“Whoever is not dead or enraptured this evening must have fought like a dishonourable dog!”

General of Cavalry Gebhard Lebrecht von Blücher

“The enemy army marched at me rapidly; his forces appeared to get larger and larger as they came forward, as if they had sprung from the ground.”

Marshal Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de Marmont, Duke of Ragusa

While writing my recent article on the Artillerie de la Marine, I was suitably inspired to wargame the apocalyptic Battle of Möckern, in which the Artillerie de la Marine played a key role.  I seem to remember having played this one before, but it was a VERY long time ago, so another visit is long overdue, as is a proper scenario.

As usual, this scenario is written for Napoleon’s Battles rules, which is designed for ‘grand-tactical’ battles at roughly 1:100 figure-to-man ratio, where the smallest unit of manoeuvre is the brigade or large regiment.  A clarification of the game scales, orders of battle, etc, can be found below under ‘Orders of Battle’.

Note that this scenario is for the Battle of Möckern of 16th October 1813 which was the northern flank of the titanic Battle of Leipzig, the ‘Battle of Nations’ and not the earlier Battle of Möckern of 5th April 1813, which was fought at a completely different village coincidentally called Möckern, near the fortress of Magdeburg.

The History Bit

My surviving reader will be relieved to recall that I covered the 1813 Campaign of Germany leading up to the Battle of Leipzig at some length in my Battle of Liebertwolkwitz article, so I’ll only cover the immediate campaign of the last three or four days leading up to the battle.  Follow the link if you want to endure it, otherwise, rejoice at that news! 🙂

In the days immediately leading up to the Battle of Leipzig, there had been much disagreement between the headquarters of the Army of Silesia under the Prussian General of Cavalry Gebhard Lebrecht von Blücher and the Army of the North under the Crown Prince of Sweden (i.e. the former French Marshal Bernadotte) as to the progress of the campaign.  Both armies had crossed over the mighty River Elbe during the first week of October, but with Napoleon marching north to find them, they had subsequently marched west over the River Mulde to avoid him and buy time for Field Marshall Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia to advance in Napoleon’s rear.  The Allied strategy, the so-called ‘Trachenberg Plan’ boiled down to one simple rule, “Retreat when Napoleon is present and attack when he is absent”.  This plan had served them very sell since the recommencement of hostilities in August, but cracks (largely fueled by the widely-differing war-aims of the various Allied nations) were emerging as to what to do next.

Blücher continued to march his army west over the River Saale, to establish himself at the old university city of Halle.  From there he could threaten both Napoleon’s current base of operations at Leipzig and his line of communication back to Erfurt and France, as well as the communications to the French-held fortress of Magdeburg and Marshal Davout’s small army on the Lower Elbe.  This also placed Blücher in a position where he could march south to link up with the left wing of the Army of Bohemia, which was then advancing north through Colditz and Altenberg.  With Bavaria having also now defected to the Allied cause, he could also cooperate with General Wrede’s Bavarian Corps in the west.  

The Crown Prince however, was terrified for the security of his lines of communication on the right bank of the Elbe and therefore kept his Army of the North close to the Elbe near Köthen and Bernburg, anticipating that he might have to re-cross to the right bank.  Napoleon had garrisons at the Elbe fortresses of Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau and Dresden, so could cross the Elbe at any of these points, whereas Bernadotte was limited to a pontoon bridge at Aken, mid-way between Wittenberg and Magdeburg.  He was therefore very reluctant to march further west, as he deduced that this would allow Napoleon a free hand to rampage on the right bank of the Elbe. 

General Charles Stewart, the British Ambassador to Prussia, reported with considerable frustration that “The most discordant opinions” existed at the Crown Prince’s headquarters.  They were apparently convinced that Napoleon was already north of the Elbe with his Guard and four army corps and that he might variously march on Magdeburg, link with Marshal Davout at Hamburg, seize Berlin, relieve the besieged fortresses on the River Oder, foment revolution in Poland or even march on Stralsund in order to revenge himself upon Sweden!  In fact, only Reynier’s VII Corps was abroad on the right bank of the Elbe, but he did make a nuisance of himself in attacking the Crown Prince’s bridge at Aken, thus reinforcing the Crown Prince’s fears for his lines of communication.

Blücher’s headquarters meanwhile, was correctly convinced that Napoleon was at Bad-Düben on the River Mulde, mid-way between Wittenberg and Leipzig.  Intelligence had been received to this effect.  Marshal Augerau’s IX Corps had also been positively identified marching from Erfurt to reinforce Leipzig and an unidentified French army corps (actually Marshal Marmont’s VI Corps) had been detected marching from Bad-Düben via Delitzsch, south to Taucha, not north to the Elbe.  Marshal Murat meanwhile, was making a stand against the Army of Bohemia with several army corps at Liebertwolkwitz; if Napoleon were planning to give up Leipzig and cross the Elbe, Murat would surely have to follow, but this wasn’t happening.  French movements all pointed to Napoleon planning to concentrate his forces at Leipzig, not marching north over the Elbe.

Blücher was therefore angered by the Crown Prince’s timidity in chasing phantom armies north of the Elbe.  If the Crown Prince’s Army of the North were to cross back to the right bank, it would leave Blücher’s Army of Silesia firmly hoch scheisse-bach; Blücher would be completely isolated and would be forced to march south to link up with Schwarzenberg, thereby allowing Napoleon to re-open his lines of communication.  However, the crown Prince ignored Blücher’s concerns and instead doubled-down, claiming that the Tsar had ordered that the Army of Silesia was now subordinate to him and that Blücher should march to join him on the right bank of the Elbe!  The Crown Prince even tried to appropriate Blücher’s pontoon train, commanded by General von Rauch, in order to build an additional bridge at Aken to facilitate the movement of the two armies back to the right bank of the Elbe.  Seeking clarification of these orders, Rauch received a sarcastic note from Blücher, “The news that his majesty Tsar Alexander has placed me under the command of His Royal Highness [i.e. the Crown Prince of Sweden] is just as unknown to me as the news that I am marching to Aken.”

Blücher, having simply ignored the Crown Prince’s claims of authority over him,  followed this up with a message to His Royal Highness, stating that he would be conducting a reconnaissance toward toward Leipzig and Delitzsch to confirm the enemy’s position and that he would then send an adjutant to the Tsar’s headquarters, to await orders from His Majesty…  In late 18th/early 19th Century military-diplomatic-speak, this basically translates as “Who the f@&£ do you think you are?!”

On the night of 13th/14th October, multiple reconnaissance reports confirmed that Napoleon was indeed at Bad-Düben and was marching his army south toward Leipzig.  Marmont’s VI Corps, which was now establishing a line north of Leipzig, from Breitenfeld to Lindethal and Wahren and centred on Möckern, was the screening-force.  Far from having a master-plan to rampage across the Elbe, Napoleon had in fact been grappling with sparse and often contradictory reconnaissance reports at Bad-Düben.  In the end, the increasing threat to Leipzig had forced his hand.

Napoleon meanwhile wrote to Marmont, suggesting that “it would be appropriate for you to move some earth.  Make some abatis and place some pallisades where they could be useful.  I send you an account of the battle of Gustavus Adolphus, which concerns the positions that you now occupy.”  This of course, referred to the Battle of Breitenfeld of 1631 when Napoleon’s hero, the Swedish warrior-king Gustavus-Adolphus defeated the Imperial army of the Count of Tilly.  Napoleon was clearly worried about that sector, writing “None of our patrols have encountered anything.  Has the enemy taken a defensive position to receive battle or has he retired, seeing that we are able to crush him?  We will know the answer to this question in a few hours.”  Marmont however, faithfully followed the Emperor’s instructions, building a number of earthworks to cover the Halle road and filling the Tannenwald with abatis.

However, even with the addition of Dąbrowski’s 27th (Duchy of Warsaw) Division and Arrighi de Casanova’s III Cavalry Corps, Marmont worried that he did not have sufficient troops for the task given him; particularly if both enemy armies attacked him at once.  To that end, he requested and was promised the support of Souham’s III Corps if this were to happen.

With Blücher and Schwarzenberg now aware and confident of Napoleon’s intention to concentrate at Leipzig, Schwarzenberg announced his intention as “the destruction of the enemy army at Leipzig.”  Invigorated by these words, Blücher prepared the Army of Silesia for the attack and encouraged the Crown Prince to do likewise.

On 14th October, Blücher’s Army of Silesia rested at Halle in preparation for the coming attack on Leipzig, while the unconvinced Crown Prince continued his preparations to cross back over the Elbe.  However, later that day, the Crown Prince (probably realising, or more likely being informed by the Tsar that he was simply wrong regarding Napoleon’s dispositions) suddenly announced that he was cancelling his planned crossing of the Elbe and would instead now march south to Halle, to join the attack on Leipzig! 

This news was not as welcome as you might expect and probably angered Blücher even more than the earlier plan to cross the Elbe, as this would now place the Army of the North in rear of the Army of Silesia!  So instead of attacking Leipzig alongside the Army of Silesia, the Army of the North would be forming a second line while the Army of Silesia did the actual fighting!  Additionally, Blücher was concerned that there might still be unlocated French corps lurking at Bad-Düben, which would threaten his left flank as he attached Leipzig.  He therefore requested that the Crown Prince reconsider these plans and instead attack toward Dessau and Bad-Düben, thereby covering the flank and removing the threat, but these requests fell on deaf ears.

South of Leipzig on 14th October, General Wittgenstein’s Advance Guard of the Army of Bohemia engaged Marshal Murat’s Southern Wing of the Grande Armée at the Battle of Liebertwolkwitz.  Entering Leipzig on the same day to cheers of “Vive l’Empereur!”, Napoleon agreed with Marshal Murat that Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia was the more immediate threat and would therefore be the Grande Armée‘s priority target. 

By 15th October, Napoleon was facing Schwarzenberg in the south (on the earlier battlefield of Liebertwolkwitz) with Victor’s II Corps, Lauriston’s V Corps, Poniatowski’s VIII Corps, Augerau’s IX Corps, MacDonald’s XI Corps, Latour-Maubourg’s I Cavalry Corps, Sebastiani’s II Cavalry Corps, Sokolnicki’s IV Cavalry Corps, Pajol’s V Cavalry Corps, Oudinot’s I Young Guard Corps, Mortier’s II Young Guard Corps, Nansouty’s Guard Cavalry Corps and d’Erlon’s Imperial Guard Corps.

Napoleon planned to draw the Army of Bohemia into an attack against his prepared position before turning the tables and counter-attacking with Marshal Macdonald’s left wing.  Once the Allies responded by sneding reserves to deal with MacDonald, Marshal Ney would then come south with the ‘Regular Reserve’ (Souham’s III Corps, Bertrand’s IV Corps and Marmont’s VI Corps) to smash the centre of the Army of Bohemia, closely followed by the ‘Grand Reserve’ (the Imperial Guard).  VI Corps would move first, covered by III Corps, who would then follow on with IV Corps.  Arrighi would continue to watch the northern and western approaches to Leipzig with his III Cavalry Corps and the Leipzig Observation Corps and would eventually be reinforced by Reynier’s VII Corps, which had at least crossed over to the left bank of the Elbe and was making its way south to rejoin the army.  However, this plan all hinged upon Ney’s northern wing not being attacked by Blücher before they could move south to join Napoleon in defeating Schwarzenberg.

Napoleon later claimed to have received no reports of Blücher’s Army of Silesia or the Crown Prince of Sweden’s Army of the North making any offensive moves, so managed to convince himself that the northern sector was safe enough for now.  He believed that both Blücher and the Crown Prince of Sweden were at Merseburg on the Saale and were making no offensive moves.  However, while the Crown Prince was in fact much further north and no immediate threat, Blücher had already crossed the Saale, was marching on Leipzig and at this moment was camped only eight miles from the city! 

Marmont, while he had failed to adequately scout the area, had on the 15th sent the Emperor the deposition of two engineer officers who had escaped captivity at Halle and who had provided a detailed report on Blücher’s dispositions and plans.  Marmont even performed a personal recce and could see the enemy’s campfires very clearly for himself.  However, Napoleon was now fixed in his beliefs and refused to accept any reports that contradicted them, criticising Marmont and telling him that he faced ‘only cavalry’.

By 0700hrs on 16th October, Blücher had concentrated the Army of Silesia at Günthersdorf.  Langeron’s Russian Wing now set off on a parallel road, aiming to outflank the identified defensive line at Lindenthal and strike at Möckern down the Landsberg road from the north, via Breitenfeld, Klein-Wiederitzsch and Gross-Wiederitzsch.  The column was led by Rudsevich’s Advance Guard Corps, followed by Kapsevich’s X Corps, Olsuviev’s IX Corps and Saint-Priest’s VIII Corps.  Langeron also had the secondary task of protecting Blücher’s left flank against any nasty surprises from Bad-Düben. 

The rest of the Army of Silesia would advance a few miles before assembling at Schkeuditz.  Yorck’s Prussian I Corps would then lead the assault on Möckern, while Osten-Sacken’s Russian XI Corps would remain in reserve at Schkeuditz until Emanuel’s IV Cavalry Corps had scouted the roads to Bad-Düben.  Having issued his orders, Blücher rode off to join Langeron’s wing; his worries for the left flank and what might be lurking at Bad-Düben were such that he felt that he needed to be personally in command, should anything unexpected develop on the left.  However, he and his chief-of-staff Gneisenau were in very good spirits at the prospect of engaging the Ogre in battle at last.

Overtures continued to be made to the Crown Prince, urging him to march forces toward Delitsch in support of Blücher’s left wing.  General Stewart in particular flattered the Crown Prince’s vanity but then also wrote bluntly, “The English nation is watching.  It is my duty to speak frankly.  England will never believe that you are indifferent, as long as the enemy is beaten, whether you take part or not.  I beg you, if you remain in second line, to send Captain Bogue with his Rocket Brigade, to operate with General Blücher’s cavalry.”  Partly through Stewart’s efforts, the Crown Prince did eventually agree to send forces toward Delitzsch, albeit very slowly; Winzingerode’s Russian Corps would march first, followed a day later by Bülow’s Prussian III Corps and then a day later still by Stedingk’s Swedish Corps.

In the meantime, Marmont was preparing, in accordance with his orders, to abandon his line and march to join the battle that Napoleon was already fighting at Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz (later known as the Battle of Wachau, to distinguish it from the earlier Battle of Liebertwolkwitz fought on the same ground).  However, Souham’s III Corps was meant to have established a new line through which VI Corps could pass.  At 0900hrs, Marshal Ney arrived at Eutritzsch to supervise this move, but there was still no sign of III Corps, which was meant to marched there from Taucha during the early hours of the morning!  

In frustration, Ney sent new orders to Bertrand at Leipzig, ordering him to carry out the mission previously allotted to Souham.  However, at 1000hrs and with Marmont reporting enemy forces appearing to his front, this order was cancelled and Bertrand was redirected to Liebertwolkwitz while Marmont determined the size of the approaching enemy force. 

Only half an hour later, Bertrand’s orders were cancelled again as increasingly panicked messages began arriving at Ney’s headquarters from Arrighi, requesting that forces be sent over the rivers to defend the Lindenau bridgehead from an enemy corps (Gyulai’s Austrian III Corps) that had just appeared in that sector.  Bertrand’s IV Corps was the only available formation, so Ney decided to send them.  Ney then advised Napoleon of his actions, assuring him that he would be sending VI Corps to Liebertwolkwitz just as soon as Souham’s III Corps arrived.

Marmont at this time, was watching enemy forces build up on the Halle and Landsberg roads.  III Corps had still not arrived, but he could not delay his march to Liebertwolkwitz any longer and wrote to the Emperor, assuring him that VI Corps was on the way.  By 1100hrs, his columns were formed up, were pulling out of their positions and were starting their march back to Leipzig.  However, despite Napoleon’s reassurances that he ‘only faced cavalry’, at least eight battalions of infantry had now been spotted on the two roads.

At 1230hrs and with only part of VI Corps having begun to march, the Württemberg cavalryman, Generalmajor Graf von Normann reported that the enemy force was actually superior in strength to VI Corps and was already engaged with the rearguard.  Marmont now had a dilemma; to continue the march meant having to pass through a series of defiles over multiple rivers and through Leipzig.  To be attacked by a superior force while attempting such a manoeuvre could only end in disaster.  His only option therefore, was to turn and face the enemy and beat them off, hopefully with the assistance of III Corps, thus winning time to successfully disengage. 

To that end, Marmont now received another guarantee from Ney that III Corps would be at his disposal; Ricard’s 8th Division was already at Eutrizsch and Brayer’s 11th Division was not far behind, though Delmas’ 9th Division, accompanying the III Corps train and artillery park, was still some three or four hours distant.  However, only half an hour after sending this guarantee to Marmont, Ney was forced by the developing situation to send III Corps south to Napoleon.  There would be no support for Marmont.

Large numbers of Allied troops were now appearing in the near-distance.  Rudsevich’s Russian advance guard was emerging from the north on the Landsberg road and the advance guard of Yorck’s I Prussian Corps was appearing from the north-west on the Halle road.  Marmont’s rearguard was seriously in danger of being crushed from both sides if it attempted to remain in the pre-prepared Lindenthal line.  After a token resistance and screened by a magnificent fighting withdrawal conducted by Normann’s Württemberg cavalry and horse artillery and Coëhorn’s French infantry, VI Corps fell back to a new line, anchoring their left flank on Lagrange’s 21st Division and the village of Möckern.  Dąbrowski’s 27th (Duchy of Warsaw) Division held Klein- and Gross-Wiederitzsch on the right flank, supported by Arrighi’s III Cavalry Corps.  Compans’ 20th Division and Friedrichs’ 22nd Division took post along a ridge in the centre, along with a considerable number of guns.

At 1400hrs, Yorck was finally in position to assault Möckern directly.  Major von Klüx’s detachment of Oberst von Katzler’s Advance Guard led the assault, preceded by a large swarm of light infantry in skirmish order.  On the left, General von Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade pushed up onto the high ground, accompanied by two batteries of 12-pounders from the corps reserve.  General von Horn’s 7th Brigade pushed out in echelon behind Hünerbein’s left flank, while Prinz Karl von Mecklenburg-Strelitz moved up to support the Advance Guard.  Oberst von Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade formed the corps reserve, along with General von Jürgass’s Reserve Cavalry Brigade.

Klüx’s detachment included a large number of rifle-armed Jäger from various units and was even supported by a small unit of Austrian Jäger, who had appeared on the opposite bank of the Elster.  Klüx’s men managed to fight their way into the village, but a determined counter-attack by the 2e Artillerie de la Marine (Buquet’s Brigade) soon sent them packing.

Major von Hiller was the next to assault the village.  Like Klüx, he had a mixed bag of battalions assigned to the Advance Guard from across I Corps and like Klüx, they quickly broke the crust of the defence and fought their way into the village.  However, again like Klüx, Hiller’s men were soon forced back out of the village by the 2e Artillerie de la Marine.  Hiller was quick to organise a second attack and again penetrated deep into the village, only to be kicked back out once again by the 2e de Marine, with some assistance from the 4e de Marine of Jamin’s Brigade.

Undeterred, Hiller organised a third attack, which again drove deep into the village, this time forcing Lagrange to commit the 37e Légère from Jamin’s brigade; the third and last of Lagrange’s regiments.  The Prussians were again ejected following bitter house-to-house fighting, but the rallied battalions of both Klüx and Hiller were soon charging into Möckern for the fourth time!

The battle had now become a contest of who had the largest amount of fresh meat to feed into the grinder and the fourth attack forced Lagrange to commit yet more of his dwindling supply of uncommitted battalions.  The counter-attack was successful and the Prussians were driven completely from the village.  This time the French pursued them out of the village, even capturing a howitzer from one of the supporting Prussian batteries.  However, the French had over-extended themselves and Hiller’s fifth attack repaid the complement; recapturing the howitzer and pursuing the French right through Möckern and out the other side!

The bloody, see-saw battle continued as French canister fire shredded the Prussian columns as they emerged from Möckern, preventing Hiller from pushing further forward.  There were also still considerable numbers of French troops within the village (primarily belonging to the 2e de Marine), still dug into houses and walled gardens, who were adding to Hiller’s misery.  With Hiller’s latest attack halted and in considerable disorder, Jamin now struck with his entire brigade; the 4e de Marine and 37e Légère, pushing Hiller back out of the village for the fifth time.

In the meantime, Langeron’s Russians had been deploying in the fields around Breitenfeld; the scene of Gustavus Adolphus’ victory in 1631.  Emanuel’s IV Cavalry Corps came first, followed by the rest of Rudsevich’s Advance Guard.  With Dąbrowski’s Polish infantry having already occupied Klein-Wiederitzsch and Gross-Wiederitzsch, Kapsevich’s X Corps was called forward to deal with these strongpoints and Olsuviev’s IX Corps moved up in reserve. 

Korff’s I Cavalry Corps meanwhile, galloped off to Podelwitz, to watch for the perceived threat coming from Bad-Düben.  Emanuel was also meant to have ridden off to the left flank to investigate the possibility of French forces emerging from Bad-Düben, but for some reason remained in position near Lindenthal, on Kapzevich’s right flank.  This failure on Emanuel’s part meant that Osten-Sacken was to remain out of the battle while he waited for news of the presence or otherwise of French forces in the east.  Noting that Emanuel had failed to conduct this vital reconnaissance, Osten-Sacken dispatched Vassilchikov’s III Cavalry Corps to carry it out.

Kapsevich’s X Corps struck Klein-Wiederitzsch at roughly the same time as Hiller’s first attack on Möckern.  The outnumbered and stubborn defenders of Żółtowski’s brigade (the Duchy of Warsaw’s 2nd & 4th Infantry Regiments) made the Russians pay for every inch and the battle swung back and forth several times.  However, the Poles were considerably outnumbered and the whole brigade eventually broke and fled toward Euteritzsch.

Emanuel, having remained in this sector of the battlefield, was now in the ideal position to pursue the routed Polish infantry.  Krukowiecki’s Polish cavalry brigade (the 2nd Uhlans and 4th Chasseurs à Cheval) and Fournier’s French 6th Light Cavalry Division were in the way, though Emanuel’s four dragoon regiments charged, utterly routing the Polish and French cavalry and capturing seven guns.

Nevertheless, the sacrifice of the Polish and French cavalry had allowed time for Żółtowski to rally his infantry.  Dąbrowski then led them forward in a determined counter-attack, which inflicted very heavy losses on Kapsevich and Rudsevich and succeeded in recapturing both Wiederitzsch villages.  The Russians, retreating in great disorder, were cut down in droves by the vengeful Polish artillery.

Repeating the pattern of the concurrent battle for Möckern, Dąbrowski’s Poles pushed on aggressively beyond the villages, only to be halted by the rallied Russian infantry and the massive Russian gun-line.  The Poles fell back to re-occupy the Wiederitzsch villages.

With the time now at around 1500hrs, Delmas’ 9th Division from III Corps appeared on the eastern flank of the battlefield, together with an unidentified cavalry detachment (probably Beurmann’s 25th Light Cavalry Brigade, or elements thereof).  Delmas had been tasked of covering the rear of III Corps, in particular the baggage train and artillery reserve, as it withdrew from Bad-Düben to Leipzig.  However, with the sounds of battle ahead, Delmas ordered his division to deploy off the road and onto the small range of hills between Seehausen and Podelwitz.  The arrival of Delmas was soon noticed by Korff’s cavalry, who quickly sent word back to Langeron’s headquarters. 

In a very short space of time, Olsuviev’s IX Corps had disengaged from the Breitenfeld sector and was marching toward Podelwitz.  Spotting a small copse of birch trees (the ‘Birkenholz’) on the Podelwitz-Wiedeitzsch road, Olsuviev ordered Udom’s 9th Division to occupy it, thereby blocking Delmas from intervening at the Wiederitzsch villages.  

Delmas now had a dilemma; to support Dąbrowski at the villages?  Or to continue to escort the III Corps train to Schönefeld in accordance with his orders?  The appearance of Olsuviev’s Russians immediately in front of him forced his hand and he ordered an attack on the Birkenholz.  The attack soon bogged down into a battle as bitter as any of those currently going on for the villages.  The battle quickly turned in favour of the Russians and in extremely bitter fighting, the Ryazan Regiment broke the 145e de Ligne, capturing their Eagle and one other flag!  Delmas was forced to fall back, pursued by Korff’s cavalry.

Back at Möckern, Katzler’s advance guard infantry (the detachments of Klüx and Hiller) were almost completely spent and with the village still in French hands, Yorck decided to disobey Blücher’s order to not commit any additional troops to the battle for Möckern until the Wiederitzsch villages were firmly in Langeron’s hands.  To that end, he ordered Prinz Karl von Mecklenburg-Strelitz’s 2nd Brigade to mount an attack on Möckern from the left, in concert with Hiller’s sixth frontal assault.

With this large injection of fresh troops, the Prussians again make good progress through the village and reach the Elster bridge in the centre of the village.  Part of Prinz Karl’s 2nd Brigade was directed against French artillery on the hill north of Möckern, while Katzler’s advance guard cavalry detachments pushed out to the left under heavy fire, accompanied by Yorck himself.  Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade was also brought forward in close support.  However, Hiller’s luck finally ran out as he was wounded during this assault.  He later wrote,

“Everyone was burning with desire to get close to the enemy, and on my shout that today must decide Germany’s fate, the battalions did not hesitate to again charge across the corpses of their brothers and engage the enemy with cries of hurrah.  Notwithstanding the courage and fury of the troops, which had increased to the extreme, it was still impossible to silence the fire of the enemy battalions posted in the houses.  Nevertheless I thoroughly enjoyed the satisfaction of watching the courage and perseverance of the brave troops, especially the Landwehr battalions, turn back the enemy grenadiers and Guardsmen who had moved up as reinforcement.  As I saw them running away, I also saw the other brigades of the Army Corps advancing.  At that moment I was wounded.  I sank to the ground in unconsciousness with the blessed feeling that we would be victorious.”

This is one of a number of Prussian references to ‘Guards’ and ‘grenadiers’ fighting in Möckern.  As mentioned in my recent article about them, the smart blue Navy-issue greatcoats, brass buttons, red epaulettes and pompoms of the four regiments of the Artillerie de la Marine, allied to their fierce fighting spirit, gave the Prussians the distinct impression that they were fighting the Imperial Guard, specifically the Sailors (Marins) of the Guard. 

This myth persists in the work of later German artists such as Richard Knötel (below), which show the Sailors of the Guard being ridden down by the Brandenburg Hussars.

With the attack again stalled, but with Hiller’s detachment and elements of Prinz Karl’s 2nd Brigade still holding around half the village, Yorck brought up his two reserve 12-pounder batteries, massing a total of 88 guns at 1,100 yards from the French artillery, in an attempt to suppress the extremely effective French fire-support.  Despite Hiller himself being out of action, his detachment now made their seventh and final charge, again in concert with Prinz Karl’s 2nd Brigade.

Despite the concentration of Prussian artillery on the hills opposite, Marmont ordered his corps to perform a ‘left wheel’ to engage the left flank of Prinz Karl’s 2nd Brigade.  He also warned General Compans that with Lagrange’s 21st Division becoming depleted, his 20th Division might also be required to go into the village.

Marmont’s dynamic defence absolutely hammered Prinz Karl’s 2nd Brigade.  Having already been pounded by Foucher’s seemingly-indefatigable French artillery on their approach to the village, the Füsilier Battalion of the 1st East Prussian Regiment received a volley from ‘Guard Marines’ at point-blank range, followed by a charge that completely destroyed the battalion.  However, the 1st & 2nd Battalions of the 1st East Prussian Regiment were quick to exact revenge, pushing back the ‘Guard Marines’ and even closing to within musketry range of the French gun-line, driving back some gunners and capturing one of the batteries. 

Nevertheless, the East Prussians had suffered terrible casualties during the assault.  Prinz Karl himself first lost a horse and then, having found a remount, was seriously wounded, ending his part in the battle.  Oberst von Lobenthal, the Commanding Officer of the 1st East Prussian Regiment, took command of the 2nd Brigade.

 

Compans’ 20th Division was now thrown into the battle for Möckern.  The 20th and 25th Provisional Regiments of Joubert’s brigade launched a fierce charge, utterly routing the depleted 1st East Prussian Regiment.  Lobenthal also now fell wounded and was carried from the field.  Joubert’s two Provisional Regiments hotly pursued the broken Prussians and succeeded in driving off most of Yorck’s 88 guns.  However, the gunners of the Prussian 6pdr Foot Battery #1 and 12pdr Foot Battery #2, quite literally stuck to their guns and halted the presumptuous French attack.  A charge by the Mecklenburg-Strelitz Hussars then drove back the Provisional Regiments.  Marmont had this to say about the episode,

“I decided to engage the troops of the [20th] Division, who in echelon formed the centre, and directed these to assist those already engaged against the enemy, who was moving against out centre.  The battle assumed a new character, and in an instant our infantry masses found themselves less than thirty paces from the enemy.  No action was more intense.  The 20th and 25th Provisional Regiments, commanded by Colonels Maury and Drouot, covered themselves in glory in this situation.  they advanced against the enemy and forced him to yield but, overwhelmed by numbers, these regiments were forced to halt, yet they managed to hold their positions.  The 32nd Light [from Pelleport’s brigade] also worked wonders.”

It was somewhere in the midst of this engagement that a Prussian howitzer shell landed among some French artillery caissons, causing several (sources say three or four) to explode and instantly removing the ready ammunition from Marmont’s 12-pounder batteries at probably the most critical moment of the battle.  Another effect of the explosion was that Marmont was wounded, though only lightly (he would be wounded again later in the battle).

It’s difficult to establish the exact sequence of events on both flanks of the battle, but at some point, Kapsevich’s rallied X Corps threw Dąbrowski out of the Wiederitzsch villages for a second time.  However, the Poles again rallied and again threw the Russians out of the villages.  Seeing a wide gap between the Prussians and the Russians, Dąbrowski took it upon himself to drive into that gap with his 27th Division and the two French light cavalry divisions (Lorge’s 5th and Fournier’s 6th), in an attempt to split the Army of Silesia in two. 

However, this gap had already been noted by Langeron, who had already called Saint-Priest’s VIII Corps forward to plug the gap.  However, this manoeuvre would take some time to perform, so Blücher personally intervened, recalling Vasilchikov’s III Cavalry Corps from the left flank where they had been scouting, to the Lindenthal sector of the battlefield.   

This timely deployment of reserves was instrumental in halting Dąbrowski, who was was blocked first by the timely intervention of Vasilchikov’s III Cavalry Corps and then by the leading elements of Saint-Priests’s VIII Corps, which was just starting to arrive near Lindenthal.  Faced now by the entire weight of Langeron’s wing and with Delmas’ 9th Division having withdrawn from the battle, Dąbrowski could not hope to hold out at the Wiederitzsch villages and was forced to fall back for the last time to Eutritzsch.

Beyond issuing the initial orders to Yorck, Langeron and Osten-Sacken, Blücher had thus far, had little direct input into the course of the battle.  He’d spent much of the day with Langeron’s headquarters and was preoccupied with the eastern flank, being still convinced that Napoleon’s main army was still somewhere between Leipzig and Bad-Düben.  In fact, the last French units in that area had been Reynier’s VII Corps and Delmas 9th Division, escorting the III Corps train as it withdrew toward Leipzig.

 

Before re-deploying to the centre of the battle, Vassilchikov had detached four cossack regiments to keep scouting in the direction of Bad-Düben and finally at 1700hrs, Blücher received word from these cossacks that they had entered Bad-Düben to find no sign of the enemy, apart from a hastily-abandoned battery of French guns (that they lacked the horse teams to carry off).  This welcome news finally prompted Blücher to order Osten-Sacken’s XI Corps to march immediately to the sound of the guns.  However, this order was not received until 1800hrs and darkness had descended long before they arrived.

On the other side of the lines, Ney’s earlier promises to Marmont of support from Souham’s III Corps had failed to materialise (Delmas’ accidental arrival doesn’t count!).  In fact, Souham had marched south hours earlier and thanks to the state of the roads, didn’t even arrive to support Napoleon in time.  The net result was that aside from Delmas’ 9th Division’s short-lived intervention described above, III Corps did not fight anywhere on 16th October.  Ironically, there is a strong likelihood that the arrival of III Corps at either battlefield may well have turned the tide in France’s favour.  There are strong parallels here to the vacillation of d’Erlon’s I Corps between the Battles of Quatre-Bras and Ligny in 1815.

As the battle for the Wiederitzsch villages was ending, the battle for Möckern also approached its final act.  With the failure of 2nd Brigade’s intervention, Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade, Yorck’s final infantry reserve, was ordered to assault the village.  This would be accompanied by a large supporting attack from the left; Horn’s 7th Brigade and Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade had only been lightly engaged on Yorck’s left throughout the day, though had been under constant long-range artillery fire the whole time, as had Jürgass’ Reserve Cavalry Brigade and the various other Prussian cavalry detachments to their rear.

With the approach of this massive new attack at around 1700hrs and with the Wiederitzsch villages having fallen, the French fell back to a more defensible position along a ridge extending roughly eastward from Möckern toward Euteritzsch.  The enormous volume of French artillery fire slowed the Prussian advance to a crawl and Steinmetz’s first line ground to a halt.  However, the second line, consisting of his elite grenadier battalions, pushed into and through the milling mass of Silesian Landwehr and pressed home the attack.  Casualties among the attackers were horrific and when Steinmetz fell wounded, the attack again stuttered to a halt.  Undaunted, one Oberst von Losthin took command of 1st Brigade and got them moving forward once again.

It was at this point that a controversial, possibly even fictitious event allegedly took place, upon which Marmont squarely placed the blame for his defeat, alongside the failure of Ney to support him.  In his memoir, written decades later, Marmont claimed that he now ordered the ordinarily-outstanding Württemberg cavalry general Graf von Normann to charge the disordered Prussian battalions.  Marmont claimed that Normann refused this order and when finally persuaded to charge, instead accidentally charged the 1er de Marine! 

The historian John H Gill strongly refutes this version of events in Broken Eagles, as it’s not described by any other witnesses and Marmont certainly didn’t mention it in reports to the Emperor only days, weeks and months after the event, when describing the course of the battle.  It seems likely that this was a later invention, perhaps prompted with hindsight by Normann’s later defection to the Allied cause?  Normann himself commented that his regiments had been forced to batter their way through crowds of French fugitives, so it might be that he was first delayed by these fugitives and the description of his men ‘riding down the 1er de Marine’ might therefore, simply have been Marmont’s impression from having seen them from afar, trying to get through the crowds.

In any case, as Yorck’s last fresh battalions (the 1st East Prussian Grenadier Battalion and the 5th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiment) attempted to renew the assault, they soon faltered, suffering heavy casualties from French firepower, including every single senior officer.

With the Prussian infantry having failed to break Marmont, Yorck now had only one option available to him.  Near to his command-post was Major von Sohr’s detachment (the 1st, 2nd and Volunteer Jäger Squadrons) of the Brandenburg Hussars.  Yorck shouted at him to charge and then rode back to deliver the same order personally to the Brandenburg Uhlans, the 5th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry and then the rest of Katzler’s advance guard cavalry, the brigade cavalry detachments and finally the Corps Reserve Cavalry Brigade of General von Jürgass.

Seeing this great mass of cavalry start to move forward, the rallied remnants of the 1st & 2nd Brigades also started to move forward and on the left, the 7th and 8th Brigades surged forward once again.  The entire Prussian I Corps was now moving forward in one great general attack!

 

Smoke from the burning village served to completely obscure the view of this great movement of troops and Sohr’s detachment of the Brandenburg Hussars completely surprised and crushed two battalions of the 3e Artillerie de la Marine and captured seven guns.  Normann’s much-maligned Württemberg cavalrymen were quick to counter-charge “with great determination”, driving into the flank of the Brandenburg Hussars and saving the remnants of the broken battalions.  However, they were in turn, struck in the flank by the Brandenburg Uhlans and the 5th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry.  Normann managed to salvage the situation briefly with his second regiment, but Yorck had already personally ordered the 2nd Leib-Hussars to charge the Württembergers and then went and ordered Henckel von Donnersmark to do the same with his two regiments (the 1st West Prussian Dragoons and the Lithuanian Dragoons).  Yorck personally accompanied the Lithuanian Dragoons and Normann’s Württembergers were swept from the field by this great mass of Prussian horsemen.  Jürgass, with the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, pursued the Württembergers all the way to Gohlis, capturing four guns along the way.

Lorge’s French 5th Light Cavalry Division now counter-charged the Prussian cavalry, but in turn was countered by the 1st Neumärk and 10th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry.  Marmont’s centre (Compans’ 20th Division) was now in complete collapse and at last, his left wing (Lagrange’s 21st Division) was forced to fall back from Möckern for the final time.

The Prussian 7th and 8th Brigades now descended upon Marmont’s right wing (Friedrichs’ 22nd Division).  Coming under intense fire from the ever-present and indefatigable French artillery, the first line slowed almost to a halt.  However, the second line pushed on through and even succeeded in driving back the French gunners.  However, the left flank of Yorck’s Prussians were finally coming up against the right flank of Langeron’s Russians and there were a few incidents of fratricide as Prussian infantry were engaged by Russian artillery, while Russian gunners were in turn engaged by Prussian infantry.

Nevertheless, the Leib-Regiment in particular, pushed on and charged a French battalion in concert with the Mecklenburg-Strelitz Hussars charging from the flank.  The charge was a complete success, completely breaking the battalion and capturing 400 prisoners, a howitzer and an unidentified flag (probably a battalion Fannion).

The Brandenburg and 12th Reserve Infantry Regiments now took the lead in the advance and again suffered heavy losses from French fire.  Once again, the casualty-rate among the senior leadership was simply appalling, yet the attack was pressed home by junior officers and NCOs and a French square was broken. 

With the irrevocable loss of Möckern, Marmont was forced to accept the inevitability of his defeat.  All that remained now was to save as much of his corps as possible.  However, the Prussian cavalry rampage was far from over.  The Brandenburg Hussars and Brandenburg Uhlans now captured 28 guns and five caissons between them, while the 2nd Leib-Hussars took another seven guns and 400 prisoners and the East Prussian National Cavalry claimed four guns.

Major Stössel of the 2nd Leib-Hussars led his regiment on to break another square, but was repulsed by French cavalry.  However, Prussian blood was up and the hussars quickly rallied before charging again and routing the French cavalry.

Although the Brandenburg Hussars later had all the glory, the Mecklenburg-Strelitz Hussars perhaps had the greatest success of the day.  They weren’t actually a Prussian regiment, but were in fact a volunteer regiment raised by the tiny Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz on the crest of the wave of German nationalism and brought to war by Prinz Karl von Mecklenburg-Strelitz, the commander of the Prussian 2nd Brigade.  They had already distinguished themselves with a very timely charge earlier in the battle, but now fell upon the rear of the 1st Battalion of the 1er Artillerie de la Marine, just as Horn’s 7th Brigade charged them from the front.  The French battalion was completely smashed, with over 700 being taken prisoner and the hussars taking the Eagle of the 1er Artillerie de la Marine as their trophy, along with another flag.

Friedrichs’ 22nd Division in the meantime, had successfully disengaged from the Prussian assault and had retreated to Eutrizsch.  Thinking them defeated and driven off, Hünerbein wheeled his 8th Brigade to the right, in order to cut off the retreat of other French units from Möckern.  However, in doing so, his units became entangled with those of Horn’s 7th Brigade and he exposed his left flank to Friedrichs, who he’d assumed was no longer a threat.  This was a fatal assumption, as Friedrichs (apparently joined by some surviving battalions of the Artillerie de la Marine from the other divisions) now rallied, turned about and struck back at Hünerbein!  The 8th Brigade was soon broken and streaming back the way it had come.  This was to be the last defiant act of the day by Marmont’s VI Corps.

Henckel von Donnersmark, having already pursued the French as far as Gohlis, was returning to friendly lines with the Lithuanian Dragoons and the 10th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry, when he realised that Friedrichs’ French division (Coëhorn’s and Choisy’s brigades) had got in behind them and was now drawn up in two large brigade-squares.  Immediately ordering the charge, the 10th Silesians went in first and perhaps because they came from an unexpected direction, broke the first square!  The Lithuanian Dragoons then charged into the second square, as recounted by Henckel von Donnersmark;

“The square was broken on the first attempt.  We had driven deep into the enemy’s ranks when the Marine Guard opposed us.  All who had already received pardon immediately seized discarded weapons, and now danger was before us and behind us and a dreadful carnage was the result.  On our right wing, other cavalry joined us; Colonel Welzein came to our support with a detachment of Silesian Landwehr.  Now our Lithuanians abandoned all caution, because the enemy shot and stabbed like mad everything around them.  But the Guard succumbed.  The scene was gruesome.  We penetrated deeper and deeper into the mass that by this time had become very confused; those who did not fall to the weapons were trampled under the horses’ hooves; heaps of twenty to thirty of these unfortunates lay jumbled together; through this some found protection from the fury of our people; and certainly nothing of this column (1,200 strong) would have escaped had not an unexpected heated artillery fire from our left side disturbed us from completing our work.”

Friedrichs’ division was destroyed, with Friedrichs himself being seriously wounded.  At last however, the survivors of Marmont’s broken corps managed to reach safety on the south bank of the River Parthe.  The day had been a disaster for Marmont and for Napoleon’s Grande Armée as a whole and although they didn’t know it yet, the Battle of Leipzig was already lost.  As discussed above, the injection of just one additional army corps in either the southern or northern sectors of the Battle of Leipzig on 16th October may well have assured victory on that front, thus allowing Napoleon to then bring his full weight to bear against each surviving Allied army in turn.  However, Souham’s III Corps spent the day marching and counter-marching, while Bertrand’s IV Corps became embroiled in a fight for the line of communication at Lindenau and Marmont’s VI Corps became embroiled in this fairly pointless battle at Möckern.

Yorck’s Prussian I Corps lost 7,681 men, the overwhelming majority of whom were infantry, whose bodies now choked the streets, gardens and back-alleys of Möckern village.  172 officers had been killed or wounded, including two brigade commanders (Prinz Karl and Steinmetz, both of whom would later recover from their wounds and return to duty), four ‘sub-brigade’ commanders, 3 regimental commanders and no fewer than 12 battalion commanders!  They had however, taken around 2,000 prisoners, 41 guns, 2 flags, the Eagle of the 1er Artillerie de la Marine and enough artillery caissons to completely replenish the ammunition expended during the battle.

Langeron estimated Russian losses at around 1,500 and have captured ‘a few hundred’ prisoners, ‘numerous’ wagons, 13 guns, 1 flag and the Eagle of the 145e de Ligne.  Rather strangely, he didn’t mention the capture of the Eagle in his after-action report, so perhaps the Eagle was carried back to Blücher’s headquarters and he was unaware of it?  The loss of the 145e de Ligne’s Eagle is well-documented.

Marmont claimed to have lost 6-7,000 men and 27 guns, but this is undoubtedly a gross under-estimate and probably doesn’t include the casualty lists for Delmas, Dąbrowski and Arrighi.  Générals de Division Compans and Friedrichs were both wounded during the battle (Friedrichs would die two days later), as was Marmont himself, along with many Générals de Brigade.  Général de Division Lagrange and Général de Brigade Coëhorn were singled out for praise, while Marshal Ney and Generalmajor Normann were squarely blamed for the defeat (although not until many years later).

Marmont’s VI Corps wasn’t completely destroyed and would fight again (this time against the Army of the North) on the 18th and as discussed in my previous article, it would escape from Leipzig and would be one of the few army corps to maintain its identity, containing largely the same sub-units and senior commanders right until the end of the war in 1814.

Scenario Outline

The scenario will last for 15 turns, starting with the Allied 1200hrs turn and ending at nightfall with the French 1900hrs turn.  See below for the detailed schedule of reinforcements.

As usual, either side can win an outright victory by pushing the enemy army permanently beyond their Army Morale limit.  Note however, that the the Army Morale limit of both armies will increase as reinforcements arrive (see the scenario schedule below).

The Allies suffer a 5 Morale Point penalty if they do not place sufficient troops on the eastern flank.  This will be eased by 1 Morale Point for every non-routed Allied cavalry brigade (including cossacks) or two non-routed infantry brigades that are placed within Map-Box X during each turn’s Victory Determination Phase.  This rule will cease to apply at the start of the Allied 1700hrs Turn.

The French suffer a 5 Morale Point penalty if they completely lose control of both built-up sectors of Möckern.  Control is determined by being the last side to occupy the built-up sector with UNDISORDERED infantry (NB infantry will immediately become Disordered as they occupy a built-up sector following a victory in combat.  There is therefore a brief opportunity for the defender to counter-attack before they establish themselves in the village and before the Morale Point penalty kicks in).

The scenario uses a 8′ x 6′ table.  The map-scale is normally 1km per foot, though I must confess that I have compressed the map very slightly (only by around 5%), in order to fit on the key features.

Orders of Battle

Napoleon’s Battles is a ‘grand tactical’ set, where each unit represents a brigade or large regiment and the man-to-figure ratio is roughly 1:100 (to be exact, it’s 1:120 for infantry and 1:80 for cavalry).  It would however, be relatively easy to convert to similarly-scaled systems such as Age of Eagles or Général d’Armée.

The ‘hieroglyphs’ on the orders of battle show the strength of a unit in figures, their nationality, the troop type and the point at which the unit will ‘disperse’ (i.e. become combat-ineffective).  For example, the code ’16 FrLN [10D]’ means a 16-figure unit of French Line Infantry, which will likely disperse when it reaches a strength of 10 figures.  The stats for French Line Infantry can then be found on the Unit Information Card at the bottom of this article.  I’m sure you can work out the rest.

Generals have a rating (e.g. General von Jürgass with ‘3″G(7)+1 [2F]’) which shows their command-span expressed in inches, a quality-rating (Poor, Average, Good or Excellent), an initiative rating between 4 and 8 (10 for C-in-Cs) and a combat modifier ranging from -1 to +3, which is added if they are attached to the unit in combat (a ‘D’ indicates that the modifier is only applied in defence).  Some also have a number with ‘F’, which is the formation’s fatigue rating if applicable (only corps headquarters and independent divisions have a Fatigue rating).  The C-in-C also usually has a number with ‘M’; this is the army’s morale rating.

Note that where a brigade is very large and/or comprising different troop-types, I will usually split it into two or more regimental sub-units.  E.g. ‘Karpov’s Brigade #1’ and ‘Karpov’s Brigade #2’.  The upper-limit of unit size in Napoleon’s Battles is 28 figures for infantry and 20 figures for cavalry.  Some units can have modifiers based on their internal composition (e.g. a line infantry unit containing a large contingent of light infantry that’s too small to split off as its own unit may have an additional +1 shooting modifier).

As for artillery; Napoleon’s Battles normally only includes horse batteries, heavy foot batteries and other specialist artillery such as all-howitzer batteries. However, I usually reflect this added combat-power by adding a base of 4x infantry infantry to units which include a light foot battery.  In this battle, every French and Polish brigade included a 6pdr foot battery, so has had a base added.  The Allies were slightly less well-served; the Prussians had one 6pdr foot battery per brigade (i.e. division) and the Russians had a few 6pdr light foot batteries in their corps artillery reserves.

The Allied Army of Silesia

General der Kavallerie von Blücher

20”E(10)+3
[5 Free Rolls]

Prussian I Korps – Generallieutenant von Yorck         10”E(7)+2D [7F]

Advance Guard – Oberst von Katzler                                                            3”A(4)+1
Hiller’s Detachment (elements of various units)                                            20 PrLN [8D]
Klüx’s Detachment (elements various units)                                                   16 PrLT [8D] (+1)
Katzler’s Detachment (elements of five regiments)                                        16 PrLC [8D]
6pdr Horse Battery #2                                                                                          Pr6#

1st Brigade – Oberst von Steinmetz                                                                4”A(7)+0
Grenadier Brigade (1st East Prussian & Silesian Grenadier Battalions)    16 PrGN [6D]
Losthin’s Brigade (5th & 13th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiments)     16 PrSLW [10D]

2nd Brigade – Generalmajor Prinz Karl von Mecklenburg-Strelitz         3”A(5)+0
Lobenthal’s Brigade (1st & 2nd E. Prussian IRs & 6th Silesian Landwehr) 20 PrLN [10D]
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 2nd Leib & Brandenburg Hussars                              12 PrLC [6D]

7th Brigade – Generalmajor von Horn                                                            4”A(6)+1D
Zepelin’s Brigade (Leib Infantry Regiment & Thüringian Battalion)           16 PrLN [8D]
Welzien’s Brigade (4th & 15th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiments)     20 PrSLW [12D]

8th Brigade – Generalmajor von Hünerbein                                                  4”A(5)+0
Borcke’s Brigade (Brandenburg Infantry Regiment)                                       12 PrLN [6D]
Götze’s Brigade (12th Reserve Infantry Regiment)                                          12 PrLN [6D]

I Korps Reserve Cavalry Brigade – Generalmajor von Jürgass            4”G(7)+1
Henckel’s Brigade (1st West Prussian & Lithuanian Dragoons)                     8 PrLC [4D]
Bieberstein’s Brigade (3rd, 5th & 10th Silesian & 1st Neumärk Ldw Cav)   12 PrLWC [7D]
6pdr Horse Battery #1                                                                                             Pr6#
6pdr Horse Battery #3                                                                                             Pr6#

I Korps Reserve Artillery Brigade – Oberstleutnant Schmidt
12pdr Foot Battery #1                                                                                              Pr12#
12pdr Foot Battery #2                                                                                              Pr12#
6pdr Horse Battery #12                                                                                           Pr6#
Ad Hoc Howitzer Battery                                                                                        PrHFA

Elements, Russian XI Corps (Osten-Sacken)

III Cavalry Corps – Generallieutenant Vasilchikov                                   5”G(4)+0 [3F]
Uschakov’s Brigade (Smolensk & Courland Dragoons)                                 8 RsLC [4D]
Yurkowski’s Brigade (White Russia & Akhtyrsk Hussars)                            16 RsLC [8D]
Vasilchikov’s Brigade (Marioupol & Alexandria Hussars)                            16 RsLC [8D]
Karpov II’s Cossack Brigade (-)                                                                           20 RsCLC [14D]
Horse Battery #18                                                                                                   2x Rs6#

Russian Army Wing – General of Infantry Count Langeron         9”G(6)+1

Advance Guard Corps – Generallieutenant Rudsevich      5”A(5)+0 [3F]

I Cavalry Corps – Generallieutenant Korff                                                  6”G(5)+1
De Witt’s Brigade (Kargopol, Kiev & Kinburn Dragoons)                            16 RsLC [8D]
Obolensky’s Brigade (Lithuania, Dorpat, Arasmass & Siversk CàC)          12 RsLC [6D]
Karpov VIII’s Cossack Brigade                                                                           20 RsCLC [14D]

IV Cavalry Corps – Generalmajor Emanuel (from VIII Corps)              5”P(4)+1
Borozdin II’s Brigade (Mitau & New Russia Dragoons)                                8 RsLC [4D]
Emanuel’s Brigade (Kharkov and Moscow Dragoons)                                  8 RsLC [4D]
Kaisarov’s Cossack Brigade                                                                                 8 RsCLC [6D]

15th Division – Generalmajor Kornilov (from IX Corps)                        3”A(5)+0
Anensur’s Brigade (Kourin & Kolyvan Regiments)                                      12 RsLN [6D] (+1)
Tern’s Brigade (Koslov & Vitebsk Regiments)                                               12 RsLN [6D] (+1)
Tichanowski I’s Brigade (12th & 22nd Jäger Regiments) (very weak; incorporated above)

Advance Guard Corps Artillery Reserve
Position Battery #15 (from IX Corps)                                                              2x Rs12#
Horse Battery #8                                                                                                  2x Rs6#

Russian VIII Corps – Generallieutenant Count Saint-Priest         8”A(5)+1 [4F]

11th Division – Generalmajor Prince Gourialov                                         3”A(5)+0
Turgenev’s Brigade (Ekaterinburg & Rilsk Regiments)                               16 RsLN [8D] (+1)
Karpenko’s Brigade (Jeletz & Polotsk Regiments)                                        16 RsLN [8D] (+1)
Bistrom II’s Brigade (1st & 33rd Jäger Regiments) (very weak; incorporated above)

17th Division – Generalmajor Pillar                                                              3”A(6)+0
Kern’s Brigade (Riazan & Bielosersk Regiments)                                          12 RsLN [6D]
Tscheriov’s Brigade (Wilmanstrand & Brest Regiments)                             12 RsLN [6D]
Charitanov’s Brigade (3rd & 48th Jäger Regiments)                                     16 RsJG [8D]

VIII Corps Artillery Reserve
Position Battery #32                                                                                             2x Rs12#

IV Cavalry Corps – Generalmajor Emanuel
(detached to Advance Guard Corps)

Russian IX Corps – Generallieutenant Olsuviev         7”G(6)+1 [1F]

9th Division – Generalmajor Udom II (from IX Corps)                            3”A(5)+0
Poltaratzsky’s Brigade (Nacheburg & Apcheron Regiments)                      16 RsLN [8D] (+1)
Juskov II’s Brigade (Riajsk & Iakutsk Regiments)                                        12 RsLN [6D] (+1)
Grimbladt’s Brigade (10th & 38th Jäger Regiments) (very weak; incorporated above)

15th Division – Generalmajor Kornilov
(detached to Advance Guard Corps)

IX Corps Artillery Reserve
Position Battery #15 (detached to Advance Guard Corps)

Russian X Corps – Generallieutenant Kapsevich         7”A(4)+0 [2F]

8th Division – Generalmajor Count Ourousov                                          4”A(4)+0
Schenschin’s Brigade (Arkhangel & Schusselburg Regiments)                 16 RsLN [8D]
Rehren’s Brigade (Old Ingremannland and 7th & 38th Jäger Regts)      16 RsJG [8D]

22nd Division – Generalmajor Tourchaninov                                          3”A(6)+1
Schapski’s Brigade (Viatka, Staropol & Olonetz Regiments)                    16 RsLN [8D]
Durnov’s Brigade (29th & 45th Jäger Regiments)                                      16 RsJG [8D]

X Corps Artillery Reserve
Position Battery #2 (half-battery)                                                                   Rs12#
Position Battery #18                                                                                           2x Rs12#
Position Battery #34                                                                                           2x Rs12#
Position Battery #39                                                                                           2x Rs12#
Don Cossack Horse Battery #2 (half-battery)                                               Rs6#

Allied Order of Battle Notes

1.  Klüx’s Detachment of Katzler’s Advance Guard consisted of the 4th Company of the Garde-Jäger Bn, 2 companies of the East Prussian Jäger Battalion, the Füsilier Battalion of the 2nd East Prussian Regiment, the Leib-Grenadier Battalion and the 4th Battalion and three Volunteer Jäger companies of the 15th Silesian Landwehr Regiment.  This is a tricky unit to classify, but I’ve decided to go with Prussian Light Infantry, which gives them a base +1 in shooting, but don’t engage in combat quite as well as Line Infantry.  I’ve also given them an additional +1 shooting modifier due to the large Füsilier and Jäger contingent and their label is marked with (+1) as a reminder (this means that they shoot with a +2).  I also considered designating them as Jäger, but they’re pretty poor at close assault.  I must confess however, that I’ve taken the Leib-Grenadier Battalion away, in order to bring Steinmetz’s depleted grenadier brigade up to strength.

2.  Hiller’s Detachment of Katlzer’s Advance Guard consisted of the West Prussian Grenadier Battalion, 1st Battalion of the Brandenburg Regiment, 2nd Battalion of the 12th Reserve Regiment, 3rd Battalion of the 13th Silesian Landwehr Regiment and 2nd Battalion of the 14th Silesian Landwehr Regiment.  As both these detachments were an odd mix of elite, line and militia troops, I’ve averaged them out as ‘Line’ class.

3.  Katzler himself directly commanded the cavalry element of his Advance Guard.  This comprised 2 squadrons of the 2nd Leib-Hussars, 3 squadrons of the Brandenburg Hussars, 4 squadrons of the Brandenburg Uhlans, 4 squadrons of the East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment and 4 squadrons of the 5th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiment.  There were other detachments of regular hussars and Landwehr light cavalry spread out in penny-packets in every brigade, but for game purposes I’ve massed all the hussars in Mecklenburg-Strelitz’s 2nd Brigade and all the Landwehr Cavalry in Jürgass’ Reserve Cavalry Brigade (in any case, they all joined in with the massed cavalry attacks at the end of the battle, so it does actually make sense to group them).

4.  Anticipating the assault on Möckern village, the Prussians created an ad hoc howitzer battery by stripping the howitzers out of their foot batteries.  The chance for Prussian 12pdr foot batteries to cause fires is therefore reduced to a roll of 1, as for horse batteries.

5.  Yorck’s Prussian I Korps and Osten-Sacken’s Russian XI Corps reported directly to Blücher.  All other Russian corps reported to Langeron, who acted as a Positional Wing Commander under Blücher’s command.  Note that Langeron’s command is often referred to as a ‘corps’ and the Army of Silesia is often referred to as consisting of ‘three corps’ (Yorck’s, Osten-Sacken’s and Langeron’s).  However, rather than being a ‘corps’ in the modern sense of an ‘army corps’, this merely reflects the 18th Century terminology used by Blücher, where any large, independently-manoeuvring body of troops was described as a ‘corps’, regardless of size.

6.  Osten-Sacken’s Russian XI Corps for the most part, remained in reserve and well to the rear until Blücher was certain that there was no threat to his left flank.  This didn’t happen until 1700hrs and the corps therefore didn’t start moving until 1800hrs and didn’t arrive until darkness had fallen.  The bulk of XI Corps is not therefore included in this scenario.  However, Vasilchikov’s III Cavalry Corps, which formed Osten-Sacken’s cavalry reserve, did ride off to scout Langeron’s left flank and was committed by Blücher during the latter stages of the battle (once he’d worked out where the French actually were).  Vasilchikov’s III Cavalry Corps therefore operates under Blücher’s direct command and does not report to Langeron.

7.  Four of Karpov II’s Cossack regiments (Vasilchikov’s III Cavalry Corps) were sent off on a scouting mission toward Bad-Düben and have therefore been deleted from Karpov’s strength.

8.  Poltaratsky’s & Juskov II’s Brigades of 9th Division, Turkenov’s & Karpenko’s Brigades of 11th Division and Anensur’s and Tern’s Brigades of 15th Division gain a +1 shooting modifier due to the divisional Jäger brigade being incorporated with the line infantry brigades.  Their label is marked with (+1) as a reminder.

9.  Emanuel’s IV Cavalry Corps and Kornilov’s’s 15th Division have been detached from their original formations and assigned to Rudsevich’s Advance Guard Corps.  Kornilov’s 15th Division and Position Battery #15 may revert back to Olsuviev’s IX Corps at any time, but may not be commanded again by Rudsevich from this point forth.  Confusingly, Nafziger’s order of battle shows Udom’s 9th Division as the division assigned to Rudsevich, but both Nafziger’s and Leggiere’s accounts are very clear that it was Kornilov’s 15th Division that was given this role.

10.  The Russian Cavalry Corps had by this stage of the war been reduced to the size of large divisions.  They did have subordinate divisions on paper, but these frequently had no general officer assigned to command them and instead, they had brigades reporting directly to the Corps HQ.  In Napoleon’s Battles these formations are treated much the same as divisions, but have a slightly increased (+2″) command-span and their commander suffers an Initiative penalty (where applicable) for taking on a higher command role.  E.g. Korff’s I Cavalry Corps officially included the 1st Chasseur à Cheval Division and elements of the 2nd Chasseur à Cheval Division and 4th Dragoon Division, while Vasilchikov’s III Cavalry Corps included the 2nd Dragoon Division, 2nd Hussar Division and elements of the 4th Dragoon Division.  However, there was no divisional command-structure in place at this time.

11.  The optional ‘Blücher Rule’ (Chapter 14.4.6 of the Napoleon’s Battles 4th Edition rulebook) may not be used in this scenario.  Blücher spent most of the battle preoccupied with the perceived threat to his left flank and left the tactical control of the battle to Yorck and Langeron.

The Reinforced French VI Corps

Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse

12”G(10)+1
[4 Free Rolls]

VI Corps (Marmont)      [6F]

20th Division – Général de Division Compans                                      3”G(6)+1
Pelleport’s Brigade (1er Artillerie de la Marine & 32e Légère)              20 FrMLN [10D] (+1)
Joubert’s Brigade #1 (3e Artillerie de la Marine)                                     16 FrMLN [8D]
Joubert’s Brigade #2 (20e & 25e Provisoire)                                             16 FrLN [10D]

21st Division – Général de Division Lagrange                                        3”G(7)+1
Jamin’s Brigade #1 (37ème Légère)                                                             16 FrVLT [8D]
Jamin’s Brigade #2 (4e Artillerie de la Marine)                                        16 FrMLN [8D]
Buquet’s Brigade (2e Artillerie de la Marine)                                            24 FrMLN [10D]

22nd Division – Général de Division Friedrichs                                   3”A(5)+0
Coëhorn’s Brigade (11e & 12e Prov., 23e Légère and 15e de Ligne)       28 FrLN [17D]
Choisy’s Brigade (16e Provisoire and 70e & 121e de Ligne)                    20 FrLN [12D]

25th Light Cavalry Brigade – Generalmajor Normann                    3”G(6)+1
Normann’s Brigade (2nd & 4th Württemberg  Chevaulégers)               12 WtLC [6D]
Württemberg Horse Battery ‘Fleischmann’                                                Wt6#

VI Corps Artillery Reserve – Général de Division Foucher              3″A(4)+0
26/5e Artillerie à Pied                                                                                      Fr12#
7/9e Artillerie à Pied                                                                                        Fr12#
1/1er Artillerie à Cheval                                                                                   Fr6#
3/4e Artillerie à Cheval                                                                                    Fr6#

27th (Polish) Division – Général de Division Dąbrowski                   4”E(7)+1
Żółtowski’s Brigade (2nd & 4th Infantry Regiments)                                24 PdLN [12D]
Krukowiecki’s Brigde (2nd Uhlans & 4th Chasseurs à Cheval)               12 PdLC [6D]
1st Polish Horse Battery                                                                                   Pd6#

Elements, III Corps (Souham)      [2F]

9th Division – Général de Division Delmas                                             3”A(6)+1
Esteve’s Brigade (2e Provisoire & 136e de Ligne)                                      20 FrLN [12D]
2nd Brigade (138e & 145e de Ligne)                                                             24 FrLN [14D]
8/4e Artillerie à Pied                                                                                        Fr12#

23rd Light Cavalry Brigade – Général de Brigade Beurmann         3”E(7)+1
10e Hussards & Baden Light Dragoons                                                        12 BdLC [6D]

III Cavalry Corps – Général de Division Arrighi de Casanova    8”G(6)+1 [3F]

4th Heavy Cavalry Division – Général de Division Defrance          4”G(6)+1
Aximatowski’s Brigade (4e, 5e, 12e & 14e Dragons)                                  8 FrLC [5D]
Quinette’s Brigade (16e, 17e, 21e, 26e & 27e Dragons and 13e Cuir.)    8 FrLC [5D]
7/4e Artillerie à Cheval                                                                                    Fr6#

5th Light Cavalry Division – Général de Division Lorge                   3”G(6)+1
Shea’s 12th Light Cavalry Brigade (5e, 10e & 13e Chasseurs)                 12 FrLC [7D]
Merlin’s 13th Light Cavalry Brigade (15e, 21e & 22e Chasseurs)            8 FrLC [5D]
1/5e Artillerie à Cheval                                                                                     Fr6#

6th Light Cavalry Division – Général de Division Fournier             3”A(5)+0
Mouriez’s 14th Light Cavalry Brigade (29e & 31e ChRs and 1er HR)    8 FrLC [5D]
Ameil’s 15th Light Cavalry Brigade (2e, 4e & 12e Hussards)                   8 FrLC [5D]
4/6e Artillerie à Cheval                                                                                    Fr6#

French Order of Battle Notes

1.  General Lagrange is woefully underrated in the official NB ratings at 3”A(5)+0, so I’ve beefed him up in most areas to 3”G(7)+1.

2.  Pelleport’s Brigade (1er Artillerie de la Marine) gains a +1 shooting bonus due to the incorporation of the 32e Légère. Their label is marked with (+1) as a reminder.

3.  Given the outstanding performance shown by the Provisional Regiments of Joubert’s, Coëhorn’s & Choisy’s Brigades, I’ve upgraded them to French Line Infantry (FrLN) class.

4.  General Foucher is the senior artillery general present on the northern front and may take command of any French, Polish of Württemberger artillery battery within his command-span.

5.  I’ve included Dąbrowski’s independent 27th (Polish) Division as part of the VI Corps total for Fatigue purposes.

6.  The strength of Żółtowski’s Polish infantry brigade varies from source to source.  Nafziger gives a different strength in the text (approximately 2,865 once cavalry are subtracted) to that given in the order of battle (1,395), while Leggiere lists two different strengths (2,065 or 1,565, once cavalry are subtracted).  I’ve therefore gone with a happy medium of 24 figures, once the divisional foot artillery are factored in.

7.  While there is no mention of Arrighi de Casanova’s participation in the battle, his entire III Cavalry Corps was here in support of Marmont and there is mention of his discussions with Ney about the movements of his corps immediately prior to the battle.  Prior to Leipzig the III Cavalry Corps had usually been split up, providing a cavalry division each to various army corps on the Northern front, while Arrighi himself had spent some time as governor of the Leipzig garrison.  Arrighi was clearly still responsible for command of the Leipzig garrison, has his concern about evemy movements at Lindenau prompted Ney to send Bertrand’s IV Corps across the Elster.  However, as his entire III Cavalry Corps was massed here, I’m inclined to include Arrighi in the order of battle.

8.  There is some disagreement as to the number of guns present with III Cavalry Corps.  Nafziger mentions six guns per division in the text, but then his order of battle shows a half-battery with each division, plus a composite battery (made up of three understrength batteries) as corps reserve.  I’ve decided to place a full horse battery with each division and ignore the corps reserve.

9.  Although their corps commander is not present, I’ve grouped the two III Corps formations (Delmas’ 9th Division and Beurmann’s 23rd Light Cavalry Brigade) as a single total for Fatigue purposes.

10.  The level of cavalry support to Delmas’ 9th Division is vague.  It may only have been a single regiment (parent formation not mentioned) on the extreme right flank of the battle.  I’ve assumed that this must have been from Beurmann’s 23rd Light Cavalry Brigade and was probably forming the rearguard for the III Corps Train, which had been escorted by Delmas’ 9th Division as it approached the battle.

11.  As with the cavalry, it’s not clear what artillery support Delmas had with him.  As he was escorting the III Corps Artillery Train, I’ve arbitrarily given him one of the corps reserve batteries.

Optional French Reinforcements (Ney & III Corps)

Marshal Ney was the commander of the Northern Wing at Leipzig, but his influence and presence was notably absent during this battle.  The other notably absent element of the French army was Souham’s III Corps, which was promised to Marmont by Ney, but which was then commandeered by Napoleon before being sent back to Ney once the Emperor realised how bad the situation was at Möckern, with the net result that aside from Delmas’ 9th Division, it didn’t fight anywhere on 16th October.

As a balancing option favouring the French, the main body of Souham’s III Corps (see below) may be brought on as a reinforcement formation.  In the Reinforcement Phase of the French turn immediately following the Allied capture of a built-up sector in Möckern, Klein-Wiederitzsch or Gross-Wiederitzsch, start rolling for III Corps to arrive as reinforcements using the Variable Reinforcement Procedure (1 on first turn, 1-3 on second turn, 1-6 on third turn and 1-8 in every turn thereafter).   III Corps will arrive in any formation, between Points H & I.

Delmas’ 9th Division and Beurmann’s 23rd Cavalry Brigade will arrive as per the main scenario.  Use the overall Fatigue rating for III Corps.

As an additional balancing factor, Marmont could be replaced as C-in-C with Ney, whose ratings are 12”E(10)+3 [5 Free Rolls].  Ney will arrive with Souham’s III Corps and Marmont will in the following turn, revert to being the commander of VI Corps with ratings of 10”G(7)+1, though can still act as a Positional Wing Commander, able to command all of his starting formations in the field (VI Corps, 27th Division and III Cavalry Corps), but not any elements of III Corps.

Here is the order of battle for Souham’s III Corps.  For clarity I’ve included the elements of III Corps (Delmas, Beurmann and the reserve battery) that are already listed above.

If III Corps is deployed, the French Army Morale Rating will increase to 16M.

III Corps – Général de Division Souham            8”G(6)+0 [4F]

8th Division – Général de Division Brayer                                              3”G(5)+0
Fournier’s Brigade (6e, 16e & 28e Légère and 40e de Ligne)                  24 FrLT [14D]
Bony’s Brigade (22e, 59e & 69e de Ligne)                                                   20 FrLN [12D]

9th Division – Général de Division Delmas                                             3”A(6)+1
Esteve’s Brigade (2e Provisoire & 136e de Ligne)                                       20 FrLN [12D]
2nd Brigade (138e & 145e de Ligne)                                                              24 FrLN [14D]

11th Division – Général de Division Ricard                                              3”G(7)+1
Charrière’s Brigade (9e Légère and 50e & 65e de Ligne)                           24 FrLN [14D]
Vergez de Bareaux’s Brigade (142e de 144e de Ligne)                                20 FrLN [12D]

23rd Light Cavalry Brigade – Général de Brigade Beurmann           3”E(7)+1
10e Hussards & Baden Light Dragoons                                                          12 BdLC [6D]

III Corps Artillery Reserve
8/4e Artillerie à Pied                                                                                          Fr12#
21/7e Artillerie à Pied                                                                                         Fr12#
5/7e Artillerie à Cheval                                                                                       Fr6#

Initial Deployment

See the map below for formation deployment areas.

Marmont starts with his entire VI Corps on table, plus Arrighi‘s III Cavalry Corps and Dąbrowski’s 27th Division.  The French Army Morale Rating at the start of the game is 11M.

Blücher is not yet on table.  Yorck is on table with Katzler’s Advance Guard, Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade and Schmidt’s Artillery Reserve.  Langeron and Rudsevich are on table, along with Emanuel’s IV Cavalry Corps and Horse Battery #8.  The Allied Army Morale Rating at the start of the game is 8M (this Morale Rating includes the units arriving as reinforcements on Turn 1).

The cavalry of the French III Cavalry Corps may start the game with React markers placed.  Normann’s Württemberg cavalry brigade is busy marching, so may not have React markers placed before the start of the game.

Game & Reinforcement Schedule

All units arrive deployed in any formation.  See the map below for reinforcement arrival points.

Turn 1 – 1200:  Game starts with the Allied turn.  Horn’s 7th Brigade arrives between Points A & B.
The remainder of Rudsevich’s Advance Guard Corps arrives between Points C & D.
The Allied Army Morale Rating remains at 8M.

Turn 2 – 1230:  Prinz Karl von Mecklenburg-Strelitz’s 2nd Brigade arrives between Points A & B.
Kapsevich’s X Corps arrives between Points C & D.
The Allied Army Morale Rating increases to 12M.

Turn 3 – 1300:  Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade arrives between Points A & B.
The Allied Army Morale Rating increases to 14M.

Turn 4 – 1330: Blücher and the remainder of Olsuviev’s IX Corps arrive between Points C & D.
Jürgass’ Reserve Cavalry Brigade arrives between Points A & B.
The Allied Army Morale Rating increases to 16M.

Turn 6 – 1430:  Vasilchikov’s III Cavalry Corps arrives between Points E & F.
The Allied Army Morale Rating increases to 18M.

Turn 7 – 1500:  Delmas’ 9th Division and Beurmann’s 23rd Light Cavalry Brigade arrive between Points G & H.
The French Army Morale Rating increases to 13M.

Turn 9 – 1600:  Saint-Priest’s VIII Corps arrives between Points C & D.
The Allied Army Morale Rating increases to 21M.

Turn 11 – 1700: The Allies are no longer required to station troops in Box X.

Turn 15 – 1900:  Scenario ends at the end of this turn (nightfall).

Miscellaneous Rules and Terrain Effects

1.  The River Elster is unfordable, though there are bridges at Wahren and Möckern.

2.  The Rietschke Stream is very marshy, though is passable to cavalry and infantry as 1 inch of Rough Terrain.  It is impassable to artillery.  Any unit crossing it will automatically become disordered.  A unit defending the bank will gain a +1 defensive modifier.  All bridges and fords may be crossed by all troop-types at the normal Column or March Column rate.

3.  Möckern Village has a cover modifier of -2 and a defensive modifier of +3 (it contained a number of very defensible, walled manor-houses) and was surrounded by walled gardens.

4.  All Other Villages have a cover modifier of -2 and a defensive modifier of +2.  Some villages have more than one Built-Up Sector (defined by the brown rectangles) and each Sector my accommodate an infantry brigade.  Villages with roads running through them may potentially accommodate more than one unit, but only if the additional units are passing through in Column or March Column formation.

5.  Hill Slopes provide a +1 defensive modifier to the defender.

6.  Woods for the most part provide a -1 cover modifier, but no positive combat modifier, just the usual negative combat modifiers, depending on troop type (suffered by both combatants, provided the defender is within the wood).  The exception to this rule is the Tannenwald, which according to Marmont had been “filled with abatis” and “turned into a fortress”.  French defenders may therefore gain a +1 defensive combat modifier when fighting in the Tannenwald.  Woods are classed as Rough Terrain for movement for all troop types.  The Birkholz, Tannenwald and the two small copses near Breitenfeld are not particularly dense and do not therefore disorder troops passing through them.  However, the woods along the Elster are marshy, are impassable to artillery and are disordering to other troop types.  Firing through woods is limited to 2 inches range.

7.  Earthworks had been dug by the French to cover the northwestern approaches to Leipzig from Halle.  These earthworks are open-backed and are each large enough to hold a full battery or up to three infantry stands.  The earthworks provide a -2 cover modifier and a +2 combat modifier.  Each emplaced battery may pivot by up to 45 degrees and remain in cover.  For infantry, treat the earthwork as an all-round defence for firing (though no negative firing modifier), though there will clearly be no cover or combat modifier if fired upon or charged from the open rear of the earthwork.

8.  Roads are only really important to units travelling on them in March Column formation, who do not then need to worry about the normal command & control rules.  So if you’re short of model roads, prioritise the roads leading from reinforcement entry-points.  River-crossings should also be marked as a matter of priority, even if you don’t have sufficient roads.

Unit Information Card

French Unit Labels

Allied Unit Labels

Umpire’s Eyes Only!

Don’t read any further if you plan to play the scenario with an umpire!

Here are some ‘fun’ rules to inject into the game to reflect a few of the historical events.  The French player should be made aware in advance of the Ambush! rule, but I would otherwise keep these secret from both players until the first time they are applied.

Ambush!  The French historically managed to use a riverside embankment to enfilade the first Prussian assault against Möckern.  Therefore, when the Allies make their first charge against the northern sector of Möckern on the western side of the main road, the French defenders will receive a +2 shooting bonus.  If the French defenders are Disordered, they will obviously not be able to shoot, but will instead remove their Disorder immediately before combat.  This ruse de guerre will only happen once!

Friendly Fire!  Yorck’s Prussians were repeatedly engaged by Russian artillery as they advanced past Möckern.  Therefore, if a Russian battery rolls an unmodified 1 when firing, it will engage the nearest visible Prussian unit within a 45-degree arc to either flank (both sides roll dice again – the French player rolls for the Russian artillery and the Allied player rolls for the Prussian target unit.  Wheel the Russian battery if necessary and apply an additional -2 modifier if it was forced to wheel.  Ignore this rule if there are any intervening French or Russian units between the battery and the Prussians.

Treason!  If you want to go with Marmont’s version of events, whenever Normann’s Württemberg cavalry attempt to charge, roll against Normann’s initiative rating (i.e. 6 or less).  If he fails the roll his brigade will not make any move and any ‘React’ marker on Normann’s brigade will be removed.

That’s it for now!  I think I’ll do some unit profiles next, including these fellas…