, supporting the battery placed there.

8.  The village of Zuckelhausen must be garrisoned at all times by one complete brigade from Sémélé’s 52nd Division of Marshal Augerau’s IX Corps.  The rest of IX Corps was positioned slightly further back, garrisoning villages (Probstheida and Stotteritz) that covered the line of retreat back to Leipzig.  IX Corps was comprised entirely of inexperienced provisional demi-brigades (i.e. battalions of replacements that had not yet reached their parent units) and played no part in the day’s action, but was in close proximity, hence the inclusion of 52nd Division here.  If desired, this formation can be removed from the scenario.  NB The nearby presence of Augerau’s IX Corps covering the line of retreat increases the French army morale level as if they were on table.

9.  Picquet’s Brigade of Berckheim’s 1st Light Cavalry Division had four squadrons of Italian Chasseurs à Cheval and four squadrons of French Chevauléger-Lanciers.  I’ve classed them as Italian, which in Napoleon’s Battles terms, gives them a slightly improved dispersal level (C instead of D), though a slightly worse response number (5 instead of 6).  Feel free to class them as French if you prefer.

10.  The Duchy of Warsaw 14th Cuirassiers had been reformed in 1813 as the 14th Light Cavalry.  They retained their old uniforms and distinctive helmets, but lost their shock cavalry role, their cuirasses and heavy horses.  They were brigaded with the Krakus Regiment under Uminski’s command and the brigade is therefore classed here as light cavalry (LC).

10.  Victor’s II Corps Artillery Reserve was historically deployed on the Galgenberg, in front of Lauriston’s V Corps and Pajol’s V Reserve Cavalry Corps.  The French player may alternatively choose to redeploy all or part of Victor’s Artillery Reserve to the II Corps deployment area.

11.  In Napoleon’s Battles, dragoons would normally be classed as light cavalry (with a few exceptions, such as British dragoons).  However I’ve given the French dragoons here a little boost, classing them as Veteran Light Cavalry (VLC), so they use their 1812 stats and have a little more combat and staying power.  All the regiments listed here had transferred from Spain, so had escaped the Russian disaster.  Although the Peninsular War was no picnic for the French cavalry, they therefore retained a reasonably large core of veterans.  Feel free to class them as normal French Light Cavalry (LC) if you disagree.

12.  One of Nafziger’s orders of battle mentions that Kellermann functioned as a cavalry wing-commander role, commanding both the IV and V Reserve Cavalry Corps, leaving Sokolnicki as the commander of IV Reserve Cavalry Corps.  However, Nafziger then contradicts himself elsewhere, stating that this organisational change didn’t happen until after Liebertwolkwitz.  As Kellermann doesn’t seem to have been at all involved in directing V Reserve Cavalry Corps on 14th October, I would suggest that the second statement is far more likely and that Kellermann should only therefore, command his own corps during this scenario.

The Vanguard of the Allied Army of Bohemia

General of Cavalry Wittgenstein                                                        17”G(10)+1D
(5 Free Rolls)

Vanguard Corps – Generallieutenant Count Pahlen III                                 5”G(7)+1 [2F]
Rüdiger’s Hussar Brigade (Grodno & Soumy)                                                     12 RsLC [6D]
Schwanow’s Hussar Brigade (Olviopol)                                                                12 RsLC [6D]
Lissanevich’s Brigade (Tschugujew Uhlans & Lubny Hussars)                        12 RsLC [6D]
Illowaiski XII’s Cossack Brigade                                                                             16 RsCLC [11D]
Russian Horse Battery #7                                                                                         2x Rs6#
East Prussian Kürassiers (from Röder)                                                               12 PrHC [4D]
Prussian Lt Cav (Neumärk Dragoons & Silesian Uhlans) (from Röder)     12 PrLC [6D]
Prussian 6pdr Horse Battery #10 (from Röder)                                                Pr6#

Russian I Corps – Generallieutenant Prince Gorchakov          7”E(6)+1 [4F]

Russian 5th Division – Generalmajor Mezentov                                           3”P(4)+0
Lukov’s Brigade (Sievesk & Kalouga)                                                                    12 RsLN [6D]
Wlastow’s Brigade (Perm, Mohilev & Grand Duchess Catherine Pavlovna) 12 RsLN [6D]
Roth’s Brigade (23rd & 24th Jäger)                                                                       12 RsJG [6D]

Russian 14th Division – Generalmajor Helfreich                                         3”G(6)+0
Ljallin’s Brigade (Tenguinsk & Estonia)                                                               12 RsLN [6D]
Wuetsow’s Brigade (25th & 26th Jäger)                                                               12 RsJG [6D]

I Corps Artillery Reserve
Position Battery #3                                                                                                    2x Rs12#

Russian 3rd Cuirassier Division (attached) – Generallieutenant Duka 4”G(7)+1
Gudowich’s Cuirassier Brigade (Military Order & Little Russia)                    12 RsHC [6D]
Levaschoff’s Cuirassier Brigade (Novgorod & Starodoub)                                12 RsHC [6D]

Russian II Corps – Duke Eugène of Württemberg                       8”G(7)+1 [3F]

Russian 3rd Division – Generalmajor Schachovskoi                                   3”A(5)+0
Schalfinski’s Brigade (Mourman & Revel)                                                           12 RsLN [6D]
2nd Brigade (Tchernigov & Selguinsk)                                                                 12 RsLN [6D]
3rd Brigade (20th & 21st Jäger)                                                                             12 RsJG [6D]

Russian 4th Division – Generalmajor Puschnitski                                       3”A(4)+0
Reibnitz’s Brigade (Krementchug & Minsk)                                                        12 RsLN [6D]
Feodoroff’s Brigade (Tobolsk & Volhynie)                                                           12 RsLN [6D]
Walkow’s Brigade (4th & 34th Jäger)                                                                   12 RsJG [6D]

II Corps Artillery Reserve
Position Battery #5                                                                                                   2x Rs12#
Position Battery #13                                                                                                 2x Rs12#
Horse Battery #?A                                                                                                     2x Rs6#
Horse Battery #?B                                                                                                     2x Rs6#

Austrian IV. Armee-Abteilung – General der Kavallerie Klenau 7”G(6)+1 [7F]

Baumgarten’s Detachment – Generalmajor Baumgarten                       3”P(4)+0
12th ‘Palatinal’ Hussars                                                                                          8 AsLC [4D]
Elements, 13th Wallach-Illyrian Grenz Infantry Regiment                            12 AsGRZ [7D]
49th ‘Kerpen’ Infantry Regiment (from Best’s Brigade, 3rd Div)               16 AsLN [10D]
6pdr Cavalry Battery                                                                                               As6#

Austrian 1st Division – Feldmarshalleutnant Mohr                                   4”A(6)+0
Elements, 13th Wallach-Illyrian Grenz Infantry Regiment                             12 AsGRZ [7D]
2nd ‘Hohenzollern’ Chevaulégers                                                                          8 AsLC [4D]
3rd ‘Erzherzog Ferdinand’ Hussars                                                                       8 AsLC [4D]
3rd ‘Erzherzog Karl’ Infantry Regiment (from Best’s Brigade, 3rd Div)    16 AsLN [10D]
29th ‘Lindenau’ Infantry Regiment (from Splenyi’s Brigade, 2nd Div)      24 AsLN [14D]
6pdr Cavalry Battery                                                                                                As6#

Austrian 2nd Division – Feldmarshalleutnant Fürst Hohenlohe-Bartenstein 3”G(6)+0
57th ‘J. Colloredo’ Infantry Regiment (Schaeffer’s Brigade)                           16 AsLN [10D]
15th ‘Zach’ Infantry Regiment (Schaeffer’s Brigade)                                         24 AsLN [14D]
29th ‘Lindenau’ Infantry Regiment (Splenyi’s Brigade) (with Mohr)            24 AsLN [14D]
40th ‘Württemberg’ Infantry Regiment (Splenyi’s Brigade)                            24 AsLN [14D]

Austrian 3rd Division – Feldmarshalleutnant Mayer                                 3”A(5)+0
12th ‘Alois Liechtenstein’ Infantry Regiment (Abele’s Brigade)                      24 AsLN [14D]
22nd ‘Koburg’ Infantry Regiment (Abele’s Brigade)                                          24 AsLN [14D]
3rd ‘Erzherzog Karl’ Infantry Regiment (Best’s Brigade) (with Mohr)           16 AsLN [10D]
49th ‘Kerpen’ Infantry Regiment (Best’s Brigade) (with Baumgarten)          16 AsLN [10D]
Desfour’s Brigade (attached) (‘Kaiser’ KR & ‘O’Reilly’ CR)                               12 AsHC [4D]

IV. Armee-Abteilung Artillery Reserve
12pdr Position Battery                                                                                               As12#
12pdr Position Battery                                                                                               As12#

Prussian II. Armeekorps – Generallieutenant von Kleist      9”G(7)+1 [7F]

Prussian 9th Brigade – Generalmajor von Klüx                                            3”A(5)+0
6th (1st West Prussian) Infantry Regiment                                                          16 PrLN [8D]
6th Reserve Infantry Regiment                                                                               16 PrLN [8D]
7th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiment                                                            16 PrSLW [10D]

Prussian 10th Brigade – Generalmajor von Pirch I                                      4”G(7)+1
7th (2nd West Prussian) & 7th Reserve Infantry Regiments                            20 PrLN [10D]
9th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiment                                                            16 PrSLW [10D]

Prussian 11th Brigade – Generalmajor von Ziethen                                     4”G(8)+1
10th (1st Silesian) & 10th Reserve Infantry Regiments                                     20 PrLN [10D]
8th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiment                                                           16 PrSLW [10D]

Prussian 12th Brigade – Generalmajor Prinz August von Preussen         3”G(5)+1
11th (2nd Silesian) Infantry Regiment                                                                   16 PrLN [8D]
11th Reserve Infantry Regiment                                                                              16 PrLN [8D]
10th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiment                                                          16 PrSLW [10D]

Prussian Reserve Cavalry Brigade – Generalmajor von Röder              4”G(6)+2
Wrangel’s Brigade (1st (Silesian) & 3rd (Brandenburg) Kürassiers)              16 PrHC [5D]
2nd (East Prussian) Kürassiers (with Pahlen)                                                    12 PrHC [4D]
6th (Neumärk) Dragoons & 2nd (Silesian) Uhlans (with Pahlen)                  12 PrLC [6D]
Mutius’ Brigade (1st, 7th & 8th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry)                           12 PrLWC [7D]
6pdr Horse Battery #7                                                                                              Pr6#
6pdr Horse Battery #8                                                                                              Pr6#
6pdr Horse Battery #10 (with Pahlen)                                                                  Pr6#

Prussian II. Korps Reserve Artillery Brigade
12pdr Foot Battery #3                                                                                               Pr12#
12pdr Foot Battery #6                                                                                               Pr12#
7pdr Howitzer Battery #1                                                                                         PrHFA
6pdr Horse Battery #9                                                                                              Pr6#

Optional Forces:

Russian III (Grenadier) Corps – Generallieutenant Raevsky  9”E(7)+2 [4F]

Russian 1st Grenadier Division – Generalmajor Pissarev                        3”G(6)+1
Kniaschnin’s Grenadier Brigade (Ekaterinoslav & Arakcheyev)                      12 RsGN [5D]
Ocht’s Grenadier Brigade (St Petersburg & Tauride)                                         12 RsGN [5D]
Yemelianov’s Brigade (Pernau & Kexholm)                                                         12 RsGN [5D]

Russian 2nd Grenadier Division – Generalmajor Tchoglokov               3”A(4)+0
Levin’s Grenadier Brigade (Kiev & Moscow)                                                       12 RsGN [5D]
Damas’ Grenadier Brigade (Astrakhan & Fangoria)                                           12 RsGN [5D]
3rd Brigade (Siberia & Little Russia)                                                                     12 RsGN [5D]

III Corps Artillery Reserve
Position Battery #30                                                                                                  2x Rs12#
Position Battery #33                                                                                                   2x Rs12#

Allied Order of Battle Notes

1.  The units shown in italics are units attached from other divisions, which for clarity are then listed again in their parent division.  Don’t count them twice!

2.  Gorchakov, commander of the Russian I Corps, may also act as a wing commander, controlling Pahlen’s Vanguard Corps, Württemberg’s Russian II Corps, Röder’s Prussian Reserve Cavalry Brigade and Duka’s Russian 3rd Cuirassier Division, in addition to his own corps.

3.  Pahlen’s Vanguard ‘Corps’ is really a very large division, with brigades reporting directly to his headquarters.  For that reason, his corps functions as a division, but he gets an improved command-span compared to a usual divisional commander.

4.  Elements of Röder’s Prussian Reserve Cavalry Brigade start the scenario under the command of the Russian General Pahlen III’s Vanguard Corps and are marked as such above.  They may be commanded by Pahlen as if they were part of his formation, but they belong to Röder and count against the Prussian II. Korps fatigue strength.

5.  The Austrian order of battle on the day is very confused, with units and brigades being split up and attached to the advance guard elements under Mohr and Baumgarten.  Baumgarten was normally part of Mohr’s command, but was detached on a separate flanking mission and completely failed to make any headway against the French left flank around Holzhausen.

6.  The 29th ‘Lindenau’ Infantry Regiment of Hohenlohe-Bartenstein’s Austrian 2nd Division is attached to Mohr’s Austrian 1st Division.  This unit may be commanded by either general.

7.  The 3rd ‘Erzherzog Karl’ Infantry Regiment of Mayer’s Austrian 3rd Division is attached to Mohr’s Austrian 1st Division.  This unit may be commanded by either general.

8.  The 49th ‘Kerpen’ Infantry Regiment of Mayer’s Austrian 3rd Division is attached to Generalmajor Baumgarten’s Detachment.  This unit may be commanded by either general.

9.  Desfour’s Austrian cavalry brigade consisted of the ‘Kaiser’ Kürassiers and the ‘O’Reilly’ Chevaulégers. Although only half cuirassiers, I’m happy to class the brigade as Heavy Cavalry (HC), as the ‘O’Reilly’ Chevaulégers were an excellent regiment and the entire brigade was rested and retained as a reserve.

10.  The Prussian II. Korps, with the exception of Röder’s Reserve Cavalry Brigade, was largely unengaged. It is described as being in position near Cröbern at 1730hrs, having marched via Gulden-Gössa.  It could potentially be left out of the scenario, though it will act discouragement to an over-aggressive French player.

11.  The Russian III (Grenadier) Corps was completely unengaged during the battle and probably didn’t even arrive in the area defined by the map.  I’ve put some arbitrary arrival times in the scenario reinforcement schedule, but this is not based on any historical evidence.  In any case, they’ll probably arrive too late to do anything meaningful.  This formation may therefore be left out of the scenario, perhaps unless the French have managed to mount a successful counter-attack that threatens Gulden-Gössa.

12.  Army Morale is initially [17M].  This increases as reinforcements arrive (see scenario reinforcement schedule) until it reaches its maximum level of [29M].

13.  The two horse batteries with Württemberg’s Russian II Corps Artillery Reserve are not identified.  I’ve therefore designated them as A and B.

Deployment

Units may either be deployed in their historical locations as per the map in the battle account above, or they may be deployed freely by either player, within the ‘formation boxes’ shown on the map below.  I suggest that each player take it in turns to deploy a division.

Units may start the game deployed in any tactical formation.

The French player may start the game with Cavalry React markers on any or all of his cavalry units.

 

Game Schedule

The Allies have the initiative and move first.

Allied commanders and units on table at the start (higher commanders are in italics):

Wittgenstein, Pahlen III (reinforced by Prussian units listed), Württemberg, Helfreich, Röder, Klenau, Mohr (reinforced by units listed) & Baumgarten (minus the infantry elements).

Turn  Time     Arriving Allied Reinforcements                                      Allied Morale

1           1000hrs  Gorchakov & Mezentov’s Russian 5th Division at Point F                [17M]
Baumgarten’s infantry detachments at Point I

2           1030hrs

3           1100hrs   Russian I Corps Artillery Reserve at Point F                                        [18M]
Mayer with Desfour’s Austrian Kürassier Brigade at Point G

4           1130hrs   Austrian Artillery Reserve at Point G

5           1200hrs   Duka’s Russian 3rd Cuirassier Division at Point A or B                     [19M]

6           1230hrs   Remainder of Mayer’s Austrian 3rd Division at Point G or H           [20M]

7           1300hrs

8           1330hrs   Kleist & Klüx’s Prussian 9th Brigade at Point C, D or E                      [21M]

9           1400hrs   Hohenlohe-Bartenstein’s Austrian 2nd Division at Point G or H     [24M]

10         1430hrs   Prinz August’s Prussian 12th Brigade at Point C, D or E                     [26M]

11         1500hrs   Prussian Artillery Reserve at Point C, D or E

12         1530hrs   Pirch I’s Prussian 10th Brigade at Point C, D or E                                [28M]

13         1600hrs   Ziethen’s Prussian 11th Brigade at Point C, D or E                               [29M]

14         1630hrs   Raevsky & Pissarev’s Russian 1st Grenadier Division at Point C, D, E or F
Russian III (Grenadier Corps) Artillery Reserve at Point C, D, E or F

15         1700hrs   Tchoglokov’s Russian 2nd Grenadier Division at Point C, D, E or F

16         1730hrs

17         1800hrs

18         1830hrs

19          1900hrs

20         1930hrs   End Game

All reinforcements arrive in March Column formation at one of the lettered arrival points shown on the map below.

Where there is a variable arrival point, the entire reinforcing division must arrive on the road at the same point and may not be split between several arrival points.

 

Terrain Notes

The scenario is played on an 8′ x 6′ table.  The map is divided into 12″ squares.

Woods – These simply count as rough terrain to all troop-types and do not cause disorder. There is a -1 cover modifier* and the usual combat modifiers for woods apply.

Hills – These give the defender a +1 combat modifier.

Streams – These are passable to all troop-types, counting as 1” of rough terrain. Any unit defending a stream-bank gains a +1 combat modifier.

River – This is impassable to all troop types. The only crossing-point is the bridge at Cröbern, which may only be passed by units in Column, Limbered or March Column formation.

Liebertwolkwitz – This town consists of three built-up sectors, all of which have been fortified.  The defender gains a -2 cover modifier and a +3 combat modifier.

Auenhain Farm – This consists of a single built-up sector, comprising a solidly-built walled farm complex that is most suitable for defence.  The defender gains a -2 cover modifier and a +3 combat modifier.

All Other Settlements – These give the defender a -2 cover modifier and a +2 combat modifier.

* Note that Napoleon’s Battles for some reason only includes a universal -2 cover modifier for all cover types from woods to redoubts, which has always seemed somewhat bizarre to me.  I therefore apply the ‘Old Standard’ of -1 for light cover and -2 for hard cover.

French Unit Labels

Allied Unit Labels

Right, that’s enough for now!  It’s occurred to me that we’re already well into February and I haven’t yet had a wargame this year, so I need to go and put that right…

Back in the primordial soup of this blog, one of my first Wellingtonic game reports was of a refight of the Battle of Salamanca, played at W.A.S.P. in 2016.

Although that article appears in my list of Napoleonic Scenarios, it really was only the most cursory outline scenario and didn’t even include a map, let alone all the labels and other gubbins that are useful for playing the game, so my remaining reader really does deserve better than that rather poor effort.  I’ve also done more reading since then, so here then, is a rather more refined version of the Salamanca scenario.

As usual, this scenario is designed for Napoleon’s Battles rules, which is a ‘grand tactical’ set, where each unit represents a brigade or large regiment and the man-to-figure ratio is roughly 1:100 (to be exact, it’s 1:120 for infantry and 1:80 for cavalry).  It would however, be relatively easy to convert to similarly-scaled systems such as Age of Eagles or Général d’Armée.

Someone recently asked about meaning of the ‘hieroglyphs’ on the Napoleon’s Battles orders of battle.  My apologies for not explaining these more often, though I have explained them in some past articles.  For example, the code ’16 BrLN [5D]’ means a 16-figure unit of British Line Infantry, which will likely disperse when it reaches a strength of 5 figures.  The stats for British Line Infantry can then be found on the Unit Information Card at the bottom of this article.  I’m sure you can work out the rest.

Generals have a rating (e.g. General Cotton with ‘5″E(7)+2 [1F]’) which shows their command-span expressed in inches, a quality-rating (Poor, Average, Good or Excellent), an initiative rating between 4 and 8 (10 for C-in-Cs), a combat modifier (ranging from -1 to +3) which is added if they are attached to the unit in combat (a ‘D’ indicates that the modifier is only applied in defence) and the formation’s fatigue rating.  The C-in-C has a number with ‘M’; this is the army’s morale rating.

Historical Background

Spring 1812: Wellington Keeps The French Guessing

With the capture of the Spanish border-fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz during the first four months of 1812, Wellington finally had a solid base in Portugal from which to carry the war back into Spain.

Facing him across the border were two French armies; Marshal Soult’s Army of the South was screening the border opposite Badajoz, while Marshal Marmont’s Army of Portugal was already starting to make a nuisance of itself once again around Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida (there were three more French field armies, as well as smaller formations spread around Spain).  While Wellington could just about manage to confront one of the two French armies facing him, there was absolutely no possibility of winning a battle against both armies combined.

However, the two French armies were separated from each other by the River Tagus.  The destruction of the bridge at Alcántara by Portuguese troops in 1809 had removed one of the few crossing points over the Tagus, leaving the bridge of boats at Almaraz (almost half-way to Madrid) as the only remaining practical crossing-point connecting Soult and Marmont (there were also bridges at Talavera, Arzobispo and Toledo, but the first two were impassable to artillery and heavy wheeled vehicles, while Toledo, being very close to Madrid was a very long way upriver and therefore a very long detour).  As a bonus, Marshal Soult’s pontoon train had also been captured at Badajoz, meaning that the French had no practical way to create a new bridge.

With Marmont once again threatening Ciudad Rodrigo and northern Portugal, Wellington needed to remove that threat as a priority, but to do so he first had to remove the possibility of Soult marching north to combine his forces with Marmont.  To that end, Wellington ordered Lieutenant General Rowland Hill (a much-loved and very capable officer known as ‘Daddy’ Hill for his compassionate and caring treatment of his men) commanding the 2nd Division, to mount a lightning raid deep into Spain, with the aim of capturing and destroying the bridge at Almaraz before withdrawing back to the border.

Following an extraordinary march, covering 100 miles in three punishing day-marches and two short night-marches, Hill’s leading units marched to assault Fort Napoleon, defending the southern end of the bridge, at dawn on 17th May.  However, the punishing terrain caused one assault column to be delayed and so dawn broke before the assault forces were in position and surprise was lost.  With the garrison now fully alerted, Hill’s men attempted throughout 17th and 18th May to get guns to the scene, but to no avail.  In desperation, Hill launched a pre-dawn attack on 19th May, first mounting distraction attacks against the nearby castle and a fortified manor-house, which had also been garrisoned by the French.  Fort Napoleon was held by 325 men with nine guns, with a further 250 men in an earthwork at the southern end of the bridge, plus more men defending the other strongpoints south of the river.  Fort Ragusa on the north bank held another 250 men and twelve guns, while the flêche at the northern end of the bridge held another 50 men.

With operational surprise having been lost two days earlier, the assault was a bloody affair, with a reported 189 British troops being lost (mostly from the 50th Foot and 71st Highland Light Infantry).  However, the garrison (being partly unreliable Prussian conscripts from the 4ème Régiment d’Étranger) eventually broke and fled!  With over 500 men attempting to cross the bridge at once, the floating structure apparently collapsed (some sources say that the French engineers cut it loose in panic), tipping hundreds of unfortunate French troops into the river!  Hill quickly had what was left of the bridge burned and the fortifications blown up.  Mission completed, Hill’s jubilant but exhausted column retired back the way they had come, along with 259 prisoners.

With communications between Marmont and Soult severed, Wellington began distraction and deception operations to tie down French formations and to keep them guessing as to his real intent.  To keep Soult busy, a Spanish army under General Ballasteros made a demonstration between Gibraltar and Soult’s base at Seville, winning a victory on 1st June against Conroux’s division at Bornos.  Safely returned from Almaraz, Hill’s 18,000 men also made their presence felt to the east of Badajoz, further convincing Soult that he was about to become Wellington’s target.  In the north, Abadia’s Spanish Army of Galicia and Silveira’s Portuguese Division (reinforced by newly-raised militia regiments) manoeuvred in an attempt to pin down Bonnet’s division (of Marmont’s army) in Asturias, while General Mendizabal’s guerrilla army increased its tempo of operations in an effort to tie up Caffarelli’s French Army of the North.  To add to French woes, the news that William Bentick’s British army in Sicily was preparing to set sail for eastern Spain served to keep Marshal Suchet’s French Army of Aragon busy, watching the coast for any signs of a British invasion fleet.  With the French armies preoccupied, Wellington marched against Marmont in the second week of June.

June 1812: Wellington Advances on Salamanca. Marmont Reacts

Marmont learned of Wellington’s advance on 14th June and ordered the concentration of his army some 20 miles to the north-east of Salamanca.  His Army of Portugal mostly achieved its concentration on 19th June, two days after Wellington reached Salamanca with around 50,000 men.  Marmont now had a little over 30,000 men, grouped into five infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, but was still missing Foy’s and Thomières’ divisions, which would bring the army up to around 43,000 men.  There were also 800 men garrisoning a number of fortified positions within the city of Salamanca.

Wellington therefore had the edge in terms of numbers for the moment, though as the Spanish and Portuguese operations in the north-west had been slow to develop, Bonnet would eventually be able to reinforce Marmont with his 6,500 men.  Marmont had also received a dispatch from Caffarelli, promising another 8,000 men.  King Joseph however, with the Army of the Centre at Madrid and worried about developments elsewhere in Spain, could spare no reinforcements for the moment.

At Salamanca, Wellington had managed to concentrate the majority of his army, consisting of seven infantry divisions, a very large cavalry division, two independent Portuguese brigades and the Spanish division of Don Carlos de España.  However, not everything was going to plan; in addition to the Spanish and Portuguese lethargy in the north-west, Wellington’s most experienced exploring officer Colquhon Grant had recently been captured and his talented Quartermaster-General George Murray had not returned from home-leave.  Most critically, two of his most experienced Lieutenant Generals, Thomas Picton and Thomas Graham had been forced to return to Britain for medical treatment.  Command of Picton’s hard-fighting 3rd Division would therefore pass to Wellington’s brother-in-law Major General Edward Pakenham, while Graham’s role of second-in-command of the army would eventually fall to the Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese Army, Marshal William Beresford (Graham would remain in post until early July 1812 and was present at the start of the Salamanca Campaign).

Having arrived in Salamanca on 17th June, Wellington immediately ordered Henry Clinton’s 6th Division to invest the three forts in the southwest corner of the city, while he marched the rest of the army out to find Marmont.  However, as the army for the moment lacked a siege train, the siege dragged on until the 26th, when at last Clinton ordered a direct assault against Fort San Gaetano, the smallest of the three.  This assault was bloodily repulsed, with General Bowes, commanding one of Clinton’s two British brigades, being killed in the attempt (having already been wounded earlier in the day, he returned to lead his men in a second assault with tragic consequences).  Nevertheless, fresh artillery support arrived on the 27th and by the end of the day all three forts had fallen.

In the meantime, Wellington had formed the rest of the army up in a good defensive position on the heights above the village of San Cristobal (San Cristobal de la Cuesta), some three miles to the northeast of Salamanca.  His right flank rested upon the River Tormes at Cabrerizos, his outpost line was placed forward at the village of Moriscos and the bulk of his army remained hidden on the reverse slope; a classic Wellingtonian deployment.  Marmont’s army appeared on the following day, intending to relieve the forts at Salamanca, but finding the way blocked.  There was a brief exchange of artillery fire and the French made an attempt to wrest control of Moriscos from the 68th (Durham) Light Infantry holding it, but these brief flurries of action did not develop into a more general engagement and at nightfall, Wellington ordered the 68th to be withdrawn.

The two armies remained glowering at each other for another two days.  Wellington for his part, hoped that Marmont would attack him and to that end on the 22nd ordered a thick skirmish-line forward to engage the French at Moriscos, hoping to provoke an attack.  However, Marmont at this point was still lacking the divisions of Thomières, Foy and Bonnet and knew he was considerably outnumbered (roughly 40,000 Allies versus 30,000 French), so had no intention of attacking (though Maucune and Ferey both advocated for an attack).  Wellington, his impatience growing, reputedly exclaimed “Damned tempting!  I have a great mind to attack ’em!”  Fortunately he did not, as Marmont was at that moment reinforced by the 9,500 men of Thomières’ and Foy’s divisions, which almost equalised the two armies.  However, Marmont then received the shocking news that the planned reinforcement of 8,000 men from Caffarelli would not be forthcoming.

Nevertheless, still hoping to relieve the Salamanca forts, Marmont attempted to manoeuvre to the east of Salamanca and crossed the Tormes with 12,000 men, though was countered by Graham with the 1st & 7th Divisions.  Early on 27th June, Marmont received word from Fort San Vicente that they would hold out for a further three days.  This news galvanised Marmont into planning a major effort to break through and to that end he ordered his entire army to prepare to cross over the Tormes, thus by-passing Wellington’s position and attacking the city from the southeast.  However, no sooner had the march been planned than it was made obsolete by the news that the forts had fallen that same day.  This meant that Clinton’s 6th Division and the artillery reserve were now free to join Wellington’s main army and Marmont was once again sorely outnumbered.

June-July 1812: Marmont Retreats to the Douro and Turns the Tables

Marmont now had no reason to remain standing in front of Salamanca and therefore, early on 28th June, his army began its retreat to Tordesillas on the River Douro, 50 miles to the northeast.  Both armies reached the Douro without incident and for the first two weeks of July, they simply faced each other across the river while considering their options.  Bonnet’s division finally joined Marmont on 7th July and at last he now outnumbered Wellington, but only by around 3,000 men.  In the meantime, Caffarelli, Soult and Suchet had all written to King Joseph, stating that they could not spare any men to reinforce Marmont.  To Joseph’s credit, he was determined to do something to aid Marmont and to that end managed to scrape up a force of 13,000 men.  However, this force didn’t leave Madrid until 21st July and didn’t reach Marmont in time for the pivotal battle.

At last on 16th July, Marmont made the first move, pushing Bonnet’s and Foy’s divisions across the Douro at Toro, which lies some 21 miles to the west of Tordesillas.  This feint forced Wellington to counter, but to do so he had to march his troops 30 miles in order to march around a large bend in the Douro, while also moving the bulk of his army back to Canizal, in order to protect his lines of communication with Salamanca.  By the time Wellington’s advance guard reached Toro, the French divisions had already withdrawn to the north bank, destroying the bridge as they did so.  While Wellington was on this wild frog-chase, Bonnet and Foy marched back to Tordesillas, where Marmont was already starting his main crossing of the river.

Thankfully, Wellington had cautiously placed a strong rearguard, consisting of Charles von Alten’s Light Division, Cole’s 4th Division and George Anson’s light cavalry brigade at Castrejon under the command of Stapleton Cotton, his senior cavalry commander, who quickly detected the French advance.  As the rearguard withdrew in the face of the French advance, Wellington and Beresford rode out to perform a personal reconnaissance, but came within a whisker of being captured by French cavalry!  Marmont constantly tried to turn Wellington’s right flank, though was countered each time.  Nevertheless, by the end of the day, Marmont had forced Wellington back over half-way to Salamanca.

19th-21st July 1812: The Parallel March

On 19th July, the two armies, exhausted by the hard marching in the high Summer heat, halted facing each other across the River Guarena.  However, at 4pm Marmont’s army set off again, marching southeast along the bank of the Guarena.  Wellington’s army shadowed them on the opposite bank.  On 20th July, Marmont again trying to turn Wellington’s right flank (i.e. the head of the column), crossed over onto Wellington’s side of the river and began marching southwest.  The two armies were now conducting a form of bizarre race, marching parallel to each other and only a few hundred yards apart!  At midday, both armies were converging on a defile at the village of Cantalpino and the French managed to reach it first, deploying guns in an attempt to force a battle.  At last, Wellington was forced to turn west toward Salamanca and took up defensive positions at Cabezabelloso, at last out of sight of Marmont’s army and only a few miles from where his army had been positioned at San Cristobal, a month earlier.

On the 21st, Marmont marched south once again, fording the River Tormes at Huerta, hoping to cut Wellington off from his line of retreat.  This left Wellington with no option but to abandon the city and march south.  Crossing the Tormes at Cabrerizos, his army once again marched south within sight of the French, until they ended the day with both armies running north-south, facing each other across a valley.  Marmont’s army’s left flank rested upon the village of Calvarisa de Arriba, while Wellington’s right flank rested upon the rocky Lesser Arapile Hill (see the map below).  Wellington’s rearguard, formed by Pakenham’s 3rd Division and d’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry brigade, remained north of the Tormes for the time being, covering the withdrawal of the baggage train from Salamanca.

22nd July 1812: The Battle of Salamanca

Following a violently stormy night, the 22nd dawned dry and warm, quickly drying the soaked ground.  Marmont’s army was still in full view of the Allies, camped along the ridge extending north from Calvarisa de Arriba.  On the western side of the valley, only the Light Division and 1st Division were in view of the French, along with Eberhardt von Bock’s KGL Dragoon brigade from the Cavalry Reserve, elements of the 4th Division on the Lesser Arapile and light infantry of Hope’s 7th Division.  Hope’s light infantry were soon engaged in a sharp skirmish with French voltigeurs, as Marmont attempted to drive them back and perform his own reconnaissance.  However, the French skirmishers were driven back and Marmont was unable to glean any information as to the location of the remainder of Welllington’s army.

The 5th and 6th Divisions, along with the bulk of the 4th and 7th Divisions, the Cavalry Reserve, Carlos de España’s division and the two independent Portuguese brigades, were in the dead ground to the rear of the visible Allied positions, around the villages of Carbajosa and Las Torres.  The 3rd Division and d’Urban’s cavalry were still north of the Tormes.

Marmont, encouraged by the sight of dust rising to the west (caused by Wellington’s baggage train evacuating Salamanca and heading back towards Ciudad Rodrigo), was now convinced that Wellington was retreating and that what he could see was merely the rearguard.  He therefore planned once again to turn Wellington’s right flank, hoping to then march west and cut Wellington’s line of retreat.  To that end, he ordered Bonnet to seize the Greater Arapile, possession of which would protect the flank and act as the ‘hinge’ of the turning movement.

Seeing the French begin to make their move to the south, Wellington realised too late that he should have occupied the Greater Arapile.  Lowry Cole was at once ordered to seize the feature, but it was already too late.  The Portuguese 7th Caçadores (from Stubbs’ brigade) dashed across the valley, but Bonnet’s voltigeurs beat them to the crest and following a heavy exchange of fire, the Caçadores fell back to the Lesser Arapile.  With the Greater Arapile in his hands, Marmont ordered the bulk of his army to move south, leaving Foy’s division as a rearguard at Calvarisa de Arriba.

With the advantage of interior lines, Welllington was quickly able to realign his formations in the dead ground to face south.  While the 1st and Light Divisions remained in place, facing Foy, Leith’s 5th Division was brought forward to Los Arapiles village, supporting the right flank of Cole’s 4th Division. Wellington also now brought in his rearguard (Pakenham’s 3rd Division and d’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry brigade), ordering them to march through Salamanca and take position at Aldea Tejada, on the Ciudad Rodrigo road.

As the French divisions moved into an assembly area in the woods to the south of the Greater Arapile, at around mid-day, Marmont climbed the hill to assess the situation.  Still convinced that Wellington was retreating, he ordered his divisions to turn west and to march along the ridge that extended westward via Miranda de Azan.  His intention was to cut the road to Ciudad Rodrigo ahead of the retreating army and force Wellington to attack him.  He was however, concerned that wellington might make another attempt to seize the Greater Arapile from Bonnet, so ordered a large battery to be placed upon it (the battery would grow during the day to 40 guns).

At around 2pm, Marmont’s army marched out once again.  In the lead was Maucune’s 5th Division, with Curto’s Light Cavalry Division covering the open southern flank.  These were followed by Thomières’ 7th Division, then Clauzel’s 2nd Division, Brenier’s 6th Division, Sarrut’s 4th Division and Ferey’s 3rd Division.  Bonnet’s 8th Division would remain in place on and around the Greater Arapile, while Foy’s 1st Division would provide the rearguard and Boyer’s Dragoon Division would remain in reserve.  In the meantime, Pakenham’s British 3rd Division, together with d’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry brigade, arrived unseen at Aldea Tejada at around 2pm.

Seeing elements of Leith’s division deploying behind the village of Los Arapiles, Maucune halted his march and deployed his division to face the village.  As skirmishers clashed, Maucune’s artillery was soon engaged in a sharp duel with Leith’s guns, as well as the two guns that Lowry Cole had placed atop the Lesser Arapile.  However, the guns on the Lesser Arapile were soon silenced by the growing French battery on the Greater Arapile.  As the situation south of Los Arapiles began to escalate, Clauzel also halted his division and formed up on Maucune’s right.  However, Thomières attempted to comply with his orders and pressed on toward the Ciudad Rodrigo road, marching around the rear of Maucune’s division, aiming for the village of Miranda de Azan and consequently isolating his division from the rest of the army.

Wellington, at that moment having a lunch of cold meat and watching from the hills opposite, is said to have thrown a chicken leg over his shoulder and riding forward for a better look, exclaimed “By God, that’ll do!”  Wellington immediately set off at speed toward Aldea Tejada, apparently galloping alone for much of the distance as his staff failed to keep up with him.  Arriving at Pakenham’s position, he gave his brother-in-law the briefest of orders; “Edward, move on with the 3rd Division, take those heights in your front and drive everything before you.”  Shaking hands with his commander-in-chief, Pakenham replied “I will, my Lord.”

As Pakenham’s division marched out to meet Thomières, Wellington rode back to the main position and ordered Victor von Alten’s light cavalry brigade (temporarily under the command of Lieutenant Colonel von Arentschildt) to join d’Urban’s brigade on the flank.  Leith’s 5th Division, Carlos de España’s Division, Bradford’s independent brigade and Cotton’s Cavalry Reserve were also ordered to advance in support of Pakenham (with several brigades having already been detached, Cotton still had direct control of George Anson’s light cavalry brigade and Le Marchant’s heavies).

Marmont, watching from the Greater Arapile, also saw the danger and like Wellington, chose to gallop off in order to personally take control of the situation.  However, as he descended the hill, a shell exploded near by, seriously wounding him.  Brennier, being the closest divisional commander, immediately assumed command of the army, but it was already too late for Thomières.

The first Allied formation to attack was Benjamin d’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry brigade (1st & 11th Cavalry Regiments), supported by the 14th Light Dragoons from Alten’s brigade.  The Portuguese horsemen emerged from dead ground to strike Thomières’ leading companies in the flank!  Some of the more alert companies did manage to fire a volley, emptying several Portuguese saddles, but the leading French battalion (of the 101ème de Ligne) was completely broken.  Worse was to come as Pakenham’s previously-undetected 3rd Division now burst into the open in column formation, only 500 yards from Thomières’ leading units.  The British and Portuguese infantry rapidly formed lines and with Wallace’s brigade leading, advanced rapidly upon the French infantry who, shaken by the destruction of the leading battalion, were unsteadily forming up on the high ground of the Pico de Miranda.

Thomières to his credit, rapidly brought up twenty guns and these now poured a destructive fire into the approaching redcoats.  Curto’s light cavalry also now came up, attempting to launch a charge into Pakenham’s right flank.  However, they were met by Arentschildt’s 1st KGL Hussars and broken.  The 9-pounders of Douglas’ Company also now came into action, providing effective supporting fire to the attacking infantry.  Nevertheless a volley from the French line dropped scores of the 88th Foot (Connaught Rangers), among them their Commanding Officer, Major Barnaby Murphy.

The sight of their slain Commanding Officer being dragged across in front of them by his horse’s stirrup, sent the 88th into an incandescent rage and they could not be held back.  With them went the rest of Wallace’s brigade; the 45th Foot (1st Nottinghamshire) and 74th Foot.  The ferocious charge of Wallace’s brigade utterly destroyed Thomières’ division within minutes.  The 101ème and 62ème de Ligne both suffered 2/3rds casualties, the entire divisional artillery was captured and Thomières himself was killed.  Only the rearmost regiment, the 1er de Ligne, managed to escape the disaster with relatively light casualties, losing around 1/8th of its strength.

As the broken remnants of Thomières’ division fled back eastward, Maucune’s division now became the focus of Allied attention.  Leith’s 5th Division, which had now spent several hours to the north of Los Arapiles under French artillery fire, finally began advancing through the village and across the plain, aiming for the far ridge, topped with Maucune’s infantry.  The French voltigeurs were outclassed by Leith’s skirmish screen and were forced to fall back to the safety of their lines, soon followed by the artillery.  To everyone’s surprise, the infantry also fell back; into a position behind the crest, not unlike the typical Wellingtonian tactic, but almost unheard of for the French!

As the British infantry crested the rise, the French let loose with a devastating volley, killing and wounding many redcoats, among them Leith himself, who fell badly wounded.  Undaunted, the British infantry halted and delivered their own volley upon their tormentors, before lowering their bayonets and charging with a wild cheer.  Bradford’s independent Portuguese brigade, which had been advancing on Leith’s right, also now charged, striking Maucune’s left flank.  It should be mentioned at this point that Maucune, having withdrawn his infantry behind the crest and having observed the approach of enemy cavalry, had ordered his battalions to form squares.  Now, faced by enemy infantry at close range, his battalion commanders tried desperately to shake out into lines… It was at this moment that Le Marchant’s brigade of heavy dragoons struck…

Although he had no way of knowing what lay beyond the ridge, Le Marchant’s orders had been clear; i.e. to ‘charge in at all hazards’ as soon as Leith’s 5th Division engaged the enemy.  Forming his brigade into two lines, with the 5th Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons in front and the 3rd Dragoons in reserve, Le Marchant inserted himself between Leith’s Division on the left and Bradford’s Portuguese on the right.  As they passed over the crest to the cheers of Allied infantrymen, the heavy dragoons plunged into the 66ème de Ligne and simply annihilated them.

The 15ème de Ligne were next and they too were soon broken and fleeing in the greatest of panic and disorder.  Behind them, Brenier’s division frantically attempted to form up and did manage to deliver volleys against the rampaging British dragoons, who had now lost all sense of order.  Nevertheless, the ferocious Allied assault eventually succeeded in driving back Brenier, but at some considerable cost, including the tragic and irreplaceable loss of John Le Marchant himself.

While the drama on the western flank was taking place, Lowry Cole’s 4th Division began its advance across the plain, aiming for Clauzel’s division on the opposite ridge.  However, Cole’s men came under stiff artillery fire, not only from the guns positioned with Clauzel, but also from the large battery now positioned on the Greater Arapile.  Matters only became worse as they closed with the French infantry and the attack soon stagnated into a vicious firefight.

On Cole’s left, Major General Dennis Pack watched with increasing concern as the French artillery positioned on the Greater Arapile chewed up Cole’s exposed left flank.  Having been given orders by Wellington to capture the Greater Arapile if the opportunity arose, Pack now decided that the time had come and ordered his independent Portuguese brigade forward.  With the French guns occupied in engaging Cole, Pack’s Portuguese made good progress across the valley, with the 4th Caçadores deployed in skirmish order quickly pushing back the enemy voltigeurs.  As they pushed on up the steep slope, they finally reached a sheer rocky escarpment, some 5 feet high, right at the top of the slope.  As the Portuguese infantry attempted to climb up, they were met by the 120ème de Ligne, who stepped forward and poured a murderous fire down into the helpless Portuguese infantry.

Pack’s Portuguese were utterly routed, leaving Cole’s left flank now completely exposed.  To make matters worse, Cole had himself been wounded and the time was now ripe for the French to mount a counter-attack.  As Clauzel’s division attacked to their front, Bonnet’s division swept in from the Greater Arapile to drive into Cole’s left flank.

Cole’s 4th Division could take no more and staggered back to the foot of the Lesser Arapile as Pack’s routed Portuguese troops streamed past.  On Cole’s left, Stubbs’ Portuguese brigade was forced to form squares in order to defend itself as Boyer’s Dragoon Division charged in support of Bonnet’s infantry.  The crisis now engulfing the Allied centre seemed at this point to be undoing all the good work done on the western flank!

One bright spot for the Allies however, was that Bonnet (the current acting commander-in-chief) fell wounded during the counter-attack and so command now passed to Clauzel.  In the midst of yet another change of army command, Wellington now countered the French with a counter-attack of his own.  Henry Clinton’s 6th Division was brought forward from the reserve and attacked frontally, while Marshal Beresford personally brought Spry’s Portuguese brigade from Leith’s 5th Division.  Bonnet’s division now found its firing line overlapped by that of Clinton and the overwhelming firepower of these fresh brigades threw Bonnet’s regiments back on Clauzel’s division.  Beresford now led Spry’s Portuguese against Clauzel’s left and the French counter-attack was finally broken (with Beresford being wounded in the process).

With the failure of Clauzel’s counter-attack, the battle was lost for the French.  All that remained now was to decide the severity of defeat.  Foy’s 1st Division, as the army rearguard, was now slowly making its way south from Calvarisa de Arriba toward the Greater Arapile, shadowed by Charles von Alten’s Light Division.  Seeing this formation isolated, Wellington ordered Henry Campbell’s 1st Division forward to cut Foy off from the rest of the army.  However, Campbell only pressed forward with skirmishers and so Foy was allowed to slip away.  This movement did however, persuade the remaining French garrison to evacuate the Greater Arapile.

Sarrut’s division meanwhile, had been pushed forward to shore up the collapsing left wing of the army and was heavily engaged before slowly giving ground to the overwhelming tide of Allied troops.

Ferey’s division was now the only remaining unengaged formation in the French Army of Portugal and as such, formed up on a steep wooded ridge to the rear of the Greater Arapile, covering the retreat of the routed army.  As night began to fall, Ferey and his men sold their lives dearly, cutting down scores of Clinton’s redcoats as they attempted to break through the position.  Clinton’s attack stagnated into a bitter, point-blank firefight for an hour until at last, artillery was brought up to break the impasse.  In a very short time, the gallant Ferey himself was cut in half by a cannonball, yet despite this, his men held their ground and still managed to throw back a determined attack by Rezende’s Portuguese brigade.  It was only a flank-attack by Leith’s 5th Division that finally drove Ferey’s heroic division from its position.  Nevertheless, the 31ème Légère continued to fight on, doggedly fighting for every yard as they pulled back; as did Foy’s division, still retiring steadily in the face of the 1st and Light Divisions.

As darkness fell, the French fugitives streamed through the forested hills, desperately hoping to find safety at the bridge and fords of Alba de Tormes.  Wellington was reluctant to commit what few uncommitted reserves he had left (consisting only of Hope’s 7th Division, Bock’s KGL Dragoon brigade and Carlos De España’s Division) into a confused pursuit through a forest at night, particularly when he knew that Carlos De España had already positioned a brigade at Alba de Tormes in order to prevent its use by the French…

However, for reasons that are not clear, Carlos De España had earlier removed the detachment from the ford (probably during the morning, when it looked likely that the army was about to retreat back to Ciudad Rodrigo) and had then compounded his error by not telling Wellington this salient fact.

23rd July to 23rd October: The Capture of Madrid and the Siege of Burgos

With the fugitive French army having slipped away across the Tormes, Wellington was absolutely furious, though his mood must have slightly improved the following day, when the previously-unengaged cavalry brigades of Major Generals George Anson and Eberhardt Otto George von Bock caught up with the French rearguard at the village of Garcia Hernandez.  As Anson’s light dragoons dealt with the remnants of Curto’s light cavalry, Von Bock’s KGL heavy dragoons achieved one of the most incredible feats of arms of the entire war; breaking two whole battalion squares with cavalry alone!

Nevertheless, with the rate of the French retreat out-pacing the exhausted Allied Army’s ability to keep up, the remnants of Marmont’s Army of Portugal slipped away; initially eastward, but then north toward their base at Valladolid.  Wellington pursued them until 25th July, but was then happy for his exhausted army to follow the retreating French at a more leisurely pace until they reached Valladolid on 30th July.  Wellington then turned southeast, marching to Madrid and entering the city to a rapturous welcome on 12th August.

On 31st August, Wellington handed Madrid over to Rowland Hill and marched back to Valladolid and then to Burgos, where on 16th September he besieged the fortress.  Sieges were never Wellington’s strong suit and this was no exception, as once again Wellington had no siege train to speak of and only three heavy guns.  The 1st Division executed the siege abysmally for five weeks until at last, Wellington gave up and withdrew from Burgos on 23rd October, pursued by a fresh and numerically-superior French army under General Joseph Souham (who outnumbered Wellington 53,000 to 35,000).

23rd October to 19th November: The Retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo

Wellington retreated via Valladolid and then Tordesillas, where the wily General Foy successfully captured the bridge before it could be destroyed by Wellington’s rearguard.  Logistics and discipline in Wellington’s army almost completely broke down and those who had experienced the appalling retreat to Corunna described the nightmarish retreat from Burgos as being even worse.

Wellington retreated all the way back to the scene of his earlier victory at Salamanca, where he united his army on 9th November with that of Hill, who had withdrawn from Madrid.  This brought Wellington’s strength up to 65,000, though Marshal Soult had also now brought his army to join with Souham’s and this combined army numbered 80,000.  There was therefore every chance of a Second Battle of Salamanca being fought in 1812, but on 14th November Wellington retreated once again.  The French army, now also suffering from the weather and long lines of communication, gave up the pursuit shortly afterwards and Wellington’s exhausted army arrived back at Ciudad Rodrigo on 19th November.

So despite his great victory at Salamanca, Wellington ended 1812 almost back where he had started the year and it is easy to simply write the year off as a pointless failure.  However, as Wellington started 1813 the major difference was that this time he was starting the year with complete control of his base at Portugal and all of the border fortresses and his army had never been stronger in terms of manpower, logistics, or strategic position.

The events in Russia would also have a major impact on the coming year as Napoleon frantically stripped troops out of Spain to rebuild his Grande Armée in Germany, but I’ve waffled on enough now, so that’s for another article.

On to the scenario and let’s roll some dice…

Scenario Outline

The scenario lasts for 11 turns, starting with the Allied 1600hrs turn and ending at nightfall, with the French 2130hrs turn.

In reality the battle was over much earlier than that, so if you want to set yourself a challenge, limit the game to 8 turns, ending after the French 1930hrs turn.

In order to achieve total victory, each side must break their opponent’s army.  However, the French can claim a ‘winning draw’ if Wellington fails to achieve this.

The French army is already on a sticky wicket, but if you want to make things even stickier, at the start of the game, roll on the Napoleon’s Battles General Elimination Table and immediately apply the result to Marshal Marmont (Free Roll markers may of course be used).  If Marmont is eliminated or otherwise removed from play, the French army will be without a C-in-C for the first turn.  His chief of staff, Général de Division Louis de Remplacement will take command at the start of Turn 2, with the stats 12″P(10)-1 (in reality, Bonnet took command, followed latterly by Clauzel, but for game purposes a replacement general will always use the lowest possible stats for his level of command, regardless of who they are).

Deployment

The French have been completely surprised by Wellington’s attack, so there is no opportunity for a flexible deployment and all formations are deployed in the locations shown on the map above.  Some units have deployed into Column formation to face the new threat, though the units shown as arrows are still deployed in March Column formation.  No French unit may start the game in Line or Square formation.  All French artillery batteries are deployed in Limbered or March Column formation, except for one battery each with Maucune’s, Clauzel’s, Bonnet’s and Foy’s Divisions (if any batteries are attached), which may be in Unlimbered formation.  The French may not place any Cavalry React markers at the start of the game.

The Allies may use the historical deployment shown on the map above, with units deployed in any formation and artillery being Unlimbered or Limbered, as desired.  Packenham may deploy his lead British infantry brigade 4 inches from Thomières’ leading brigade (i.e. close enough to charge in Line formation).

Alternatively, they may deploy more flexibly, with each formation being deployed as desired within the boxes shown on the map below (though only one of Packenham’s infantry brigades may be deployed within 4″ range of the French).  Note that the deployment of each division from left to right was largely dictated by its position in the order of march, with Packenham being the advance guard and Alten being the rear guard, so there is only limited opportunity to alter the position of each division.

Whichever deployment option is taken, the French deploy first, followed by the Allies.  Once the Allies have deployed, the French player may adjust the facing of any deployed artillery batteries and of Thomières’ leading infantry brigade, in order to bring Allied units within their arc of fire.

Allied Peninsular Army Order of Battle

General Sir Arthur Wellesley, Earl of Wellington
17”G(10)+3D
[6 Free Rolls]
[19M]

Cavalry Reserve – Lieutenant General John Stapleton Cotton                  5”E(7)+2 [1F]
Le Marchant’s Brigade (5th Dragoon Guards and 3rd & 4th Dragoons)      12 BrHC [4D]
G Anson’s Brigade (11th, 12th & 16th Light Dragoons)                                     12 BrLC [5D]
Bull’s ‘I’ Troop Royal Horse Artillery                                                                    Br6#

1st Division – Major General Henry Frederick Campbell                              4”G(4)+1 [2F]
Fermor’s Brigade (1/2nd & 1/3rd Foot Guards)                                                  16 BrGD [5D]
Wheatley’s Brigade (2/24th, 1/42nd, 2/58th & 1/79th Foot)                           24 BrLN [10D]
Löwe’s Brigade (1st, 2nd & 5th KGL Infantry Battalions)                                 16 BrLN [6D]
Gardiner’s Company Royal Artillery                                                                      Br9#F

3rd Division – Major General Edward Michael Pakenham                          4”A(7)+1D [3F]
Wallace’s Brigade (1/45th, 74th & 1/88th Foot)                                                 16 BrLN [6D]
J Campbell’s Brigade (1/5th & 2/5th Fusiliers and 2/83rd & 94th Foot)     16 BrLN [6D]
Power’s Portuguese Brigade (9th & 21st Infantry and 12th Caçadores)         20 PtLN [10D]
V von Alten’s Brigade (14th Light Dragoons & 1st KGL Hussars)                   12 BrKLC [5D]
D’Urban’s Portuguese Cavalry Brigade (1st & 11th Dragoons)                         8 PtLC [4D]
Douglas’ Company Royal Artillery                                                                          Br9#F

4th Division – Lieutenant General Galbraith Lowry Cole                               3”G(8)+1 [2F]
W Anson’s Brigade (3/27th & 1/40th Foot)                                                           12 BrLN [5D]
Ellis’ Brigade (1/7th & 1/23rd Fusiliers and 1/48th Foot)                                  12 BrLN [5D]
Stubbs’ Portuguese Brigade (11th & 23rd Infantry and 7th Caçadores)           20 PtLN [10D]
Sympher’s 4th Company KGL Artillery                                                                   Br9#F

5th Division – Lieutenant General James Leith                                                3”A(6)+0 [2F]
Greville’s Brigade (3/1st, 1/9th, 1/38th & 2/38th Foot)                                     24 BrLN [10D]
Pringle’s Brigade (1/4th, 2/4th, 2/30th & 2/44th Foot)                                    16 BrLN [6D]
Spry’s Portuguese Brigade (3rd & 15th Infantry and 8th Caçadores)              20 PtLN [10D]

6th Division – Lieutenant General Henry Clinton                                           4”A(6)+1 [2F]
Hulse’s Brigade (1/11th, 2/53rd & 1/61st Foot)                                                    12 BrLN [5D]
Hinde’s Brigade (2nd, 1/32nd & 1/36th Foot)                                                      12 BrLN [5D]
Rezende’s Portuguese Brigade (8th & 12th Infantry and 9th Caçadores)       24 PtLN [12D]

7th Division – Major General John Hope                                                          4”G(7)+1 [2F]
Halkett’s Brigade (1st & 2nd KGL LI & Brunswick Oels Jäger)                        12 BrLT [5D]
De Bernewitz’s Brigade (51st & 68th LI & Chasseurs-Britanniques)               12 BrLT [5D]
Collins’ Portuguese Brigade (7th & 19th Infantry and 2nd Caçadores)           16 PtLN [8D]
MacDonald’s ‘E’ Troop Royal Horse Artillery                                                       Br6#

Light Division – Lieutenant General Charles von Alten                                4”G(7)+1 [2F]
Barnard’s Brigade (1/43rd LI, 2/95th & 3/95th Rifles and 1st Caçadores)   16 BrLT [6D]
Vandeleur’s Brigade (1/52nd LI, 1/95th Rifles and 3rd Caçadores)               16 BrLT [6D]
Bock’s KGL Brigade (1st & 2nd KGL Dragoons)                                                  12 BrKHC [4D]
Ross’ ‘A’ Troop Royal Horse Artillery                                                                    Br6#

Spanish Division – Teniente-General Don Carlos de España                      3”A(4)+0 [1F]
Infantry Brigade (Princesa, Tiradores de Castilla, Jaen & 1st Sevilla)            20 SpLN [14D]
Cavalry Brigade (Cazadores de Castilla & Lanceros de Castilla)                      12 SpLC [7D]
Horse Battery                                                                                                               Sp4#

Portuguese Independent Brigade – Major General Dennis Pack           4”G(6)+2 [1F]
Pack’s Portuguese Brigade (1st & 16th Infantry and 4th Caçadores)               24 PtLN [12D]

Portuguese Independent Brigade – Major General Thomas Bradford  3”A(5)+0 [1F]
Bradford’s Portuguese Brigade (13th & 14th Infantry and 5th Caçadores)     16 PtLN [8D]

Allied Order of Battle Notes

1.  Cotton is the overall Allied cavalry commander and may take control of any British, KGL or Portuguese cavalry brigade or horse battery within his command span, even if they are temporarily attached to other divisions at the start of the battle.  Although all British, Portuguese and KGL cavalry are formally part of his command, the detached cavalry brigades are assumed to be a part of the division to which they are attached for Formation Fatigue purposes during this battle.  Although they are not formally part of his command, Cotton may also command the Spanish cavalry and horse artillery if they fall within his command-span.

2.  Victor von Alten’s and d’Urban’s cavalry brigades start the battle attached to Pakenham’s 3rd Division.

3.  Von Bock’s KGL Dragoon Brigade and Ross’ Troop RHA from the Cavalry Division start the battle attached to Charles von Alten’s Light Division.

4.  Le Marchant’s performance as a cavalry brigadier was nothing short of superb and Salamanca was his master-stroke, though resulted in his death.  Le Marchant’s brigade may therefore use a -3 recall modifier instead of the usual -4 for British cavalry.

5.  If desired, a single artillery battery (but not a 12-pounder battery) on each side may be positioned on top of their respective Arapile at the start of the game, having been manhandled there with some difficulty.

6.  The 1st, 3rd & 6th Divisions had their skirmish-screen beefed up by independent companies of the 5/60th Rifles, while the 5th Division was boosted by rifle-armed companies of the Brunswick Oels Jäger.  The 4th Division had companies of both the 5/60th Rifles and the Brunswick Oels Jäger.  The strength of these units is absorbed into the brigade strengths and the strong fire-combat factors of British infantry reflects the inclusion of these specialist marksmen.

7.  Sir Arthur Wellesley was styled the Earl of Wellington from February 1812.  He would be elevated to Marquess in August 1812, but wouldn’t become a Duke until May 1814.

8.  One of the foibles of Napoleon’s Battles is that light and medium foot artillery are not represented in the game.  This isn’t normally a problem in the ‘central’ theatres of war, where the armies were up to their proverbials in 12-pounders and horse batteries, but in the ‘fringe’ theatres, this can mean that some battles are simply too light on artillery.  The use of artillery by both sides in this battle was decisive and I’ve therefore included 9pdr and 8pdr foot batteries (with my own unofficial stats).

9.  Lieutenant Colonel Frederick von Arentschildt of the King’s German Legion’s 1st Hussars was temporarily in command of Major General Victor von Alten’s light cavalry brigade, due to the General catching a voltigeur’s bullet in his thigh during the previous evening.  Von Alten would return to duty on 25th July, having missed the battle.

10.  Wellington may apply the Optional Wellington Rule as described in the main rule book’s optional rules section.  If he does not move during his army’s movement phase, he may alternatively be given a Cavalry React Marker and may then spend this marker to move in any of his army’s Reacting Cavalry phases.

11.  Optional Beresford Rule:  Marshal William Beresford, the commander-in-chief of the Portuguese Army and Wellington’s second-in-command, personally led Portuguese brigades forward during the battle until he was seriously wounded.  Beresford may therefore be represented on table by a single general figure with the rating of 0″E(8)+1.  He does not have a command-span, but may roam the battlefield and attach himself to any single Portuguese unit, who will gain the benefit of his other ratings (in much the same manner as the optional Blücher Rule from the NB rule book).  If Beresford activates an infantry unit to which he is attached, they may perform a full move instead of the usual half-move.  I do however, have to say that the Allies do already have a quite considerable advantage, so this might perhaps be an extra advantage too far.  Perhaps only invoke this rule if the ‘Risk to Marmont’ optional rule is not used or if the short version of the scenario is used.

French Army of Portugal Order of Battle

Maréchal Auguste de Marmont, Duc de Raguse
14”G(10)+1
[6 Free Rolls]
[13M]

1er Division – Général de Division Maximilien Sébastien Foy                      4”G(7)+2 [1F]
Chemineau’s Brigade (6ème Légère & 69ème de Ligne)                                   24 FrLT [12D]
Degraviers-Berthelot’s Brigade (39ème & 76ème de Ligne)                             20 FrLN [10D]

2ème Division – Général de Division Bertrand Clauzel                                 4”G(7)+1 [1F]
Berlier’s Brigade (25ème Légère & 27ème de Ligne)                                          28 FrLN [14D]
Barbot’s Brigade (50ème & 59ème de Ligne)                                                       28 FrLN [14D]

3ème Division – Général de Division Claude François Ferey                       4”G(7)+1 [1F]
Menne’s Brigade (31ème Légère & 26ème de Ligne)                                          24 FrLT [12D]
Arnaud’s Brigade (47ème & 70ème de Ligne)                                                      24 FrLN [12D]

4ème Division – Général de Division Jacques Thomas Sarrut                     4”G(6)+0 [1F]
Fririon’s Brigade (2ème Légère & 36ème de Ligne)                                            28 FrLN [14D]
2nd Brigade (4ème Légère & 130ème de Ligne (absent))                                  12 FrLT [6D]

5ème Division – Général de Division Antoine Louis Popon de Maucune   3”A(4)+0 [1F]
Arnaud’s Brigade (15ème & 66ème de Ligne)                                                       24 FrLN [12D]
Montfort’s Brigade (82ème & 86ème de Ligne)                                                   20 FrLN [10D]

6ème Division – Général de Division Antoine-François Brenier de Montmorand 4”E(8)+1 [1F]
Taupin’s Brigade (17ème Légère & 65ème de Ligne)                                          24 FrLT [12D]
2nd Brigade (22ème de Ligne)                                                                                 16 FrLN [8D]

7ème Division – Général de Division Jean Guillaume Barthélemy Thomières 3”G(6)+0 [1F]
Bonté’s Brigade (1er & 62ème de Ligne)                                                               24 FrLN [12D]
2nd Brigade (101ème de Ligne)                                                                               12 FrLN [6D]

8ème Division – Général de Division Jean-Pierre-François Bonnet          4”G(7)+1 [1F]
Gautier’s Brigade (118ème & 119ème de Ligne)                                                   24 FrLN [12D]
Charles’ Brigade (120ème & 122ème de Ligne)                                                    28 FrLN [14D]

Light Cavalry Division – Général de Division Jean-Baptiste Théodore Curto      3”A(5)+0 [1F]
1st & 2nd Brigades (3ème Hussards and 22ème, 26ème & 28ème Chasseurs) 12 FrLC [6D]
3rd Brigade (13ème & 14ème Chasseurs à Cheval and Escadron de Marche) 12 FrLC [6D]
Horse Battery                                                                                                               Fr4#

Dragoon Division – Général de Division Pierre François Xavier Boyer     3”A(6)+0 [1F]
Boyer’s Brigade (6ème & 11ème Dragons)                                                             12 FrLC [6D]
Carrié’s Brigade (15ème & 25ème Dragons)                                                          8 FrLC [4D]
Horse Battery                                                                                                               Fr4#

Reserve Artillery
Horse Battery                                                                                                                Fr4#
Heavy Foot Battery                                                                                                      Fr12#
Heavy Foot Battery                                                                                                      Fr12#
Foot Battery                                                                                                                   Fr8#F
Foot Battery                                                                                                                   Fr8#F
Foot Battery                                                                                                                   Fr8#F

French Order of Battle Notes

1.  The exact French artillery order of battle is not known for this battle other than the number of guns and men, so the artillery organisation here is speculative, based on the typical organisation for a French corps, as well as the number and type of guns listed as captured during the battle.

2.  The three reserve 8pdr foot batteries and 4pdr horse battery may start the game attached to any infantry division (no more than one battery per division).  The reserve 12pdr foot batteries start the game attached to Ferey’s 3rd Division.  Only batteries attached to Maucune, Clauzel, Foy or Bonnet may be deployed Unlimbered at the start of the game.  All others must be in Limbered or March Column formation.

3.  If desired, a single artillery battery (but not a 12-pounder battery) on each side may be positioned on top of their respective Arapile at the start of the scenario, having been manhandled there with some difficulty.

4.  Many of the infantry Générals de Brigade are not known and many of these seem to be single-regiment brigades, so it’s probable that the regimental Colonel was acting as the de facto brigade commander and that there weren’t actually designated Générals de Brigade for those brigades.  In a couple of cases, one of the brigade’s two regiments was absent, so it may be that the Général de Brigade was commanding the detached element.

5.  The 1st and 2nd Brigades of Curto’s Light Cavalry Division were very weak (around 500 and 400 men respectively), so I’ve massed them into a single unit.  The Générals de Brigade are not known.

6.  The 1st Brigade of five divisions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th & 6th) included a light infantry regiment, along with a line infantry regiment.  I’ve therefore arbitrarily designated three of them (the 1st Brigade of 1st, 3rd & 6th Divisions) as light infantry, as well as the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Division, which consisted of a single light infantry regiment.  The French player may alternatively opt to change which divisions have the light infantry.

7.  One of the foibles of NB is that light and medium foot artillery are not represented in the game.  This isn’t a problem in the ‘central’ theatres of war, where the armies were up to their proverbials in 12-pounders and horse batteries, but in the ‘fringe’ theatres, this can mean that some battles are simply too light on artillery.  The use of artillery by both sides in this battle was decisive and I’ve therefore included 9pdr and 8pdr foot batteries with my own unofficial stats.

8.  Brenier’s 2nd Brigade also included a very small detachment from the 4ème Régiment d’Étranger (also known as the Régiment de Prusse), the majority of whom had been given a drubbing by Daddy Hill at Almaraz.  The strength of this tiny detachment is absorbed into that of the 22ème de Ligne.  As it happens, I actually painted these when we re-fought Salamanca ‘In The Grand Manner’ at our second Général de Brigade Wargames Weekend at the National Army Museum in 2003, so here they are (not my best… I seem to remember that they were painted in a spare hour or so before the game):

Terrain Notes

1.  The Arapiles were each topped by a sheer rocky escarpment on the sides facing each other, making them excellent defensive positions, while they sloped away slightly more gently on the opposite sides.  The lower contours provide the defender with a +1 defensive modifier and do not affect movement.  However, the rocky upper contour of each Arapile counts as 2 inches of rough terrain to enter or exit and each has the following restrictions:

2.  The Greater Arapile:  The French eventually managed to mass forty guns on top of this feature, so I therefore suggest that it may accommodate up to five batteries and a single infantry brigade.  The north, west and east slopes give the defender a +4 defensive modifier and are impassable to artillery and cavalry.  The southern slope gives the defender a +2 defensive modifier and is passable to all troop types as 2 inches of rough terrain.  Horse Artillery may not evade either to or from the Greater Arapile.

3.  The Lesser Arapile may accommodate up to three batteries and a single infantry brigade.  The south, west and east slopes give the defender a +4 defensive modifier and are impassable to artillery and cavalry.  The northern slope gives the defender a +2 defensive modifier and is passable to all troop types as 2 inches of rough terrain.  Horse Artillery may not evade either to or from the Lesser Arapile.

4.  Other Hills give the defender a +1 defensive modifier and do not cause any movement penalty.

5.  Woods count as rough going for all troop types.

6.  Villages provide the defender with a -1 cover modifier and a +2 combat modifier.  Most may only accommodate a single brigade, but Los Arapiles village may accommodate two brigades.

7.  Streams were probably simply dried-up gullies at this time of year and are therefore passable to all troop types as 1 inch of rough terrain.  They provide a defender with a +1 combat modifier.  Units in Column, March Column or Limbered formation may cross at fords/bridges with no movement penalty.

Unit Labels

Well as Mrs Fawr always says; that was a big one!

Ask anyone to name the last battle of the Napoleonic Wars and the answer in 99% of cases will be ‘Waterloo’.  However, the war continued for some time after Napoleon’s catastrophic defeat.  The remainder of the war for the most part consisted of sieges, assaults on forts, small actions and clashes of outposts, but before the war finally ended there was one more large battle fought between two armies in the open field.  This battle occurred ten days after Waterloo on 28th June 1815, along the River La Souffel (or ‘Suffel’), just outside the fortress-city of Strasbourg.  It resulted in a victory for the French Army of the Rhine, commanded by General Rapp.

However, unlike the other major battles of 1815, the details of this battle are extremely scant, with General Rapp’s memoir providing the most detailed description of the battle though being frustratingly vague in many places.  Further details can be gleaned in the published reports to London from a few British liaison officers, as well as footnotes in other histories, the ever-essential orders of battle by George Nafziger and some very detailed online discussions on fora such as The Napoleon Series.

Although some of the details still require a fair degree of guesswork, La Souffel is a very interesting, modestly-sized battle that should provide an excellent game within a reasonable timeframe.  It’s certainly not one I’ve wargamed before, chiefly as the essential details are only really now available to be discovered thanks to the wealth of information now available online.

As always, this scenario is written for Napoleon’s Battles rules, where each unit represents a brigade or large regiment at a ratio of roughly 1:100.  The scenario would be easily adapted for similarly-scaled rules such as Age of Eagles or Général d’Armée.

Historical Background: The Hundred Days on the Rhine

Following Napoleon’s sudden return to power in 1815 he rapidly built up France’s armies to face the inevitable military response by his enemies.  By the end of May, he had rebuilt the army from 56,000 to 198,000 men.  The I, II, III, IV & VI Corps, the Imperial Guard Corps and the Cavalry Reserve, stationed along France’s northern borders and Paris, would become the Army of the North and would march north with the Emperor.  The rest of France was very sparsely defended by a number of ‘armies’, each being at most only the strength of a weak corps.  However, Napoleon hoped that with the advantage of interior lines, he could quickly knock out the  Allied armies individually as they appeared before turning to face the next one, much as he had tried (and ultimately failed) to do in Germany in 1813 and France in 1814.

The strongest of the subsidiary ‘armies’ defending France was the Army of the Rhine (otherwise known as the V Corps) under Général de Division Jean Rapp, centred on the fortress city of Strasbourg.  By mid-June this formation had around 24,000 men under command, organised into three infantry divisions (Rottembourg’s 15th, Albert’s 16th & Grandjean’s 17th), a light cavalry division (Merlin’s 7th), a reasonably strong artillery component and a weak reserve division comprising Gardes-Nationale militia, commanded by General Berckheim.  Although pretty anaemic as an army, as an army corps it was actually stronger than most.

The Allied Powers, then convened at the Congress of Vienna, scrambled to form a new Seventh Coalition and to mobilise forces to oppose Napoleon.  Wellington’s Anglo-Allied Army in the Netherlands and Blücher’s Prussian Army of the Lower Rhine were among the quickest to assemble and being close to Frances’s northern border, were Napoleon’s most immediate threat and would be tackled first.  The Russians would of course, take some considerable time to appear in the theatre of war.

The various south-western German states (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hessen-Darmstädt, etc), would be able to mobilise and arrive on the French border relatively quickly, but would operate under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg’s Austrian Army of the Upper Rhine.  This would take some time to assemble as the very large Austrian component was assembled from across the Austrian Empire.  Matters were further complicated for Austria when Joachim Murat, the King of Naples, declared war on Austria in March 1815, thus kicking off the Neapolitan War.  This was resolved with Murat’s defeat in May, but forced Austria to divert considerable forces and materiel at a time when they needed to build up their forces in western Germany and northern Italy.

Nevertheless, by mid-June, Schwarzenberg had assembled an army of over 260,000 men on the eastern bank of the Rhine, outnumbering Rapp’s tiny command by more than ten-to-one.  This massive force comprised the Austrian I Corps, Austrian II Corps, the ‘Austrian’ III Corps (which was actually mostly Württemberger, with Austrian and Hessen-Darmstädt divisions), the IV (Bavarian) Corps, ‘Austrian’ Reserve Corps (again including a lot of allied German contingents, especially Badener), a multi-national Blockade Corps and a Saxon Corps.  To this was added Count Lambert’s Russian Corps, being the advance guard element of Barclay de Tolly’s Russian Army, the bulk of which was still weeks away.

Schwarzenberg’s plan required the Right Wing, consisting of the Crown Prince of Württemberg’s III Corps and Wrede’s IV Corps, with Lambert’s Russian Corps guarding the right flank, to cross the Rhine north of Strasbourg and then swing around to cross the Saar and cut Strasbourg off from its western lines of communication to Nancy, Metz and the Vosges Mountains.  The rest of the army would form the Left Wing under the command of Archduke Ferdinand.  This would cross the Rhine to the south and would drive on Nancy from the south, aiming to cut off Strasburg’s lines of communication with the interior of France.  Barclay de Tolly’s Russian Army would also aim to concentrate at Nancy as they arrived and would eventually form up on Schwarzenberg’s right as they advanced into France.

Cautious as to Napoleon’s intentions, Schwarzenberg’s army remained stationary until at last Schwarzenberg received word of Napoleon’s invasion of the Netherlands.  Spurred into action at last, Schwarzenberg issued his orders.  However, by the time those orders were acted upon, the Battle of Waterloo was already being fought!

Wrede’s IV (Bavarian) Corps crossed the Rhine on 19th June, followed by the Crown Prince of Württemberg’s III Corps.  In response, Rapp marched his corps north to meet the invaders, intending initially to defend the line of the River Queich (which forms a natural barrier, extending east from the dense Pfälzerwald forest, through the small fortified town of Landau to the Rhine) before falling back to defend the ‘Lines of Wissembourg’.  This chain of fortifications had been built in 1706 by Marshal Villars and stretched between Wissembourg and the densely-forested hills of the Mundat Forest to the west, along the River Lauter, to Lauterbourg on the banks of the Rhine, to the east.  These fortifications had been fought over during the War of Spanish Succession and the War of Austrian Succession and again during the War of the First Coalition in 1793.  However, Rapp now found the Lines to be in a very sorry state of repair and almost indefensible in their current state.

Only Rapp’s advance guard was able to reach the Queich before Allied troops from the Crown Prince of Württemberg’s III Corps were present in significant numbers.  Rapp therefore had to content himself with reinforcing the garrison of Landau with a battalion and conducting a skirmish along the river, before falling back to the Lines of Wissembourg.

It was at this time, on or around the 21st June, that Rapp received word of Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo.  Rapp decided not to tell his men about this catastrophe, fearing what it might do for their morale.  One account also says that Napoleon had ordered Rapp to march to Paris, but Rapp made no mention of this in his memoir.  Nevertheless, Rapp must have received some form of communication from the Emperor, as on 25th June, Lieutenant Colonel George Jenkinson (Royal Horse Artillery), the British liaison officer to Crown Prince of Württemberg’s headquarters, reported that Rapp had written to the Crown Prince during the previous day, advising him that Napoleon had on 22nd June formally abdicated in favour of his infant son (who was at the time a ward of his grandfather, the Austrian Emperor Francis).  The Crown Prince surmised (probably correctly) that this was merely a play for time rather than a serious overture for an armistice and operations therefore continued.

In any case, Wrede’s IV (Bavarian) Corps had on 23rd June, seized the crossings over the River Saar at Saarbrücken and Sarreguemines and by the 24th was in full flood across Rapp’s lines of communication to the west.  The fortress of Bitche was blockaded and called out to surrender (which they refused), while Bavarian cavalry penetrated as far south as Saarlouis.  Lambert’s Russians followed in Wrede’s wake and pushed west to observe the fortress of Metz and the River Moselle.  As Wrede continued to advance on Lunéville and Nancy, any hope that Rapp had  held of retreating to the west or linking up with forces at Metz now vanished (General Gérard’s French IV Corps had been posted at Metz a few weeks earlier, but had been called away by the Emperor to join his doomed march on Brussels).

With Rapp having established a new defensive position along the decrepit Lines of Wissembourg, the Crown Prince’s III Corps advanced to contact, leaving Count Wallmoden-Gimborn’s Corps (a divisional-sized multi-national formation from the Austrian Reserve) to blockade Landau.  As the Crown Prince formed up in preparation for the assault across the River Lauter, Rapp was finally able to gain a full appreciation of the disparity in numbers.  Having left one of Rottembourg’s brigades to guard the flank and rear along the Rhine, Rapp had only around 11,000 men to guard 12 miles of ruined fortifications and was outnumbered at a ratio of roughly 4:1!  With the Allied assault expected at dawn on the 25th, Rapp’s army quietly slipped away southward during the night of 24th June.

As Rapp retreated back toward Strasbourg, he would be forced to pass through the large Forest of Haguenau.  There would then be an opportunity to turn on his pursuers at the village of Surbourg, which guards the entrance to the only practicable route through the forest.  At the eastern end of the forest, one of Rottembourg’s brigades garrisoned Seltz, which guards the narrow defile between the forest and the Rhine.

The Crown Prince did not disappoint, as on the 26th his advance guard immediately launched an attack on Rapp’s rearguard, which stood on the high ground north of Surbourg.  The Württemburg cavalry were given a bloody nose and fell back to await the arrival of Austrian infantry, but the French rearguard then fell back over the River Sur to repeat the exercise.

The situation was repeated at Seltz, where Wallmoden’s Corps, having left a detachment to watch Landau, launched itself at the French flank-guard.  Accounts are conflicting, but the assault seems to have been bloodily repulsed before Rottembourg fell back to the next position.  Both sides claimed victory at both actions, but on balance they seem to have been very effective rearguard actions by the French; inflicting damage and delay on the enemy, followed by counter-attack before falling back to the next defensive position.

However, it was during this period of rearguard and withdrawal that Rapp’s men discovered the truth about Napoleon’s defeat and became mutinous!  Rapp discovered that one regiment, of impeccable fighting reputation, was already formed up with its supporting battery limbered, preparing to march off without orders to the Vosges Mountains and from there mount a guerrilla campaign.  Seizing their Eagle, Rapp exhorted them to retain their honour and stand with him in the defence of France.  This seemed to work and the men cheered him before returning to their duties.

With mutiny averted and having passed through the Forest of Haguenau, Rapp’s rearguard made another stand at Haguenau on the 27th before falling back once again after a sharp skirmish.  Rapp considered offering battle at Brumath (aka Brumpt), but with Rottembourg’s 15th Division still detached and with Wrede’s Bavarians making unchecked progress in the west, Rapp decided to fall back to a more defensible position along the River La Souffel, in front of the walls of Strasbourg itself.  At last, Rapp’s army was united and formed up along the river.

On the morning of 28th June, Rottembourg’s 15th Division formed up on the right of Rapp’s army, in front of the village of Hönheim, with his right resting upon the River Ill and his left on the village of Souffelweiersheim.  Albert’s 16th Division formed up on the left, with his left flank resting upon the Hausbergen ridge.  The left bastion of the defence was formed by the village of Mundolsheim, which had been prepared for defence by Général de Brigade Beurmann and the 10ème Légère.  One battalion of the 10ème Légère had also been posted on the north bank of the river, to fortify and hold the village of Lampertheim, which guarded the northern end of one of the few bridges.  Grandjean’s 17th Division and Merlin’s 7th Light Cavalry Division were held in reserve near Bischheim and Berckheim’s Reserve Division of Gardes-Nationale was also somewhere in the vicinity.

The Battle of La Souffel

Accounts of the Battle or La Souffel are fragmentary, contradictory and brief.  Jenkinson’s and Rapp’s accounts of the day read as though they are of completely different events.  Note also that Rapp’s memoir (and those accounts drawn from Rapp’s account) often refers to ‘Austrians’ where there were no Austrian forces present.  It makes far more sense when we take ‘Austrian’ to mean ‘Allied’ or ‘enemy’.  Anyway, here’s my best stab at describing the action.  Any mistakes or misunderstandings are entirely of my own making …

The Crown Prince wasted no time on deploying his troops for a deliberate assault on Rapp’s line, instead throwing his divisions straight into the assault as they arrived on the battlefield.  Palombini’s Austrian division, forming the right flank of the army, was the first to arrive and was ordered to assault the detachment holding Lampertheim.  The battalion of the 10ème Légère posted there apparently did massive damage to the hasty Austrian attack, but faced by overwhelming numbers was forced to fall back over the bridge to the regiment’s main position in Mundolsheim.

As Prince Emil’s Hessen-Darmstädt Division arrived, it too was thrown into the assault, attacking Mundolsheim from across the river to the east, while Palombini’s Austrians attacked from Lampertheim.  Graf Kinsky’s Austrian hussars meanwhile, found more crossing-points to the west and was soon joined by some of Palombini’s Austrian infantry, who moved up to attack Albert’s left flank on the Hausbergen Ridge.

General Beurmann and the 10ème Légère somehow managed to beat off repeated assaults, but soon found themselves completely surrounded and cut off from the rest of Rapp’s army.  A counter-attack by the 32ème de Ligne of Albert’s Division relieved the situation for a while, but with the arrival of Franquemont’s Württemberg Corps, a wedge was driven between Rapp’s two leading divisions and the 10ème Légère were once again isolated and cut off from support.

As Albert’s 16th Division was pushed back on Hönheim, Rottembourg’s 15th Division wheeled left to face the renewed threat.  Rapp ordered Grandjean to send a brigade forward from the reserve (the 36ème and 103ème de Ligne) to hold the centre.  The 36ème relieved the defenders of Souffelweiersheim but then, for reasons that aren’t clear, were then pulled back out of the village in order to mount a counter-attack to relieve the beleaguered 10ème Légère.

This counter-attack proved to be successful and the heroic General Beurmann with his 10ème Légère were finally able to withdraw from Mundolsheim, but there was now a huge hole in the centre, through which the Württembergers poured!

Franquemont’s Württemberg infantry swarmed across the river and occupied Souffelsweierheim before Rapp could react.  Nevertheless, Rapp quickly organised a counter-attack and Generals Fririon and Gudin moved forward.  Despite initial success, Württemberg reinforcements arrived and the French were able to make no further headway in recapturing the village.

A great mass of Württemberg infantry and cavalry, supported by a large number of guns, now appeared in the centre, aiming to drive across the main Brumath Road bridge between Souffelweirsheim and Mundolsheim.  Prince Adam led his Württemberg Cavalry Division across the bridge in an audacious charge, which sabred at least one French battery before it had time to escape (two French battery commanders were killed while defending their guns, so it may have been two batteries, but one complete French horse battery was captured and the guns taken away as trophies before the French could counter-attack).  Some Württemberg cavalry apparently got so carried away in the pursuit, that they came within range of the guns on the walls of Strasbourg!  With the Allies now in full flood across the river and driving into the French centre, the critical moment of the battle had now been reached.

However, in driving deep into the French position, the Württembergers had exposed their left flank to Rottembourg’s division, which had already wheeled left to face just such an eventuality.  Rottembourg’s artillery poured a devastating fire into the Württemberg flank.  With the Württembergers now wavering, Rapp drew his sabre and placing himself at the head of two of Merlin’s cavalry regiments (the 7ème Chasseurs à Cheval & 11ème Dragons), launched a charge into the disordered enemy!

The effect of this timely charge was clearly devastating.  In Rapp’s own words, “I routed the first line, penetrated the second, and overthrew every thing that offered me any resistance.  We made a dreadful slaughter of the Austrian and Württemberg cavalry.  At the same time the 32nd came up at the charge in close columns, and prevented them from rallying.  They were thrown back on their own infantry, whom they put to flight.

General Rottembourg, on his side, pushed forward his right wing, and opened on the enemy, who defiled in confusion before his columns, a most destructive fire of artillery and musquetry; in an instant the field of battle is covered with the slain, and the immense army of the Prince of Württemberg is routed.  The defeat was so complete that baggage, which was two leagues in the rear, was attacked and plundered, and the Prince himself lost his equipages.  The confusion extended itself as far as Haguenau, and would have gone still farther if 30,000 Russians, who came up from Weissembourg, had not by their presence encouraged the fugitives.”

Rapp’s heavily-outnumbered Army of the Rhine had won a remarkable victory at La Souffel, but what was it all for?  Immediately following the battle, Rapp withdrew his army into Strasbourg fortress, which was what the Allies had been trying to achieve all along.  If nothing else, Rapp had regained some of France’s wounded pride and honour, but at the expense of over 2,000 men killed on each side.  The battle also had consequences for the local civilians in the immediate aftermath, as the Crown Prince of Württemberg took his frustration out on them, burning the village of Souffelweiersheim and threatening the parish priest, seemingly out of petty vengeance.

With Rapp having refused all entreaties to surrender, the Crown Prince blockaded Strasbourg.  However, he lacked a siege train and in any case, didn’t have the numbers to formally besiege a fortress as large as Strasbourg, so Rapp was able to mount numerous sorties and expeditions outside the walls.

On 4th July the Crown Prince’s III Corps was relieved by Hohenzollern-Hechingen’s Austrian II Corps.  Hostilities finally came to an end with the news of the fall of Paris and the signing of a local armistice in Alsace on 24th July.  However, Rapp’s problems were not over.  His men, fearing not being paid for their service upon demobilisation, mutinied and took over the fortress and held the officers hostage, demanding their back-pay!  At last however, the mutiny was resolved on 5th September and the Army of the Rhine, the last standing formation of Napoleon’s army, was finally dissolved.

Game Outline

The game starts with the Allied 1430hrs turn and ends with the French 2100hrs turn, so the game lasts for 14 turns or until the Allied victory conditions have been met.  The battle actually ended long before nightfall, so this could be shortened to 12 or 10 turns if preferred.

Although the number of troops wasn’t all that vast, the battle was fought over quite a large area, so the table is 8′ x 6′.  Each grid-square on the map is equivalent to one square foot on the table or 1,000 Prussian ‘paces’ (‘schritte’), as per the map below.

[N.B. Having been working on the assumption that a ‘schritt’ was ‘about a yard’, I’ve since discovered that a ‘schritt’ was only about 2 feet, or two thirds of an Imperial yard.  This map could probably therefore be reduced in size by a third, to around 6′ x 4′, but I can’t be arsed…]

Victory Conditions

Very simply, the Allies need to break the French army’s morale in order to force them back into Strasbourg fortress.  The French just have to frustrate the Allies’ objective in order to achieve victory, though of course they will win a glorious victory if they succeed in breaking the Allied army’s morale.

III Austrian-Allied Corps Order of Battle

Feldmarschall Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm Karl von Württemberg
9”E(10)+0 (6 Free Rolls)

Württemberg Corps (Centre)

Feldzeugmeister Friedrich Graf von Franquemont                           8”G(5)+1 [4F]

1st Württemberg Division – Generalleutnant Christian Johann Gottgetrau von Koch      3”A(6)+0
Kirchberg’s Brigade (IR 2, IR 4 & IR 5)                                               28 WtLN [17D]
Misani’s Brigade (IR 3 & IR 7)                                                               24 WtLN [14D]
Lalance’s Brigade (IR 8)                                                                          16 WtLN [10D]

2nd Württemberg Division – Generalleutnant von Döring      3”G(6)+1
Stockmayer’s Brigade (IR 6)                                                                  16 WtLN [10D]
Hügel’s Brigade (IR 9, IR 10 & IR 11)                                                   28 WtJG [14D]

Württemberg Cavalry Division – Generalleutnant Prinz Adam von Württemberg      3”G(6)+0
Jett’s Brigade (CR 2 & CR 4)                                                                    12 WtLC [6D]
Moltke’s Brigade (CR 3 & CR 5)                                                              12 WtLC [6D]
1st Horse Battery                                                                                        Wt6#
2nd Horse Battery                                                                                      Wt6#

Württemberg Artillery Reserve
12pdr Foot Battery                                                                                      Wt12#

Right Wing (Temporary Corps)

Feldmarschalleutnant Giuseppe Federico Palombini                          5”G(4)+0 [3F]

Austrian Division (Palombini) – Generalmajor Franz Graf Kinsky  3”A(5)+0
Kinsky’s Brigade (HR 6)                                                                             20 AsLC [10D]
Luxembourg’s Brigade (IR 18 & IR 47)                                                   28 AsLN [17D]
Czollich’s Brigade (IR 49 & IR 63)                                                           28 AsLN [17D]
12pdr Position Battery                                                                                As12#

Hessen-Darmstädt Division – Generalleutnant Prinz Emil von Hesse  4”G(7)+1
Folhenius’ Brigade (Leibgarde, Garde-Füsilier & Erbgrossherzog IRs)  16 HsGD [6D]
Gall’s Brigade (Prinz Emil & Leib IRs)                                                    24 HsLN [12D]

Left Wing (Flanking Corps)

German Division – Feldmarschalleutnant Ludwig Graf von Wallmoden-Gimborn 4”A(7)+0 [2F]
Ysenburg-Büdingen’s Rhenish Brigade                                                  20 RhLN [12D]
La Roche-Starkenfeld’s Baden Landwehr Brigade                               20 BdLW [14D]
4 Sqns, Austrian Chevauléger-Regiment 1 ‘Kaiser’                               8 AsLC [4D]

Allied Order of Battle Notes

1.  III Korps was officially an ‘Austrian’ corps, though in reality was a multinational formation, led by the Württembergers, hence the ‘Austrian-Allied’ tag.  Very strong for an army corps, III Korps was a de facto army, with the Württembergers organised in their own ‘corps within a corps’ under Franquemont.

2.  The Württemberg brigades are very unbalanced in strength, so I’ve shifted some strength from Kirchberg’s and Hügel’s colossal brigades to Lalance’s & Stockmayer’s brigades in an attempt to slightly balance things out.

3.  I’ve shifted the strength of the Hessian ‘Erbgrossherzog’ Infantry Regiment to Gall’s brigade in order to separate the two Guard regiments of Folhenius’s brigade as a dedicated Guard brigade and have Gall’s brigade as the Line brigade.  Feel free to reverse the strengths if you prefer, though you’ll then have to decide whether or not to class Folhenius’ large brigade as Guards.

4.  Pallombini appears to have been placed in command of the right wing, consisting of his own Austrian Division and Prinz Emil’s Hessian Division.  Pallombini has therefore been elevated to the position of Temporary Corps Commander, with a slightly increased command-span.  For game purposes, I’ve arbitrarily appointed a random brigade commander (Graf Kinsky) to take command of Palombini’s division.

5.  As the Napoleon’s Battles site has gone down, I’m using the generalship ratings from the 1st Edition Red Module for Palombini and Prinz Emil (though it strangely says that Prinz Emil died in 1813 – he was taken prisoner by the Prussians at Leipzig, but didn’t die!).  However, I’ve got no ratings whatsoever for Döring or Koch, so have just given them very average base stats (though Döring gets a boost from the presence of the hard-fighting veteran Major Generals Stockmayer and Hügel).

6.  I’ve been unable to establish the first name of Generalleutnant von Döring.

7.  By a process of elimination with there being a few Grafs Kinsky on the Austrian Army List, I think that this Graf Kinsky must be Franz de Paula Joseph Graf Kinsky von Wschinitz und Tettau (aged 46), as he was the only Graf Kinsky still alive and still serving with the rank of Generalmajor at the time.  The family at the time also included the still-serving Feldmarschalleutnant Karl Graf Kinsky and the retired Generalmajor Philipp Joseph Graf Kinsky.

8.  There is some disagreement in sources regarding the identity of Württemberg and Hessian brigade commanders, with some sources showing Hohenlohe in lieu of Kirchberg and Stockmayer elsewhere (commanding the Württemberg Landwehr), with Lalance commanding both IR 6 & IR 8.  They also show all the infantry grouped under Koch, with no divisional command under Döring.  Some also describe the army as being commanded by Duke Eugène of Württemberg, but that is definitely wrong.  One source shows Generalmajor Schönberg commanding the Hessian 2nd Brigade instead of Gall.

9.  The Württemberg reserve 12pdr battery may be commanded by either of the Württemberg infantry divisional commanders.

10.  Thoughts and Wafflings on Wallmoden’s Corps:  A divisional-sized ‘corps’ commanded by the Austrian Feldmarshalleutnant Ludwig Georg Thedel Graf von Wallmoden-Gimborn formed the detached Left Wing of the Crown Prince of Württemberg’s command.  A grandson of King George II (his father Johann having been an illegitimate son of the King, though holding high office in Hanover), Wallmoden was then serving as an Austrian officer, having previously held Hanoverian, Prussian, Austrian, British and then Russian commissions.  Wallmoden had made a name for himself as a light cavalry commander during the Battle of Wagram in 1809 and as the leader of the multi-national corps fighting in northern Germany 1813-14.

However, Wallmoden’s active participation in the Battle of La Souffel is a matter of some debate.  His corps had already fought a sharp action on 26th June against Rottembourg’s Division at Seltz and although some thumbnail biographies mention his involvement at La Souffel, Lt Col George Jenkinson mentioned that “The division of Count Wallmoden took no part in the action… opposed as they were by a well-known position, which the enemy occupied, between the Ill and the Rhine.”  This was probably the fortified bridgehead at Englisch-Hof, held by Berckheim’s Garde-Nationale, so in game terms, Wallmoden probably did appear ‘on the table’, but didn’t actively engage the enemy.  I’ve therefore included his corps as late reinforcements.

Despite having decided to include Wallmoden, I must confess that I have been unable to exactly discover what the strength and composition was of his corps.  George Nafziger shows his division at the commencement of operations as belonging to the Austrian Reserve and comprising only a single brigade of four Rhenish battalions (Reuss, Ysenburg, Fulda and Frankfurt), commanded by Generalmajor Graf Ysenburg-Büdingen.  One board-game of the battle shows Wallmoden’s corps as comprising ‘Landwehr’ of indeterminate nationality.

Lieutenant General Stewart, the British liaison officer to the Austrian Imperial Headquarters, reported on 25th June that Wallmoden had “ten battalions and a regiment of Austrian cavalry” blockading Landau and went on to say that “four thousand men and some squadrons… will be left before Landau.”  However, Lt Col Jenkinson, being much closer to the action, reported that only a ‘small detachment’ had been left at Landau, which does suggest a much smaller number than 4,000 (a force of that size would have represented a very large chunk (possibly the majority) of Wallmoden’s ten battalions).

Digby Smith states that Wallmoden had six battalions and four squadrons present at Seltz on 26th June, totaling approximately 4,800 men, which would suggest that there was more than just the Rhenish brigade.  Lt Col Jenkinson meanwhile, mentions the heroic presence at Seltz of a Major General Wrede (not to be confused with the Bavarian army commander of the same name), who led the ‘Lunebourg and Frankfort battalions’.  The ‘Frankfort’ (Frankfurt) battalion is certainly one of the Rhenish units mentioned above, but the ‘Lunebourg’ battalion must surely be a mistake (Lüneburg being a Hanoverian city that at the time was providing two battalions to Wellington’s army).  Jenkinson’s spelling of people and place names is fairly random, so might this battalion perhaps have been a Baden Landwehr battalion from the city of Laufenburg?

At the end of the Battle of La Souffel, one account mentioned that the only remaining threat to Rapp’s army was ‘Wallmoden’s cavalry’, which must presumably refer to the above-mentioned four Austrian squadrons (almost certainly belonging to the 1st ‘Kaiser’ Chevaulégers).

From all of this, it would appear that Wallmoden had taken a portion of the Baden General Graf Hochberg’s Division under command.  According to Nafziger, Hochberg at the start of the campaign had Stockmayer’s Brigade (1st, 2nd & 3rd Württemberg Land-Regiments (i.e. Landwehr), a Württemberg battery and a Hessen-Darmstädt Landwehr Battalion), Volkmann’s Brigade (1st, 5th & 8th Baden Landwehr Battalions, 4th (Landwehr) Battalion of Austrian IR 63 ‘Bianchi’, Austrian Chevauléger-Regiment #1 ‘Kaiser’ and two Austrian 3pdr foot batteries) and La Roche-Starkenfeld’s Brigade (three unidentified battalions of Baden Landwehr and the Baden Jäger Corps).  According to Lieutenant General Stewart, Hochberg was tasked with taking Volkmann’s Brigade, ‘some Hessen-Darmstädt troops’ (the Landwehr battalion, presumably?) and two squadrons of the ‘Kaiser’ Chevaulégers to invest Neu-Breisach.  If the remainder were left with Wallmoden, that would amount to the above-mentioned ten battalions and four squadrons.  Assuming that one brigade was left behind to cover Landau, that would leave Wallmoden with six battalions and four squadrons, so this seems possible.

I’m also guessing that Wrede replaced had La Roche-Starkenfels as commander of the Baden Landwehr?  I’ve arbitrarily included Wrede on the label sheet, anyway.  La Roche-Starkenfels does however, appear slightly later in the story, being wounded and captured by the 57ème de Ligne while in command of some Allied cavalry during a skirmish outside Strasbourg.

Anyway, this is a lot of research, waffle and speculation to then just make a wild-arsed guess as to the composition of a very small formation that probably won’t do very much, but that’s how I roll… 🙂

The French Army of the Rhine (V Corps) Order of Battle

Général de Division Baron Jean Rapp
10”G(10)+2 [7M] [6F] (5 Free Rolls)

15ème Division – Général de Division Henri Rottembourg           4”G(7)+1
Garbe’s Brigade #1 (39ème & 40ème de Ligne)                                     24 FrLN [14D]
Pouart’s Brigade (52ème & 104ème de Ligne)                                       20 FrLN [12D]

16ème Division – Général de Division Baron Joseph Jean-Baptiste Albert  4”G(7)+1
Beurmann’s Brigade (10ème Légère)                                                       20 FrLT [12D]
Sabatier’s Brigade (32ème de Ligne)                                                        12 FrLN [7D]
Cressonier’s Brigade (18ème & 57ème de Ligne)                                   24 FrLN [14D]

17ème Division – Général de Division Baron Charles-Louis-Dieudonné Grandjean      3”A(7)+0
Nempe’s Brigade (36ème & 103ème de Ligne)                                        24 FrLN [14D]
Laurain’s Brigade (17ème & 58ème de Ligne)                                          24 FrLN [14D]

7ème Division du Cavallerie-Légère – Général de Division Comte Christophe Antoine Merlin      3”A(5)+0
Grouval’s Brigade (2ème & 7ème Chasseurs à Cheval)                          8 FrLC [5D]
Rambourg’s Brigade (2ème Hussards, 11ème Dragons & 13ème Ch à Ch) 16 FrLC [10D]
1/2ème Artillerie à Cheval                                                                             Fr8#

Artillery Reserve – Colonel Aime-Prosper Saint-Cyr                          3”A(6)+0
5/4ème Artillerie à Pied                                                                                  Fr12#
?/4ème Artillerie à Pied                                                                                  Fr12#
?/2ème Artillerie à Cheval                                                                              Fr8#

Reserve Division – Général de Division Sigismond Frédéric de Berckheim  4”A(5)+0
1er Brigade (Garde Nationale)                                                                       16 FrNGI [10D]
2ème Brigade (Garde Nationale)                                                                   16 FrNGI [10D]

French Order of Battle Notes

1.  The Napoleon’s Battles site seems to have finally died, so I can no longer access the generalship ratings database, which is a shame.  However, I’ve already got most of the generals listed in other scenarios and I’m using the generalship ratings from the 1st Edition Red Module for Rottembourg.  Prosper St-Cyr isn’t listed, so I’ve given him very average stats.

2.  There is enormous uncertainty and disagreement regarding the identity of the French brigade commanders, but I’ve gone with the list suggested during a detailed discussion in the now-defunct Napoleon Series forum.  Rapp’s memoir also mentions some others, which I will discuss below.

3.  Colonel Prosper St-Cyr, the commander of the artillery reserve (ordinarily Commanding Officer of the 5th Artillery Regiment, which supplied the 8-pounder foot batteries to the infantry divisions), may also take command of Merlin’s horse battery if it falls within his command-span.  The batteries of St-Cyr’s Artillery Reserve may alternatively be commanded by any divisional commander and they may be deployed with divisions at the start of the game, though not with the 10ème Légère detachment at Lampertheim.

4.  General Boulart’s history (found on The Napoleon Series) lists the two batteries of horse artillery as being equipped with Gribeauval 8-pounders.  This was also true of the four batteries of light foot artillery present (one with each infantry division), though these aren’t represented in Napoleon’s Battles.  Although the French Army had standardised years before on the An XI 6-pounder as its standard light artillery piece, Gribeauval 4-pounders and 8-pounders had re-emerged from the arsenals to replace losses suffered 1812-1814.  There had also been an ideological drive by ultra-Royalist artillery commanders during the Restoration to return to the Gribeauval system and purge the Republican An XI system from the order of battle.  Napoleon’s Army of the North was still using An XI 6-pounders, but here on the Rhine they had 8-pounders.

5.  Players may prefer to even up Merlin’s two cavalry brigades to 12 figures apiece instead of 8 and 16.

6.  If desired at the start of the game, the 10ème Légère (Beurmann’s brigade of Albert’s 16ème Division) may occupy the village of Mundolsheim, which has been prepared for defence.  In addition, a battalion-sized detachment consisting of 8 figures may also garrison the village of Lampertheim, which has similarly been fortified.  Separate labels for the two parts of the 10ème Légère are included in the label-sheet (below) if this option is taken.

7.  Général de Brigade Beurmann is recorded by Rapp as being in command of the 10ème Légère.  This must have been Jean Ernest Beurmann, whose biography does mention him commanding a brigade of Albert’s 16th Division (the only other General Beurmann committed suicide in April 1815).  However, Nafziger’s order of battle shows Général de Brigade Sabatier as commanding both the 10ème Légère and 32ème de Ligne.  I’ve therefore inserted Beurmann into the order of battle as commanding the 10ème Légère, though it’s possible that he might simply have taken over the whole brigade from Sabatier.

8.  Another general mentioned in Rapp’s account but not appearing in Nafziger’s order of battle, is Général de Brigade Gudin.  I’ve worked out that this was Pierre César Gudin des Bardières, brother of the more famous Général de Division Charles Étienne César Gudin de la Sablonnière, who was killed in Russia.  According to one biography, Gudin commanded a brigade in Rottembourg’s 15th Division at La Souffel, though I don’t know which regiments he commanded or who he replaced.

9.  Yet another officer mentioned by Rapp but not by Nafziger is Général de Brigade Fririon.  I’ve managed to establish that this was Joseph François Fririon, whose biography does mention that he was serving ‘in Strasbourg’ during the Hundred Days.  He should not be confused with the slightly more famous and more senior Général de Division François-Nicolas Fririon, who was then holding a command in Paris (even though several websites use the same portrait for both men!).  Both men enlisted in the Artois Regiment, albeit nine years apart (in 1782 and 1791), so may have been related.

10.  A board-game of the battle has a completely different set of French brigade commanders.  I’ve no idea what the source is, but it does include the above-mentioned Beurmann, Gudin and Fririon, so has the ring of truth about it, though it also shows ‘Prince Eugène of Württemberg’ as the Allied commander, so should be treated with some suspicion.  The list shows Rottembourg’s 15th Division as having Gudin and Montagnier, Albert’s 16th Division with Beurmann and Voyrol and Grandjean’s 17th Division with Fririon and Dandlau.  Although I’ve included Beurmann in my order of battle, I’ll leave the rest as per Nafziger’s version until I can find some better information (Voyrol was certainly Colonel of the 18ème de Ligne and not a General, though may have been temporarily in command of a brigade).

Terrain Notes

River La Souffel – This is impassable to artillery and cavalry (it was described as such in a dispatch by Lieutenant Colonel George Jenkinson of the Royal Horse Artillery, the British liaison officer to the Crown Prince of Württemberg).  Infantry may pass over the river, treating it as 2 inches of rough terrain.  The defender also benefits from a +1 defensive modifier.

River Ill – This large river cuts across the eastern corner of the table and is impassable to all troop-types, except at the marked (fortified) bridge.

Streams – These are passable to infantry, cavalry and limbered artillery and are treated as one inch of rough terrain.  They do not cause disorder to crossing units, but do give the defender a +1 defensive modifier.

Bridges and Fords – These allow all troop types to pass over a watercourse without penalty, provided the unit is in March Column, Column or Limbered formation.  The defender still gains the +1 defensive modifier.

Hills – The terrain is very gently rolling, though there are significant low hills and ridges, which serve to block line of sight and simultaneously provide artillery with improved lines of fire from the crests.  I would only apply the usual +1 defensive combat modifier where the defender is holding the second contour of a two-level hill.  If you’re short of terrain, the map can be simplified by treating the map as mostly flat, ignoring the lower level of contours and only including hills were there is a second contour level.

Woods – The woods are classed as rough terrain for all troop types, though are relatively open and are not disordering.

Villages – Most villages provide the defender with a -2 cover modifier and a +1 combat modifier.  The smaller villages may only accommodate a detachment of up to 8 figures, while the larger villages (Mundolsheim, Hönheim and Reichstett) may be garrisoned by a single brigade of any size.

Lampertheim & Mundolsheim Villages – These villages have been prepared for defence and have a -2 cover modifier and a +2 combat modifier, in addition to any +1 modifier for crossing a river/stream.

Bischheim and Hönheim Villages – These villages have a line of entrenchments and redoubts along their western side (as shown by the black chevrons on the map).  These were built in previous years as part of the outer defences for the city of Strasbourg.  Any units defending the village have a +3 combat modifier against any assault from that side, but a +1 modifier against attacks from any other direction (i.e. treat them as part of the village defences, rather than additional redoubts).  Any attached batteries on the western side of these villages will also gain the -2 cover modifier and +3 combat modifier (i.e. although the batteries are deployed just outside the village, they still benefit from the cover provided by surrounding entrenchments).

Redoubts and Entrenchments – The gap between the villages of Bischheim and Hönheim is also heavily entrenched, as are both ends of the bridge over the River Ill at Englisch-Hof.  These entrenchments provide the defender with a -2 cover modifier and a +2 combat modifier in their front arc only.

Deployment

All French units may be deployed in any formation, within the formation-boxes shown on the map.  As mentioned above, the 10ème Légère (Beurmann’s Brigade) of Albert’s 16th Division have the option of garrisoning Mundolsheim and/or deploying an 8-figure detachment to garrison the village of Lampertheim.

All Allied units will march on to the table as per their reinforcement schedule.  Their army morale rating will increase as reinforcements arrive.

If the umpire is feeling generous, General Rapp may be allowed to deploy his forces anywhere south of the La Souffel.  However, given the various divisions’ previous manoeuvres, I would insist that the general position of the two forward divisions should remain the same; i.e. Rottembourg’s 15th Division on the right and Albert’s 16th Division on the left.  Grandjean’s 17th Division, Merlin’s Light Cavalry Division, Berckheim’s Reserve Division and St-Cyr’s Artillery Reserve may be deployed as Rapp sees fit.

Game & Reinforcement Schedule

See the map below for Allied reinforcement arrival points.

1400hrs (Turn 1):  The Crown Prince of Württemberg, FML Palombini, Palombini’s Austrian Division (commanded by GM Kinsky) and Prince Emil’s Hesse-Darmstädt Division arrive deployed in any formation, anywhere between Point A & Point B.  The Allied Army Morale rating is now 3M.

1430hrs (Turn 2):  GL Franquemont, Koch’s 1st Württemberg Division, Döring’s 2nd Württemberg Division and the Württemberg 12pdr Foot Battery arrive in March Column formation on either of the two roads at Point B and Point C (they may arrive as a single column or in two separate divisional columns).  Prince Adam’s Württemberg Cavalry Division may arrive deployed in any formation, anywhere between Point A & Point C.  The Allied army morale rating is now 8M.

1700hrs (Turn 7):  Wallmoden’s German Division arrives in March Column formation on either of the two roads at Point D.  The Allied army morale rating is now 9M.

2100hrs (Turn 14):  The game ends at the end of the French turn.

I do not recommend using the Variable Arrival Time optional rule for this scenario.

Unit Labels