As mentioned in the last few articles, we’ve recently had a run of Seven Years War games at W.A.S.P., starting with the Defence of the Dürren-Berg (during the larger Battle of Strehla). We wanted to do a rather larger full-day game, so the natural choice was the sequel to Strehla, the Battle of Wittenberg.
This battle is also often referred to as a ‘Combat’, as while there was significant fighting around the villages of Dobien and Teuchel, as well as a massive artillery-duel, the Reichsarmee was never fully committed to action (it’s sometimes referred to as the Combat of Dobien). However, I think I’ll call it a ‘Battle’, as Hülsen’s Prussian army was certainly fully engaged and it had a significant effect on the outcome of this campaign. It’s an interesting engagement and while there is a huge disparity in numbers, the nature of the terrain and the Prussian defences again make it a tough nut for the Reichsarmee to crack. It also provides me with the opportunity to get some ‘never-served’ Reichsarmee units onto the table at last!
Next time I’ll post the game-report from our recent refight, but in the meantime here is the scenario. As always, it’s designed for Tricorn, our 18th Century variant of Shako rules, but it should be easy enough to convert to other rulesets.
The History Wafflings
Hülsen
Following his victory on 20th August 1760 at Strehla, the Prussian Generallieutenant Johann Dietrich von Hülsen won valuable time to withdraw his tiny army from the trap being set for him by the numerically-superior Reichsarmee, commanded by Reichsmarschall Friedrich Michael Count Palatine von Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld (or ‘Zweibrücken’ for short).
Quickly withdrawing down the western (left) bank of the Elbe, by 22nd August Hülsen had established a new fortified camp on the Ratsweinberg, a high, vineyard-covered hill between the Prussian fortress of Torgau and the village of Zinna (the scene of another battle between Prussia and the Reichsarmee earlier that year; it would also be the scene of the titanic Battle of Torgau later that same year). Positioned on steep slopes and flanked by lakes, marshes and the fortress of Torgau, Hülsen’s new position was viewed by Zweibrücken as being virtually impregnible.
For the next few weeks, Hülsen’s main body remained in place on the Ratsweinberg while the Imperial main body watched him. There were some minor manoeuvres, including feints across the Elbe to the right bank by both sides, but little changed in the overall situation.
Zweibrücken
Luszinsky’s Corps, which had been detached from Zweibrücken’s army during the Battle of Strehla, marched to the Prussian university city of Halle in order to extract plunder, while the Prussian Generalmajor Linden was sent with a small force to discourage him. However, Linden’s effort failed and Luszinsky extracted ‘contributions’ from the burghers of Halle before withdrawing. To make matters worse for Hülsen, he learned that the Württemberg Army, some 10,000 strong, was also on the march, aiming to join Zweibrücken in Saxony.
On 28th August Hülsen received the further unwelcome news that Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick’s army in Hanover (consisting of Hanoverian, British, Hessian, Brunswick, Prussian and Schaumburg-Lippe troops) would be unable to support him, as they had their hands full in Hesse and on the Lower Rhine. However, Hülsen hoped that the news that the Württembergers were also on the march might force Ferdinand’s hand, in order to protect Brunswick (i.e. Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel) from this new threat.
The Württemberg Army finally arrived at Halle on 8th September. On the 9th, they marched on to Leipzig and called out the tiny garrison to surrender. However, Major von Keller commanding the garrison, replied that at the first sign of attack he would burn the city’s suburbs to the ground and would defend it to the last man. He went on to say that as soon as a breach was made in the city walls, he would burn the rest of the city and then withdraw to the citadel. Unwilling to see the wholesale destruction of an allied Saxon city, the Duke of Württemberg decided that Leipzig was simply not worth the effort and marched back to Halle where his army stayed for the next ten days, extorting yet more ‘contributions’ from the locals.
Keller
With all armies in Saxony waiting to see what happened next, nothing happened for much of September, until the Württembergers finally left Halle on 20th September and marched east to Düben, arriving there on the 23rd. Luszinsky’s Corps meanwhile, marched to Dommitzsch; a small town on the Elbe, downstream of Torgau and approximately one-third of the distance to the Prussian-held fortress of Wittenberg. Zweibrücken in the meantime, having received a reinforcement of heavy guns from Dresden, finally broke camp and marched north through the forest to Grosswig, to the west of Dommitzsch.
The Duke of Württemberg was received at Zweibrücken’s headquarters and together, along with Zweibrücken’s Austrian advisor General of Cavalry Andreas Graf Hadik von Futak (or simply ‘Hadik’), they formulated a plan to surround Hülsen on both banks of the Elbe, trapping him at Torgau before launching a general assault on his camp.
On 24th September, the Duke of Württemberg’s army arrived at Pretzsch, another potential crossing point on the Elbe, a little over halfway along the river from Torgau to Wittenberg. On the 25th, the Württembergers there began building a bridge, while Luszinsky’s Corps simultaneously started building a bridge at Dommitzsch. Zweibrücken’s main army meanwhile started pressing in on Hülsen’s positions from the west, occupying the village of Zinna. Once Luszinsky and Württemberg were across the Elbe, Zweibrücken aimed to fully-encircle Hülsen’s army on the 26th and once the encirclement was in place, his main army would launch its assault on the Ratsweinberg.
Duke Carl II Eugen of Württemberg
Hülsen, although confident of the strength of his position, had only sufficient provisions to hold it for than another 14 days. Suspicious of Imperial activity, he had already moved all his baggage and artillery train into the eastern bridgehead, ready to make a break for it, should it become necessary. His cavalry and agents soon brought back reports of the bridge-building and a small force under Oberstleutnant Heilsberg was dispatched to disrupt these engineering operations. However, they soon sent back reports that Austrian Grenzer and Jäger had already crossed the Elbe. As Heilsberg approached the bridges early on the 26th he discovered that they were already complete and that formed bodies of cavalry and infantry were already across in force.
In the meantime, elements of Zweibrücken’s main army had pushed back Prussian outposts near Zinna early on the 26th, though there was still no major attack in that sector and the Imperial probes were easily halted by the Prussian ‘Markgraf Carl’ Regiment. It became clear to Hülsen that Zweibrücken was waiting for the encircling forces to be in place before launching his main attack. In order to rectify the situation, Hülsen planned to sally out that night on the eastern bank of the Elbe, attack Luszinsky and Württemberg while they were in the midst of their crossing operation, destroy their bridges, remove the threat to the eastern bank and then withdraw to his lines at Torgau. However, as the morning went on, further reports came in from Heilsberg, making it very clear that Luszinsky was already across in full strength and would be in position before Hülsen had managed to organise his attack.
Although the King’s orders explicitly required him to hold Torgau, Hülsen lacked the provisions to adequately do so and without hope of further reinforcement or resupply from Berlin, he reluctantly made the decision to evacuate Torgau at around noon on the 26th. The decision was made so suddenly that there was considerable disorder as those units still on the Ratsweinberg, along with Hülsen’s packhorse train, attempted to reach the eastern bank.
Hadik
As chaos erupted around the bridges, Feldmarschallieutenant von Kleefeld, observing the Ratsweinberg position from the north, spotted the Prussians pulling out of their camp at around 1300hrs and immediately ordered his Grenzer to occupy the vacated defences. Feldmarschallieutenant von Zedtwitz did likewise from the south, aiming to cut the withdrawing Prussians off from the bridges. Only the determined actions of the rearguard, commanded by the former Saxon officer Oberst Ludwig Philipp von Röbel, now commanding the ex-Saxon ‘Hauss’ Fusiliers, saved the withdrawal from complete collapse. However, the Austrian light troops managed to deploy some light artillery pieces within range and these guns quickly managed to set fire to the main bridge. This bridge was soon completely ablaze, leaving Hülsen’s pontoon bridge as the only practicable crossing. Nevertheless, the fortress’ guns and Hülsen’s considerable contingent of heavy field artillery firing from the right bank managed to hold off the Imperial pursuit long enough for the rearguard to successfully withdraw to the right bank, though the pontoon bridge had to be abandoned to the enemy.
Before Hülsen marched his army away, he designated one Major von Normann with around 2,500 men to stay behind as the garrison of Torgau and to hold the city for as long as they could. However, while they had plenty of ammunition, they only had sufficient provisions for a few days. Even so, Normann didn’t even wait even that long and surrendered the fortress at 1700hrs that afternoon, barely even before Hülsen’s column was out of sight! Upon hearing of this shameful capitulation, the garrison of the right bank Bridgehead fortification, consisting of 250 men of the IV Garrison Regiment ‘Lettow’ led by Oberstleutnant von Oginsky, quit their post and immediately marched out to rejoin Hülsen’s army.
Kleefeld
By nightfall, Hülsen’s army had concentrated at Rosenfeld, a few miles north of the Torgau Bridgehead. Here he reunited with Heilsberg’s and Oginsky’s detachments and planned to attack Luszinsky’s Corps at Prettin (the village at the eastern end of the bridge at Dommitzsch). Luszinsky however, realising that he was now facing Hülsen’s entire army alone, wisely withdrew from Prettin during the night and crossed back over to the left bank.
On the 27th Hülsen learned of Luszinsky’s withdrawal, so contented himself with marching to Prettin and attempting to destroy Luszinsky’s bridge. However, his efforts were repulsed by the strong Imperial battery positioned on the other side of the river at Dommitzsch and Hülsen was forced to give up. His secondary objective of attacking the Duke of Württemberg was also cancelled following the news that the Duke had also withdrawn to the left bank and so the Prussians continued their march north to the town of Jessen, where they were able to cross over the Black Elster River without further incident.
On the 28th and with Hülsen’s army having withdrawn to the north, Luszinsky’s Corps crossed back over to the right bank, followed by Kleefeld’s Corps. This combined force then set off in pursuit of the Prussians. They were followed a day later by Zweibrücken’s main body, though instead of immediately following the advance guard, Zweibrücken instead dallied at Prettin. Zedwitz’s Corps meanwhile, marched down the left bank of the Elbe and joined with the Duke of Württemberg’s Corps at Pretzsch.
Salenmon
On the 29th, Hülsen sent the energetic Röbel out on a reconnaissance, which succeeded in taking some of Kleefeld’s hussars prisoner. This mission convinced Hülsen that his position at Jessen was unviable and could be outflanked at any moment. He therefore ordered his baggage-train, covered by a screen of hussars and grenadiers, to retreat immediately to the fortress of Wittenberg, which was still held by the Prussian Generalmajor Salenmon.
The rest of Hülsen’s army marched out of Jessen on the morning of the 30th, covered by a rearguard of ‘Green’ Kleist’s cavalry, three battalions of grenadiers and Röbel’s Saxon renegades of the ‘Hauss’ Fusiliers. The army reached Wittenberg without incident later that same day and established its camp just to the north of the city, facing east with its right flank resting upon the fortress and the left flank upon the village of Teuchel, which was occupied by the ‘Hauss’ Fusiliers.
Luszinsky’s Corps followed the retreating Prussian army as close as he dared, given the presence of Kleist’s cavalry, who were far superior in both numbers and quality. Kleefeld’s Corps followed on behind, while Zweibrücken’s main army crossed the Black Elster. The Duke of Württemberg and Zedtwitz’s Corps meanwhile, shadowed the march on the left bank of the Elbe and occupied Wartenberg.
On 1st October Hülsen held a council-of-war with his senior officers; should they make a stand at Wittenberg? Or should they continue the retreat and march north to the relative safety of the Mark of Brandenburg? The council concluded that they would make their stand at Wittenberg.
‘Green’ Kleist
However, the Duke of Württemberg’s Corps on the opposite bank of the Elbe was reported to be marching west with a pontoon train, probably attempting to repeat the earlier manoeuvre attempted at Torgau; to march downstream and build a bridge across the Elbe to block the line of retreat before the main Reichsarmee launched its attack. This threat could not be ignored and so Hülsen sent Röbel with his Saxons, plus a battalion of the ‘Salmuth’ Fusiliers, half of the ‘Schorlemmer’ Dragoons, a detachment of Frei-Regiment ‘Wunsch’ and a battery of heavy guns a couple of miles downstream, to cover the most likely crossing-point at Coswig.
Zweibrücken had spent the day trying to scout Hülsen’s camp, but he and his escort were driven off by Kleist’s outposts. Nevertheless, he had managed to determine that Hülsen’s position ran roughly north-south, facing east. He therefore ordered his army to march around the northern (left) flank of the position.
Early in the morning of 2nd October, the Reichsarmee marched out from its camp in two columns with Luszinsky’s Corps forming the vanguard and Kleefeld’s Corps screening the right flank. By 0900hrs they had reached the village of Euper and finally had a good view of the Prussian positions. As the main army continued to march in an arc around the northern end of Hülsen’s line, Luszinsky advanced to push back Kleist’s outposts around Trajuhn and the heights above Teuchel. However, Kleist advanced in force and Luszinsky was forced to fall back to the main body. Kleist could do no more against the huge mass of troops pouring into the field, so fell back to extend the army’s left flank to the village of Dobien.
Zweibrücken quickly established his artillery on the heights to the west and north of Trajuhn and these guns now opened a heavy fire on the Prussian positions. With the guns having hopefully suppressed the Prussian artillery sufficiently, Zweibrücken ordered Guasco’s Grenadier Corps (part of Stolberg’s Reserve Corps) to advance on Teuchel.
Stolberg
However, Hülsen had established a strong battery of eighteen heavy 12-pounders in a large redoubt precisely to guard against an attack such as this on his left flank (it’s not clear if Hülsen had built this redoubt or if it existed from previous campaigns – the smaller redoubt between Teuchen and Dobien is specifically described as an ‘ancient redoubt’, so it’s possible that this fortification was also an old earthwork). A further five 12-pounders were positioned further out on the left, to support the outpost at Teuchel. These 23 heavy guns, along with numerous lighter battalion-pieces, now opened a furious fire on the approaching Imperial Grenadier Corps! The attack rapidly staggered to a halt long before they reached musketry-range and they deployed their own battalion guns to return fire.
Seeing that the Reichsarmee’s main effort was being directed against his left flank, Hülsen decided to move five battalions from his right flank to shore up his left flank. He trusted that his right flank would be covered by the heavy guns mounted on the walls of Wittenberg fortress. Grenadier Battalion ‘Lubbath’ was also ordered to occupy the ‘ancient redoubt’ near Dobien. Prussian light troops were also described as operating in the area between Teuchel and Dobien (presumably the Frei-Regiment ‘Wunsch’ and the Jäger Corps).
The Duke of Württemberg meanwhile, had arrived at Pratau, just to the south of the Wittenberg Bridgehead on the left bank of the Elbe. Somewhat astonishingly, he had not been advised of Zweibrücken’s intention to attack! In addition and contrary to Prussian intelligence reports, the Württembergers did not have a pontoon train, as they’d already used it to build a bridge over the Black Elster and had not yet recovered it. Nevertheless, the Duke could hear the heavy cannonade beyond Wittenberg and realised that battle had been joined and he therefore had to find suitable fording-points. As already discussed, the town of Coswig, being the most suitable crossing-point, was already occupied by Röbel’s detachment. However, the Württembergers soon found an alternative ford only a short distance downstream of Wittenberg, near the village of Piesteritz.
At around 1400hrs, the Duke of Württemberg ordered the Hussar Regiment ‘Gorcy’ and two squadrons of the Grenadiers à Cheval to attempt a crossing, supported by Zedtwitz’s Grenzer. However, the crossing was detected by Kleist’s patrols and Kleist himself soon arrived with four squadrons of the ‘Schorlemmer’ Dragoons, a company of the Frei-Regiment ‘Wunsch’ and some of his hussars. The Württemberg cavalry were quickly overwhelmed, with the survivors being thrown back across the river. The dismayed Duke of Württemberg was forced to cancel any further attempts at joining the battle.
At around 1700hrs and with the continuing artillery duel completely failing to gain any advantage for the Reichsarmee, Zweibrücken ordered the Grenadier Corps to withdraw. However, Luszinsky’s Corps, having marched to the right flank, now launched an attack through the woods against the Prussian positions at Dobien. This attack was led by Luszinsky’s Grenzer detachment and the Austrian ‘Otto’ Jäger Corps and soon managed to break into Dobien village, which was soon engulfed in flames. As the battle intensified, four more Imperial regiments were committed (presumably Luszinsky’s three Franconian regiments and the ‘Salzburg’ Regiment), while the Prussians threw in Grenadier Battalion ‘Heilsberg’, the 1st Battalion of Fusilier Regiment ‘Salmuth’, the recruit detachment for Fusilier Regiment ‘Hauss’ and five 12-pounders.
The battle for Dobien and the ‘ancient redoubt’ was a bitter one and accounted for the majority of casualties suffered by either side through the day, though the the fighting eventually died out as darkness fell. The main body of the Reichsarmee meanwhile, just as at Strehla, remained resolutely unengaged and while the pointless battle for Dobien was raging, Zweibrücken marched them away to the west, to the village of Schmilkendorf, where they would establish their camp.
The butcher’s bill for the day amounted to 5 Prussian officers and 221 men, while the Reichsarmee suffered the loss of 5 officers and 255 men. The Duke of Württemberg lost a further 5 officers and 30 men.
Although Hülsen had successfully defended his position, Zweibrücken’s new position at Schmilkendorf threatened his line of retreat and Hülsen was once again in danger of being surrounded and destroyed in detail. His line of retreat to Berlin had already been cut and with the last line of retreat toward Magdeburg under threat, he was forced once again to order a retreat. His baggage was immediately sent on its way to Coswig that evening, closely followed by the rest of the army, leaving Generalmajor Salenmon and his garrison to hold for the fortress of Wittenberg. Major Keller was ordered to abandon Leipzig, which he did on 5th October, having spiked all the heavy guns in the fortress.
Arriving in Coswig during the afternoon of 3rd October, Hülsen reunited with Röbel and after a brief rest, marched his army on to Mühlstedt near Zerbst. However, aside from a couple of hussar regiments and some light troops, Hülsen found that he was not being pursued, as Zweibrücken had instead, decided to formally besiege Wittenberg. Unlike the debacle at Torgau, the garrison this time managed to defend their post and did so for nearly two weeks, finally surrendering the fortress to Zweibrücken on 14th October.
Scenario Notes & Victory Conditions
1. The game lasts 20 turns.
2. The Prussian player may issue any orders to his commands at the start of the game.
3. The astonishingly cautious Imperial C-in-C may only issue orders to Guasco and Luszinsky at the start of the game. From the Command Phase of Turn 2, orders may also be sent via messenger to Kleefeld and Würzburg. From Turn 5, orders may be sent to the remaining Imperial commanders.
4. In order to claim a Victory, the Imperial player must break the morale of the Prussian Army.
5. The Prussians may claim a Legendary Victory if they break the Imperial Army’s morale. They may claim a Tactical Victory if they prevent the Imperial player from claiming Victory and/or successfully withdraw from the field with army morale intact (but not before Turn 15).
Infanterie-Regiment ‘Markgraf Carl’
Orders of Battle
The Prussian Corps of Generallieutenant Johann Dietrich von Hülsen
(Good – 2 Messengers)
Right Wing – Oberst Hans Christian von Brietzke (Average)
Grenadier-Bataillon ‘Nesse’ (2/g2) [5/2]
II. Bn, Infanterie-Regiment ‘Markgraf Carl’ (IR 19) (elite) [5/2]
I. Bn, Füsilier-Regiment ‘Grant’ (IR 44) [4/1]
II. Bn, Füsilier-Regiment ‘Grant’ (IR 44) [4/1]
I. Bn, Füsilier-Regiment ‘Salmuth’ (IR 48) [4/1]
Battalion Guns [2/0]
Battalion Guns [2/0]
Left Wing – Generalmajor Christian Bogislav von Linden (Average)
Grenadier-Bataillon ‘Lubath’ (7/30) [5/2]
Recruit Detachment, (ex-Saxon) Füsilier-Regiment ‘Hauss’ (IR 55) (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, Frei-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Wunsch’ (F 7) [4/1]
Jäger Detachment, Frei-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Wunsch’ (FJ 7) [Skirmishers]
Feldjäger-Corps zu Fuß [2x Skirmishers]
Battalion Guns [2/0]
Centre – Generalmajor August Wilhelm von Braun (Good)
Grenadier-Bataillon ‘Beyer’ (11/14) [5/2]
Grenadier-Bataillon ‘Heilsberg’ (38/43) [5/2]
IV. Stehende-Grenadier-Bataillon ‘Lossau’ (g1/g11) [5/2]
I. Bn, Infanterie-Regiment ‘Braunschweig-Bevern’ (IR 7) (elite) [5/2]
II. Bn, Infanterie-Regiment ‘Braunschweig-Bevern’ (IR 7) (elite) [5/2]
I. Bn, Infanterie-Regiment ‘Markgraf Carl’ (IR 19) (elite) [5/2]
I. Bn, Infanterie-Regiment ‘Alt-Schenckendorff’ (IR 22) (elite) [5/2]
II. Bn, Infanterie-Regiment ‘Alt-Schenckendorff’ (IR 22) (elite) [5/2]
Detachment, IV. Garnison-Regiment ‘Lettow’ (poor) [3/0]
Battalion Guns [2/0]
Battalion Guns [2/0]
Battalion Guns [2/0]
Artillery Reserve
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Cavalry – Oberst Friedrich Wilhelm Gottfried Arend von Kleist (Excellent)
II. Bn (5 Sqns), (‘Porzellan’) Dragoner-Regiment ‘Schorlemmer’ (DR 6) [5/2 – Large Unit]
I. Bn (5 Sqns), (‘Grünne’) Husaren-Regiment ‘Kleist’ (HR 1) (elite) [5/2]
II. Bn (5 Sqns), (‘Grünne’) Husaren-Regiment ‘Kleist’ (HR 1) (elite) [5/2]
4 Sqns, Frei-Dragoner-Regiment ‘Kleist’ (FD II) [5/2]
2 Sqns, Frei-Husaren-Regiment ‘Kleist’ (FH II) [4/1] (-)
Detachment at Coswig – Oberst Ludwig Philipp von Röbel (Good)
II. Bn, Füsilier-Regiment ‘Salmuth’ (IR 48) [4/1]
I. Bn, (ex-Saxon) Füsilier-Regiment ‘Hauss’ (IR 55) [4/1]
Detachment, Frei-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Wunsch’ (F 7) [Skirmishers]
I. Bn (5 Sqns), (‘Porzellan’) Dragoner-Regiment ‘Schorlemmer’ (DR 6) [5/2 – Large Unit]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Garrison of Wittenberg – Generalmajor Konstantin Nathanael von Salenmon (Good)
I. Bn, (ex-Saxon) Füsilier-Regiment ‘Plotho’ (IR 54) (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, (ex-Saxon) Füsilier-Regiment ‘Plotho’ (IR 54) (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, III. Garnison-Regiment ‘Grolmann’ (poor) } [3/0]
1 Coy, Neu-Garnison-Regiment } [combined above]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Formation Breakpoints
Division FMR ⅓ ½ ¾
Right Wing (Brietzke) 26 7 13 20
Centre (Braun) 49 17 25 37
Left Wing (Linden) 17 6 9 13
Artillery Reserve 15 – – –
Cavalry (Kleist) 25 9 13 19
Detachment (Röbel) 17 6 9 13
Garrison (Salenmon) 29 10 15 22
Army FMR ¼ ⅓ ½
Prussian Army 178 45 60 89
Frei-Infanterie & Feldjäger-Corps zu Fuß
Prussian Order of Battle Notes
1. II. Bn, Frei-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Wunsch’ may alternatively be deployed as 2x Skirmishers. Note that it was an excellent unit of its type, so is classed as MR 4, rather than the more usual MR 3 for Frei-Infanterie.
2. The independent skirmisher stands from Frei-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Wunsch’ will be destroyed on their first hit. They do not count toward formation morale.
3. The ex-Saxon Füsilier-Regiment ‘Hauss’ had lost its 2nd Battalion at Maxen in 1759. However, by the time of this battle the regiment had 400 recruits being trained at Wittenberg as part of the garrison, who would likely become the new 2nd Battalion. When the regiment’s 1st Battalion was sent to Coswig with Röbel’s Detachment, the recruits relieved them in their position at Teuchel. While the recruit detachment is rated MR 3, I’ve upgraded the regiment’s 1st Battalion to MR 4, as they’d performed well at Strehla under Röbel’s leadership and had performed superbly during the rearguard-action at Torgau and the subsequent retreat to Wittenberg. Röbel was a Saxon turncoat; a former officer of the Saxon ‘Prinz Clemens’ Regiment, he flourished in Prussian service following the Saxon capitulation of 1756 and his leadership ensured that the ‘Hauss’ Regiment (which became the ‘Röbel’ Regiment in December 1760) was one of only two ex-Saxon regiments not to be disbanded due to desertion. Röbel was promoted to Generalmajor in December 1760 and earned the Pour le Mérite for his bravery, though was to die of dysentery in September 1761.
4. Infantry Regiments ‘Markgraf Carl’, ‘Braunschweig-Bevern’ and ‘Alt-Schenckendorff’ were excellent regiments and are classed as Elite (MR 5), along with the grenadiers.
5. Infantry units deployed in the entrenchments may offset their flank-lines (i.e. increase their arc of fire to 45 degrees on either side).
6. It is often difficult or even impossible to physically place infantry models in fortifications where artillery models are already present. Therefore, any infantry unit in base-to-base contact to the rear of a battery in the entrenchments will class as defending the parapet of the entrenchments against attackers. They may therefore fire volleys and conduct melee as normal, even when the artillery has already fired from the same position (in much the same way as infantry support batteries in the normal Tricorn rules).
7. Aside from the identity of units fighting on the left flank and those units moved from the right to the left flank under Brietzke, I have very little information on the exact structure of the main body of Hülsen’s army. If preferred, the Centre may be further broken down into two brigades. Adjust the formation breakpoints accordingly.
8. The command-structure for Hülsen’s main body is simply not known and for the most part, nor are the names of his subordinate formation commanders. I’ve therefore added some speculative commanders’ names (in italics) and arbitrarily split them into three commands and given them named commanders who are known to have been in senior command-roles at the time. I’ve grouped the units fighting on the left wing under Generalmajor von Linden, who had often commanded the light troops during August and September, while the units that were transferred from the right wing to the left wing have been grouped under the command of Oberst von Brietzke, the ‘field’ Colonel of the ‘Grant’ Fusiliers. The rest of the main body has been placed under the command of Generalmajor von Braun, the hero of Strehla.
9. Although not listed on any order of battle, on 26th September, one Oberstlieutenant von Oginsky managed to escape from Torgau with 250 men of IV. Garnison-Regiment ‘Lettow’ and then reportedly ‘rejoined Hülsen’s army’. I’ve therefore slotted this detachment into the main corps as a weak battalion. It is of course, entirely possible that these men were used to guard the baggage, reinforce the garrison of Wittenberg, etc, but Hülsen needs all the help he can get in this scenario.
10. Although some accounts describe Oberst von Plotho as commanding the garrison of Wittenberg, he had been replaced during August by the freshly-promoted Generalmajor Konstantin Nathanael von Salenmon. Although not actually a noble, this roguish commander of Frei-Truppen, who had risen meteorically through the ranks, styled himself ‘von’ following his promotion to Generalmajor and nobody, not even the King, ever corrected him.
11. Even though Röbel’s Detachment and the garrison of Wittenberg aren’t directly involved in the battle, I take the view that their close proximity would make a morale difference (especially the presence of a bloody-great fortress), so their totals are included here. I’ve included their orders of battle in full for those who are interested in such things, as well as those who might like to bring them on as a ‘what-if’ option (for which we would have to ignore the threat to the line of retreat posed by the Württemberg Army at Coswig).
12. The heavy batteries of the fortress are distributed evenly around the walls of the fortress and may not be moved. If you’ve got a bastion-fortress model like mine, treat each ‘face’ of the fortress as a battery.
13. The ‘Kleist’ Frei-Husaren are very weak (only 2 sqns), so apply a single casualty to the unit before the start of the game to reflect this. This casualty may not be recovered through sixes rolled during the Initiative Phase.
14. A march-battalion of 500 recruits and replacements from Berlin is mentioned as having joined Hülsen’s army as it retreated through Coswig on 3rd October (the day after the battle), so it’s possible that this unit had joined Röbel’s Detachment there on the 2nd. If you want to include Röbel’s Detachment as an optional reinforcement, he may therefore add a single battalion (MR 3) to his command.
Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurmainz’
The Imperial Army of Reichsmarschall Friedrich Michael Pfalzgraf von Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld
(Average – 2 Messengers)
Main Corps Left Wing – General der Infanterie Prinz Karl August Johann Reinhard von Baden-Durlach (Poor)
I. Bn, Schwaben Kreis-Füsilier-Regiment ‘Alt-Württemberg’ [4/1]
I. Bn, Schwaben Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Rodt’ (poor) [3/0 – Large Unit]
II. Bn, Schwaben Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Rodt’ (poor) [3/0 – Large Unit]
I. Bn, Schwaben Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Baden-Baden’ (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, Schwaben Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Baden-Baden’ (poor) [3/0]
I. Bn, Mainz Infanterie-Regiment ‘Lamberg’ [4/1 – Large Unit]
II. Bn, Mainz Infanterie-Regiment ‘Lamberg’ [4/1 – Large Unit]
I. Bn, Würzburg Infanterie-Regiment ‘Rot-Würzburg’ [4/1 – Large Unit]
II. Bn, Würzburg Infanterie-Regiment ‘Rot-Würzburg’ [4/1 – Large Unit]
Mainz & Würzburg Battalion Guns (Austrian) [2/0]
Schwaben Battalion Guns [2/0]
Württemberg Battalion Guns [2/0]
Main Corps Right Wing – Feldmarschallieutenant Michael Gottfried Freiherr von Rosenfeld (Average)
II. Bn, Pfalz Garde-Regiment zu Fuß [4/1]
I. Bn, Kurrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurmainz’ (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, Kurrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurmainz’ (poor) [3/0]
III. Bn, Kurrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurmainz’ (poor) [3/0]
IV. Bn, Kurrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurmainz’ (poor) [3/0]
I. Bn, Kurrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurköln’ (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, Kurrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurköln’ (poor) [3/0]
I. Bn, Kurrhein (Pfalz) Infanterie-Regiment ‘Effern’ (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, Kurrhein (Pfalz) Infanterie-Regiment ‘Effern’ (poor) [3/0]
I. Bn, Kurbayern Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurbayern’ (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, Kurbayern Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurbayern’ (poor) [3/0]
III. Bn, Kurbayern Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurbayern’ (poor) [3/0]
Kurbayern Battalion Guns [2/0]
Mainz Battalion Guns [2/0]
Pfalz Battalion Guns [2/0]
Main Corps Cavalry – Feldmarschallieutenant Johann Ferdinand Balthazar Kolb von Rheinstadt (Good)
3 Sqns, Franken Kreis-Cuirassier-Regiment ’Bayreuth’ (unreliable cuirassiers) [4/1]
3 Sqns, Kurrhein Kreis-Cuirassier-Regiment ‘Kurpfalz’ (unreliable heavy horse) [4/1]
5 sqns, Austrian Cuirassier-Regiment ‘Bretlach’ (C 29) [6/2 – Large Unit]
5 Sqns, Austrian Cuirassier-Regiment ‘De Ville’ (C i) [6/2 – Large Unit]
Imperial Artillery Reserve
Imperial Artillery Reserve Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Imperial Artillery Reserve Light Position Battery [3/0]
Imperial Artillery Reserve Light Position Battery [3/0]
Austrian Reserve Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Austrian Reserve Heavy Position Battery [3/0]
Grenadier & Carabinier Corps – Feldmarschallieutenant Peter Alexander Graf von Guasco (Average)
I. Bn, Austrian Infanterie-Regiment ‘Sachsen-Gotha’ (IR 30) [4/1 – Large Unit]
II. Bn, Austrian Infanterie-Regiment ‘Sachsen-Gotha’ (IR 30) [4/1 – Large Unit]
I. Bn, Austrian Infanterie-Regiment ‘Pallavicini’ (IR 15) [4/1 – Large Unit]
II. Bn, Austrian Infanterie-Regiment ‘Pallavicini’ (IR 15) [4/1 – Large Unit]
I. Kreis-Grenadier-Bataillon (Poor – Kurmainz, Effern & Baden-Baden IRs) (poor) [4/1]
II. Kreis-Grenadier-Battaillon (Poor – Rodt, Kurköln & Kurbayern IRs) (poor) [4/1]
III. Kreis-Grenadier-Bataillon (Hesse-Darmstädt, Pfalz Garde & Alt-Württemberg IRs) [5/2]
I. Austrian Grenadier-Bataillon (Mainz-Lamberg & Austrian IRs) [5/2]
3 Sqns, Schwaben Kreis-Cuirassier-Regiment ’Hohenzollern’ & Elite Coys (poor cuirassiers) [5/2]
Austrian Battalion Guns [2/0]
Austrian Battalion Guns [2/0]
Kreis-Dragoner-Regiment ‘Württemberg’ & Kreis-Dragoner-Regiment ‘Sachsen-Gotha’
Feldmarschallieutenant Prinz Christian Carl zu Stolberg-Gedern’s Reserve Corps
Reserve Corps Infantry – Feldmarschallieutenant Karl Freiherr von Würzburg (Poor)
I. Bn, Kurrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurtrier’ (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, Kurrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurtrier’ (poor) [3/0]
I. Bn, Oberrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Pfalz-Zweibrücken’ (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, Oberrhein Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Pfalz-Zweibrücken’ (poor) [3/0]
I. Bn, Austrian Infanterie-Regiment ‘Macquire’ (IR 46) [4/1 – Large Unit]
I. Bn, Austrian Infanterie-Regiment ‘Luzarra’ (IR 48) [4/1 – Large Unit]
II. Austrian Grenadier-Bataillon (46/48 IRs) [5/2]
Oberrhein Battalion Guns [2/0]
Kurtrier Battalion Guns [2/0]
5 Sqns, Pfalz Leib-Dragoner-Regiment ‘Kurfürstin’ (poor dragoons) [4/1 – Large Unit]
Auxiliary Corps of Feldmarschallieutenant Wenzel Mathias Knoget Freiherr von Kleefeld (Good)
I. Bn, Würzburg Infanterie-Regiment ‘Blau-Würzburg’ [4/1 – Large Unit]
II. Bn, Würzburg Infanterie-Regiment ‘Blau-Würzburg’ [4/1 – Large Unit]
I. Bn, Grenz-Infanterie-Regiment ‘1. Banalisten’ [3/0]
I. Bn, Grenz-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Karlstädter-Szluiner’ [3/0]
Austrian Battalion Guns [2/0]
5 Sqns, Austrian Chevauxléger-Regiment ‘Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld’ (Ch 39) [5/2]
5 Sqns, Austrian Husaren-Regiment ‘Baranyay’ (H 30) [4/1]
Corps of Feldmarschallieutenant Gabriel Georg Graf von Luszinsky (Average)
I. Bn, Kurbayern Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Salzburg’ (poor) [3/0]
II. Bn, Kurbayern Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Salzburg’ (poor) [3/0]
I. Bn, Franken Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Cronegk’ (poor) [3/0 – Large Unit]
I. Bn, Franken Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Hohenlohe’ (poor) [3/0 – Large Unit]
I. Bn, Franken Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Varell’ (poor) [3/0 – Large Unit]
IV. Kreis-Grenadier-Battaillon (Cronegk, Hohenlohe, Varell & Salzburg) (poor) [4/1]
I. Bn, Schwaben Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Baden-Durlach’ (poor) [3/0]
Austrian Frei-Jäger-Corps ‘Otto’ & Grenzer Detachment [2x Skirmishers]
Kurbayern Battalion Guns [2/0]
Franken Battalion Guns [2/0]
4 Sqns, Franken Kreis-Dragoner-Regiment ‘Ansbach’ (poor) [4/1]
2 Sqns, Schwaben Kreis-Dragoner-Regiment ‘Württemberg’ (unreliable) } [3/0]
2 Sqns, Obersachsen Kreis-Dragoner-Regiment ‘Sachsen-Gotha’ (unreliable) } [combined]
2 Sqns, Grenz-Husaren-Regiment ‘Slavonisch’ (H 43) } [combined]
Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kurköln’
Formation Breakpoints
Division FMR ⅓ ½ ¾
Main Corps Left Wing (Durlach) 44 15 22 33
Main Corps Right Wing (Rosenfeld) 43 15 22 33
Imperial Artillery Reserve 15 – – –
Main Corps Cavalry (Kolb) 22 8 11 17
Grenadier Corps (Guasco) 47 16 24 36
Reserve Infantry (Würzburg) 36 12 18 27
Auxiliary Corps (Kleefeld) 27 9 14 21
Luszinsky’s Corps 39 11 20 30
Army FMR ¼ ⅓ ½
Reichsarmee 273 69 137 205
Kreis-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Cronegk’
Imperial Order of Battle Notes
1. Grenzer battalions may alternatively be deployed as 2x Skirmisher stands. The combined light infantry unit of Luszinszky’s Corps (the ‘Otto’ Jäger and a Grenzer detachment) are permanently grouped as 2x Skirmisher stands. Each light infantry unit is classed as MR 3 and the pair of skirmisher stands may therefore accumulate three hits between them before the battalion is broken.
2. Kleefeld had a grenadier battalion formed from the grenadiers of the ‘Blau-Würzburg’ Regiment and the Grenzer Regiments. However, this battalion was almost certainly very weak, especially after Strehla where it was heavily engaged, and I’ve therefore incorporated the grenadiers’ strength into their parent regiments.
3. I’ve arbitrarily numbered the grenadier battalions for game purposes. These were temporary units and would be known by the name of the officer designated to command them on the day, but these simply aren’t known. There were actually six four-company grenadier battalions under Guasco’s command, but I’ve reduced this to four six-company battalions, as the four-company battalions would have been very weak.
4. The Austrian ‘Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld’ Chevauxléger Regiment (Ch 39) is a retitled Dragoon regiment (D 39) and is classed as Dragoons (MR 5/2) for movement, combat and morale purposes. The regiment lost roughly 25% of its strength at Strehla (including its commanding officer, the Prince of Nassau-Usingen), so is not classed as a Large Unit.
5. The excellent Hesse-Darmstädt ‘Prinz Georg’ Regiment (arguably the best regiment in the Reichsarmee) is listed in all orders of battle for Wittenberg, but was actually detached on 30th September to garrison the newly-captured fortress of Torgau, so would not have been present at Wittenberg.
6. The Hungarian ‘Nikolaus Esterházy’ Regiment (IR 33) was badly cut up at Strehla and as a consequence was sent to perform garrison duty at Meissen, replacing the 2nd Battalion of the ‘Kurtrier’ Regiment, which then rejoined the army in time for Wittenberg.
7. The sub-unit organisation and commanders’ names for the Reichsarmee Main Corps are simply not recorded for this campaign. I’ve therefore arbitrarily allocated likely commanders based on the previous years and these are shown in italics. The Reichsarmee had in previous campaigns been divided into a Left Wing, a Right Wing and a Reserve Corps, so I’ve stuck with that pattern. The Prince of Baden-Durlach (or ‘Durlach’) had previously commanded the left wing, so I’ve left him in place. The Right Wing had been commanded by Fürstenberg, but he died in 1759, so I’ve replaced him with Rosenfeld, who was Fürstenberg’s 2ic in 1758 and who had commanded an independent corps in 1759. Zedtwitz had commanded the heavy cavalry at Strehla, but this time was commanding light troops on the other side of the Elbe. I’ve therefore replaced him with Kolb, who had previously commanded the army’s advance guard and who had previously served as an Austrian cavalry general.
8. The artillery order of battle of the Reichsarmee at this time is complete guesswork. In previous years the Imperial Artillery Reserve had provided roughly six 12pdrs and around a dozen lighter pieces. This was then supplemented by a similar number of Austrian guns. Zweibrücken is known to have been reinforced on 23rd September by ‘additional heavy guns from Dresden’, though it’s anyone’s guess as to what this reinforcement consisted of. I’ve given them a second Austrian heavy battery to account for this reinforcement. It’s clear that the Reichsarmee was heavily out-gunned by Hülsen (for whom we do have an accurate gun-count), so I wouldn’t give them any more heavy pieces.
9. The sources are very inconsistent when it comes to the ranks of the senior officers involved. This was probably caused by differences between their substantive rank in their home country and their acting Imperial rank.
10. The Swabian ‘Rodt’ Regiment was formerly known as the ‘Fürsteberg’ Regiment and is sometimes referred to as such even after its change of inhaber and title (it’s also sometimes confused with the Würzburg ‘Rot’ (Red) Regiment). Similarly, the Franconian ‘Hohenlohe’ Regiment is often referred to by its former title ‘Ferntheil’.
11. The two battalions of the ‘Kurköln’ Regiment were regiments in their own right and are often listed separately. The 1st Battalion was Leib-Infanterie-Regiment ‘Nothaft’, while the 2nd Battalion was Infanterie-Regiment ‘Wildenstein’.
12. The ‘Kurbayern’ Regiment was made up from elements of two regular Bavarian Army regiments; the 1st & 2nd Battalions were the Infanterie-Regiment ‘Pechmann’, while the 3rd Battalion was the 1st Battalion of Infanterie-Regiment ‘Holnstein’.
13. The Swabian ‘Württemberg’ Dragoons, the Upper Saxon ‘Sachsen-Gotha’ Dragoons and the ‘Slavonisch’ Grenz-Hussar Regiment are all very weak units and for game purposes are combined into a single unit of unreliable dragoons (MR 3).
14. The three Franconian infantry regiments (‘Cronegk’, ‘Hohenlohe’ & ‘Varell’) each theoretically had two battalions, but only one of each regiment is mentioned as being present during this campaign. The regiments were very badly cut up at Rossbach in 1757, never really recovered their strength and suffered horribly from desertion, so were probably reduced to a single battalion or perhaps their strength had become so low that it made no difference? The ‘Cronegk’ Regiment certainly lost its 2nd Battalion to a Prussian cavalry ambush in 1759. They’re shown as Large Units in the order of battle based on their original organisation (and that’s how I’ve organised mine), but they were probably much weaker than this and should probably be ‘normal’ units.
15. While Zweibrücken might normally be rated as a ‘Poor’ C-in-C on his own, he was supported by an excellent 2ic in Hadik and the professional Reichsarmee General Staff (the only permanently-manned elements of the Reichsarmee were the General Staff and the Artillery Reserve), who collectively bump his rating up to ‘Average’ (plus two Messengers).
Pfalz Infanterie-Regiment ‘Effern’
Terrain Notes
The table is 8’x6′ and each grid-square on the map is 1′ square.
Most terrain features function as per the terrain chart on Page 2 of the Tricorn QRS, but here are a few clarifications:
The terrain is fairly hilly and slopes provide a defender with a +1 melee modifier.
The Built-Up Sectors (BUS) marked on the map have a -1 cover and +1 melee modifier.
The Prussian entrenchments provide the defender with a -1 cover and +1 melee modifier, though this is added in all cases to the +1 melee modifier for the slope. Class as a linear obstacle to pass through. Troops in entrenchments may roll to rally from stagger without any penalty for being within the enemy musketry template.
The large redoubt in the centre of the Prussian line may accommodate three batteries and two infantry battalions. The other, smaller earthworks may each accommodate a single battery and infantry battalion.
In terms of combat, infantry defending the earthworks may extend their firing-arc out to 45 degrees on either side, but suffer a -1 modifier if they do so (the earthworks are well-built and designed to enable enfilade fire, so defending units can mutually support each other). Units defending the earthworks may claim flank and rear support, but attackers may only claim rear support.
It’s probably also worth reminding that units defending BUS may fire at opportunity targets in any direction as Skirmisher fire. They may also conduct volley fire simultaneously at ALL units attacking the BUS, but do so with a -1 modifier. They may not claim any support modifiers in melee, but the attackers may claim rear (not flank) support.
The streams are very minor and class as linear obstacles, as per the QRS.
There is one wide river. This is only passable at marked crossing-points to units in Column, Limbered or Skirmish formation.
Woods give the defender a -1 cover modifier against skirmishers and formed musketry only. Visibility is limited to 2 inches and rear-support may only be given by units within 2 inches.
Infanterie-Regiment ‘Blau-Würzburg’
Deployment Notes
It should be emphasised that aside from a few identified formations, the deployment map shown here is a complete wild-arsed guess on my part, based on the 19th Century Prussian Greater General Staff study map and a few known key facts:
1. The position of Guasco’s Grenadier Corps and Luszinsky’s Corps is positively identified in maps and accounts.
2. Kleefeld’s Corps is known to have been deployed on the Imperial right flank.
3. Würzburg’s Corps formed the rearguard as it marched into the field, so was probably the formation deployed around Trajuhn on the Imperial left flank.
4. Kleist is known to have been covering the Prussian left flank (though also found time to go and defeat the Duke of Württemberg’s attempted crossing, just off the bottom-left-hand corner of the map).
5. Also deployed on the left were the ‘Wunsch’ Frei-Bataillon defending Dobien, the Jäger detachments and the ‘Lubath’ Grenadiers, who occupied the old redoubt on a knoll to the east of Dobien. The recruit detachment of the ‘Hauss’ Fusiliers also marched to the left flank, along with a battery of 12-pounders (having started the battle on the left flank of the main body).
6. The battalions listed under Brietzke’s command were marched from the right flank to shore up the left flank.
Other than these known facts, the actual deployment is anyone’s guess and I’ve given it my best stab. Feel free to rearrange the deployment within these perimeters if you disagree with my version. In our game I allowed both sides to redeploy their units within their general deployment areas. The Prussians immediately chose to pull their central line of infantry back from their exposed forward position in front of the main redoubt.
The garrison of Wittenberg for the purposes of this game is invulnerable to fire and may not be assaulted. No garrison units may be staggered or suffer casualties or suffer morale failures. Garrison infantry units may move sideways along the ramparts at a rate of 4 inches per turn and may perform musketry as normal. Batteries are distributed evenly around the fortress perimeter and each face of the fortress is essentially classed as a heavy position battery (every point around the fortress should be covered by 2-3 fortress batteries, but no more than that).
Tune in next time to see how the game went.
