The recent 75th anniversary of VJ Day and conversations with our friend Olivia on the Battle of Wetlet thread prompted me to re-read some history of the Burma Campaign and suitably inspired, I thought I’d add another post about the XIVth Army in Burma. This time I’m looking at the British and Indian Armoured Regiments and Brigades that fought in the campaign (as well as some earlier armoured units that were fighting in Burma prior to the creation of XIVth Army).
7th Armoured Brigade
The first Allied armoured formation to arrive in Burma was the British 7th Armoured Brigade, which was originally ordered to reinforce Singapore (from North Africa), but was diverted to Burma, where it would come under the command of Eastern Army (the precursor to XIVth Army). The brigade consisted of two regiments, the 7th Hussars and 2nd RTR, each with 52 Stuart Mk I (M3) light tanks, plus a Brigade Headquarters of 11 tanks, for a total of 115 tanks. The brigade’s vehicles were repainted green to better suit the Burmese terrain and as part of the repaint, the red jerboa sign of 7th Armoured Brigade was changed to green. The Stuart was an excellent tank and was in all respects far superior to the Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks being used by the Japanese in Burma, though the brigade was completely lacking in 37mm HE and canister ammunition and this considerably hampered their anti-infantry capability.
7th Armoured Brigade arrived in Rangoon in late February 1942, in the midst of the Japanese invasion and two days before the disaster of the Sittang Bridge and almost immediately was forced to retreat along with the rest of I Burma Corps. The arrival of the 7th Armoured Brigade (along with the arrival of Lieutenant General William ‘Bill’ Slim to take command of the deteriorating situation) had a decisive effect on the course of the campaign; while not being enough to bring victory, the armour succeeded in turning what would otherwise have become a disorderly rout into a relatively orderly withdrawal to India (one of the longest fighting retreats in military history).
The tanks gave Slim’s command and his Chinese allies the power to break through roadblocks, to counter-attack and to break through to units that had become isolated. Without them, it’s highly likely that the 17th Indian Division, the 1st Burma Division and the various garrison units, as well as various Chinese units retreating toward the Indian border, would have been utterly annihilated.
As mentioned above, the Stuart was far superior in all respects to the Japanese tanks in Burma (which initially consisted of a light tank company of the 2nd Tank Regiment which marched over with the first wave from Thailand, later joined by the 1st & 14th Tank Regiments which landed with the second wave at Rangoon in April). The Stuart’s armour was largely impervious to Japanese 37mm anti-tank guns, but they could still blow off a track. Japanese 75mm infantry guns and artillery had better luck against the Stuarts and the (thankfully rare) Type 88 75mm anti-aircraft gun was especially deadly. The Japanese even tried knocking Stuarts out with chemical weapons! These were glass ‘grenades’ (simply small glass bottles) filled with hydrocyanic acid that would turn to a gas when the glass was broken. The gas attacks were unsuccessful, but further Stuarts were lost to air attack, to determined infantry with pole-charges, to breakdown and to simply running out of fuel (the Stuart’s powerful engine was particularly thirsty and required specialist high-octane aviation fuel). One was even lost to a surprise attack by a captured Stuart!
By the time they reached the Chindwin River eleven weeks later, 44 Stuarts had been lost and as mentioned above, some of those had already been recovered and pressed into service by the Japanese, who were also making good use of enormous quantities of captured motor transport. Only one of the remaining 71 Stuarts was successfully ferried across the river. The remaining 70 were ‘scuttled’ either by blowing them up or in most cases, by draining the engine oil and running the engines until they seized. The solitary survivor (named ‘Curse of Scotland’ – a reference to another historical Stuart) re-crossed the Chindwin in 1945 (now missing its turret) as the CO’s tank of the Indian 7th Light Cavalry.
The few tanks recovered intact by the Japanese were formally adopted as the 6th Company of the 14th Tank Regiment and five of these were still running (along with a captured Lee) when the regiment intervened in the Battle of Imphal two years later.
The markings of the 7th Armoured Brigade are shown below. However, note that they painted them in non-standard fashion, with the brigade sign on the ‘starboard’ mudguard and the Arm-of-Service sign on the ‘port’ side (I painted mine the wrong way round!). 7th Hussars and 4 RTR used standard squadron signs; red and yellow respectively, with the troop number painted in the same colour.
50th Indian Tank Brigade
With the departure of the 7th Armoured Brigade from the theatre, General Noel Irwin‘s Eastern Army had only three partially-formed armoured formations; the 50th, 254th and 255th Indian Tank Brigades. These had only started forming at the end of 1941 and progress was further hampered by a severe shortage of tanks; a situation not helped by constant demands to send tanks to the Middle East! However, with several Indian cavalry regiments being converted to armour for the first time, personnel were unlikely to be in short supply, even if the supply of British personnel dried up.
First to be combat-ready was the 50th Indian Tank Brigade, which was established in October 1941. Its main ‘teeth’ units were three former British infantry battalions converted to armoured regiments of the Royal Armoured Corps, namely the 146th, 149th and 150th Regiments RAC, equipped with Valentine Mk III infantry tanks. These were supplemented by Indian support elements (hence the ‘Indian’ part of the title).
The organisation of these three tank regiments was very much the same as the regimental organisation used by 7th Armoured Brigade, with 52 tanks per regiment, though with two significant differences. First, instead of the more commonly-used Daimler Dingo, the scout cars of the Recce Troop were India Pattern Wheeled Armoured Carriers Mk II. Secondly, while the Valentine was an excellent, reliable and thickly-armoured tank, its firepower was somewhat anaemic, being limited to a 2pdr (40mm) gun, which at this time lacked an HE round, only one co-ax MG and no bow MG.
Ordinarily, British armoured squadron HQs of the time would normally include a pair of Close Support (CS) tanks armed with 3-inch or 95mm CS howitzers, though for some reason the British Army did not adopt a 3-inch CS version of the Valentine (the New Zealand Army by contrast equipped around one-third of their Valentines as 3-inch CS tanks when fighting in the Pacific). Thus the Valentine had most of the tactical disadvantages suffered by the Stuarts of 7th Armoured Brigade. However, to offset this lack of tank firepower a regimental Mortar Troop was added, consisting of six 3-inch (81mm) mortars, transported by Universal Carriers. This Troop could be held centrally as a single fire support element, or could be distributed as sections of two mortars to each squadron. Regiments equipped with Stuart in India were also eventually equipped with a Mortar Troop.
By late 1942 plans were afoot to launch a counter-offensive into Japanese-occupied Burma, initially with the limited aims of re-taking the Arakan coastal belt and the island of Akyab, with its all-weather airfield and port. This plan was designated Operation CANNIBAL. The heavily-reinforced 14th Indian Division, taken from Slim’s newly-created XV Corps was selected for the task, though the prickly General Irwin opted to by-pass Slim’s HQ and micro-manage the battle in person, feeding more and more brigades into the battle until the poor GOC 14th Division was controlling no fewer than nine brigades instead of the usual three!
As the attack down the Mayu Peninsula stalled in the face of the heavily fortified Japanese ‘citadel’ at Foul Point, 50th Indian Tank Brigade was finally called upon in January 1943 to provide armoured support to take on the bunkers. Slim and the local brigadier insisted that a full tank regiment was required to support the attack, but they were overruled by Irwin and just a half-squadron of eight tanks from ‘C’ Squadron 146th RAC (two troops of three Valentines and an HQ of two) was allocated. The attack was a disaster, with some of the tanks being bogged in ditches and the rest being destroyed or immobilised by artillery fire and overrun by Japanese infantry. The Japanese counter-attack drove 14th Indian Division back out of the Arakan. Thankfully, Slim had once again been called forward to ‘pull the fat out of the fire’ and was again able to prevent the defeat from turning into a disaster.
In the recriminations that followed the disastrous First Arakan Campaign, Irwin sacked Slim out of sheer spite. However, Field Marshal Wavell, C-in-C India took a very different view; he immediately reinstated Slim and removed Irwin from his command. Irwin was sent home on ‘sick leave’, being replaced by the much more amenable George Giffard, whose priorities were to restore morale and train the British and Indian Armies for jungle warfare; a process that was continued and expanded under Slim when he was appointed as commander of the newly-created XIVth Army in November 1943. Slim was adamant that tanks were essential to victory in Burma and were never again to be thrown away in tiny penny-packets.
The freshly-blooded 50th Indian Tank Brigade meanwhile, was sent to the newly-formed XXXIII Corps, to prepare for the planned Operation ZIPPER (the re-conquest of Malaya) and for future amphibious operations along the Arakan coast. However, it had been determined that the Valentine was unsuitable for jungle warfare and was therefore to be replaced in 50th Tank Brigade with medium tanks, namely the Lee and the Sherman. However, around a regiment’s-worth of Valentine DD tanks were obtained for amphibious operations (later supplemented by large numbers of Sherman DD tanks) and Valentines were relegated to training, as well as being converted to ‘Scorpion’ flails, armoured bridge-layers and armoured observation posts.
The organisation of medium tank-equipped armoured regiments in India and Burma remained much the same as the previous organisation, though the Mortar Troop was disbanded and the scout cars of the Recce Troop reverted to Daimler Dingos, though it’s certainly possible that some India Pattern Carriers were retained. However, the Indian Armoured Corps history records that some units found wheeled scout cars to be unsuited to jungle warfare and so switched to a mixed organisation of Jeeps and Universal Carriers. Nevertheless, some units (such as the 3rd Carabiniers of 254th Tank Brigade) kept their Dingos until the end of the war. The Indian Armoured Corps history also discusses a reduced tank regiment establishment, with RHQs reduced from 4 to 3 tanks and SHQs reduced from 4 to 2 tanks, for a total of 45 tanks. However, several regimental war diaries, histories and personal accounts discuss having the full 52 tanks on hand at various times throughout the campaign, so this may merely have been a temporary measure for when tank replacements were in short supply.
While waiting for Operation ZIPPER, 50th Indian Tank Brigade acted as something of an armoured reserve pool for the formations at the front line. In March/April 1944, in the wake of the Japanese offensive Operation Ha-Go (the Second Arakan Campaign), and the subsequent Operation U-Go (the Japanese offensive to take Imphal and invade India), most of the personnel of ‘C’ Squadron 150th RAC were flown into the besieged city of Imphal to take over the reserve Lee medium tanks of 3rd Carabiniers (254th Indian Tank Brigade, which was the armoured component of IV Corps). This ad hoc unit formed the Carabiners’ fourth squadron and was designated ‘YL’ Squadron (for Yorks & Lancs – the infantry regiment from which 150th RAC was formed). These men fought at Imphal until May, when the trickle of tank losses meant that a fourth squadron was no longer viable and the men of ‘YL’ Squadron were then flown out to rejoin 150th RAC. In the meantime, the remaining personnel of ‘C’ Squadron 150th RAC were sent to Dimapur in Assam, where along with some spare artillerymen and signallers, crewed five more reserve Lee tanks. These five tanks were initially the only armour available to support the leading elements of XXXIII Corps as they advanced to relieve the garrison at Kohima and the besieged IV Corps at Imphal.
A few days later the bulk of 149th RAC (minus ‘C’ Squadron’), equipped with Grant medium tanks (essentially the same as the Lee, though with a larger, British-designed turret) arrived at Dimapur to greatly increase the armoured ‘punch’ of XXXIII Corps. This growing mass of tanks was further reinforced by the armoured cars of the Indian 11th (Prince Albert Victor’s Own) Cavalry (Frontier force) (or ‘PAVO’) and the Stuart IIIs of the Indian 45th Light Cavalry. The armoured cars and Stuarts were mainly used to keep lines of communication open while the Lees and Grants provided close infantry support.
In the meantime, ‘C’ Squadron 149th RAC, equipped with 16 Sherman V medium tanks, was sent to join the XV Corps Armoured Group in the Arakan, reinforcing the 25th Dragoons who had been instrumental in defeating the Japanese offensive. This squadron was the very first unit in the theatre to use Shermans operationally and fought in the Arakan from April to May 1944, before returning to the regiment which was now fighting at Kohima. The squadron left its Shermans with HQ 50th Tank Brigade and picked up new Grant tanks en route to Kohima.
Following the relief of Imphal in late June 1944, the 45th Light Cavalry were sent to the Arakan and were transferred from XXXIII Corps Troops to the 50th Indian Tank Brigade. 149th RAC meanwhile, came under the command of 254th Indian Tank Brigade at Imphal and was formally transferred to that formation in August, though was immediately sent back to India to re-train and re-equip with the Churchill infantry tanks. 149th RAC would not see action again. In November 1944, 150th RAC was also brought to Imphal and was transferred from the 50th Indian Tank Brigade to the 254th Indian Tank Brigade, thus filling the gap left by the departure of the above two regiments.
Aside from the previously-discussed transfers of armoured regiments, the composition of 50th Indian Tank Brigade was a constantly moving feast. From August 1942 the 1st Cameronians were added as a Motor Battalion until April 1943. There was then no Motor Battalion in the brigade until August 1944 when the 2/4th Bombay Grenadiers were assigned. Also assigned in August 1944 were the Indian 19th (King George V’s Own) Lancers, who were equipped with Sherman V, many of them being DD tanks. The brigade also included the 1st Independent Bridging Troop RAC, equipped with Valentine bridge-layers, as well as the most unusual 400th Independent Scorpion Squadron RAC, equipped with Valentine Scorpions.
With the commitment of XXXIII Corps to the Battle of Imphal and re-conquest of Burma, a new XXXIV Corps was formed in India to take over the long-postponed Operation ZIPPER role. 25th Dragoons, now equipped with Sherman and Valentine DD tanks, were allocated to the new corps, thus freeing up 50th Indian Tank Brigade, who were now transferred en masse to XV Corps. At long last, the entire brigade was committed to action in support of XV Corps in the 3rd Arakan Campaign from October 1944 to February 1945, though the 146th RAC (mostly equipped with Lee, though ‘A’ Squadron included 10 Grants) and 19th Lancers (with standard Shermans and no DDs) were involved in amphibious operations along the Arakan coast until April 1945.
Finally on 2nd May 1945, ‘A’ Squadron 19th Lancers landed at Rangoon as part of Operation DRACULA. However, the Japanese had gone and the Lancers assisted 26th Indian Division in taking the city without firing a shot. On 15th May the Lancers, driving north, linked up with the 3rd Carabiniers of 254th Indian Tank Brigade, who were the lead element of XXXIII Corps driving south. After much celebration, the two units joined forces to attack a Japanese strongpoint, even engaging Type 95 Ha-Go Light Tanks and capturing one in perfect running order! This was to be 50th Indian Tank Brigade’s very last engagement of the war.
All the models pictured above are 15mm models by Battlefront Miniatures/Flames of War. The Valentine Bridge-layer was converted by my good friend Martin Small.
If your chosen model manufacturer only refers to US type-numbers or even more vague descriptions such as ‘Honey’, here’s a quick guide:
Stuart Mk I – In US terms, this is the early-model M3 Light Tank with octagonal turret and protruding commander’s cupola. Having just come from North Africa they were also fitted with sand-skirts, though these were quickly damaged or ripped off by combat and terrain.
Stuart Mk III – In US terms this is the M3A1 Light Tank with the same hull as the Stuart I (M3), but with a cylindrical turret. By the time these entered front-line service in 1944 they were amply supplied with 37mm HE and Canister rounds, so were much better equipped to take on Japanese infantry than the Stuart Mk Is of 7th Armoured Brigade.
Lee Mk I – In US terms this is the M3 Medium Tank. Some other marks (Lee Mk II (M3A1), IV (M3A3), V (M3A3 variant) & VI (M3A4)) were used in Burma, though these looked very much like the original Mk I and were rather rare. Both short (M2) and long (M3) 75mm guns were employed and some of these also had prominent muzzle-counterweights. Many Lees in Burma had the prominent commander’s cupola removed and instead replaced with a Sherman-style cupola with two semi-circular hatches. Of those that kept the cupola, I’ve never seen one with the cupola MG fitted. One unusual feature is that some Lees in Burma retained the twin bow MGs that were usually removed; these were operated by the co-driver, who could only elevate or depress the guns and relied upon the driver traversing the entire tank!
Grant Mk I – This was exactly the same tank as the Lee Mk I, except that it had a larger, British-designed turret. Curiously, the British turret was also fitted to some Lee Mk IV/V. The Grant Mk II (M3A5) was also used in Burma, but somewhat confusingly, these mostly had Lee turrets (some may have had British turrets)! As with the Lee, both short (M2) and long (M3) 75mm guns were employed and some of these also had prominent muzzle-counterweights.
Sherman Mk V – In US terms this is the M4A4 Medium Tank.
British and Indian vehicles in the Far East were painted a single uniform camouflage colour. There were no official disruptive camouflage schemes and to date I have not come across any confirmed examples of locally-adopted disruptive schemes. However, photographs of the 7th Armoured Brigade’s Stuarts in 1942 do tend to suggest a banded camouflage in some photos. Some have suggested that this might be the remnants of their previous Middle Eastern camouflage, though records do state that the brigade repainted its vehicles in transit to the Far East. It may therefore be merely a trick of light, dust, damp or poor photographic reproduction.
The standard camouflage colours used by the British and Indian Armies are described below. The suggested paint recipes come from the primary expert on the topic, Mike Starmer. However, please note that having tried mixing up various shades of greens, I found that the difference on the table was so minimal that I simply stuck with my standard late-war ‘S.C.C. 15 Olive Drab’ for all vehicles, for which I start with a thinned Humbrol 33 Black undercoat, then a base coat of Humbrol 75 Bronze Green, a highlight coat of Humbrol 159 Khaki Drab and then a final light ‘weathering’ dry-brush of Humbrol 72 Khaki Drill.
Middle Bronze Green (a.k.a. ‘Khaki Green No.3’): This was the standard colour for all British vehicles in the Far East in the late 1930s and early 1940s and this was the colour used to repaint the Stuarts of 7th Armoured Brigade onboard ship, en route to Burma. The closest match is Humbrol 80, though note that prior to the Japanese attack, vehicles belonging to garrison units would normally be polished to a shine resulting in a deeper, darker tone. A suggested match is Vallejo 895(88).
Standard Camouflage Colour (S.C.C.) 13 ‘Jungle Green’: This colour replaced Middle Bronze Green on British vehicles in the Far East from 1943. It was a very drab and muddy green and darker than US Olive Drab. The title ‘Jungle Green’ was not official and it was significantly different to the Jungle Green dye used in uniform manufacture, which was rather bluish and faded to a greyish tone. S.C.C. 13 was however, used for weapons and personal equipment such as helmets. Mix Humbrol 159 + 155 + 33 in ratio 4:3:1. A suggested match is Vallejo 893(95).
S.C.C. 15 Olive Drab: This was introduced in April 1944 and although not officially used in the Far East, vehicles and equipment delivered from the UK or Canada would normally arrive painted in S.C.C. 15 and might not be repainted prior to deployment in the field. The colour was introduced to match US Olive Drab, which it did when fresh, though it faded to green unlike US Olive Drab, which faded to grey. Mix: Humbrol 150 + 159 + 33 in ratio 5:5:2. A reasonable match is Humbrol 159 + 33 in ratio 8:1. A suggested match is Vallejo 924(94).
S.C.C. 16 Very Dark Drab: This colour was introduced in the Far East in 1944, though according to Dennis Oliver’s work, does not appear to have been employed in the field until 1945 and possibly only by 50th Indian Tank Brigade. It was certainly used for the Shermans of 19th Lancers in the final Arakan battles. It was a very dark, dull, dirty brown green. Darker than both S.C.C. 13 and US Olive Drab. It is also sometimes referred to as S.C.C. 207 and was recorded as being too dark to be used in the painting of personal equipment. Mix Humbrol 155 + 66 + 33 in ratio 10:2:1. A suggested match is Vallejo 897(98).
US Olive Drab: US equipment delivered directly from the USA would normally arrive painted in US Olive Drab and would often find its way into the field still painted in this colour. The closest match is Humbrol 155. A suggested match is Vallejo Brown-Violet 887(93).
Armoured crew were initially dressed in Khaki Drill (‘KD’) tropical uniforms, for which I use a Humbrol 72 Khaki Drill with a heavy highlight. Uniforms gradually changed to Jungle Green (‘JG’) from late 1943 onwards, for which I use Humbrol 116 US Army Green with a heavy highlight. However, tank crew seem to have continued to wear KD long after the infantry had universally adopted JG (see photo above of a tank commander in KD talking to Indian infantry in JG). Berets were black for all regiments, though crewmen could also wear the RAC helmet, US tank crew helmet or for Sikhs, the traditional turban in KD or JG.
It has to be said that the markings for 50th Indian Tank Brigade have been an absolute nightmare to research and there is still much conjecture. It doesn’t help that there are very few photos of 50th Tank Brigade tanks in existence and these are largely limited to the Grants of 146th RAC and the Shermans of 19th Lancers in 1945. I have not found any photos of Valentines belonging to the brigade, no photos of 146th RAC Lees in the Arakan and no photos of 45th Light Cavalry Stuarts after their adoption by 50th Tank Brigade. The only photos seem to be of a few Grants belonging to ‘A’ Squadron 146th RAC on Ramree Island in 1945 and of 19th Lancers’ Shermans at the latter end of the 3rd Arakan Campaign in 1945. There is also a short sequence of film showing ‘C’ Squadron 149th RAC’s Shermans in action in April 1944. There are however, lots of photos of random Lees from non-specific locations and seemingly devoid of markings (save perhaps a squadron sign), which does tend to indicate that tanks were frequently either devoid of markings or were so covered in crud as to make them invisible in black and white photography!
From the available evidence, it would appear that 50th Indian Tank Brigade initially used the same marking scheme positively recorded as being used by 254th Indian Tank Brigade. This is indicated by the film of 149th RAC Shermans, who are marked with the Arm-of-Service (AoS) serial ‘5’ on a two-tone (red/yellow) square and light-coloured (yellow?) squadron signs, which would fit as the second-most-senior regiment of the brigade (squadron signs would be red, yellow and light blue for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd regiments of a brigade). If this assumption is correct, here is how the marking scheme would work:
Note that I have not included the full array of support units, as I’ve no idea what their AoS serials would have been. Note that when the 149th RAC and 150th RAC were transferred to 254th Indian Tank Brigade, their seniority would have been unchanged, so would have simply carried on with the same markings, just changing the formation sign (if it were painted at all).
In 1944 a new standard marking scheme was ordered for all Indian Tank/Armoured Brigades. 254th Indian Tank Brigade is known to have simply carried on using the old scheme shown above for a time before painting the new markings after the end of major operations in 1945. 255th Indian Tank Brigade meanwhile, immediately adopted the new scheme and was already carrying the new markings when they went into action for the first time in 1945.
However, it’s anyone’s guess if 50th Indian Tank Brigade implemented the new marking scheme, as no photos show AoS markings of any type. 19th Lancers’ Shermans were clearly painted with the ‘mailed fist’ formation sign of 50th Tank Brigade, alongside a badge of unknown provenance, showing a hand rising from the waves holding a kris sword (colours thought to be yellow on blue). These signs are painted centrally on the transmission housing below the glacis plate, as well as on the left side of the rear hull plate. No AoS signs are visible, though some seem to have a curious white square on the tank-telephone box at the rear-right, which might be an over-exposed photo of an AoS sign. or might be an old painted-out AoS sign or a partly-painted new AoS sign…
This is the full list of AoS markings that would be carried if the 1944 regulation was applied:
Some markings were meant to be universal to all vehicles, but were not always painted. Yellow ‘bridging discs’, with weight-class in black were almost always seen painted at the front-right of the glacis plate. War Department registration numbers were painted on the tank sides. From mid-1944 onwards, white Allied stars were meant to be painted on the sides and top of all AFVs and this order was enthusiastically obeyed by the 254th and 255th Tank Brigades, but seemingly not by the 50th Tank Brigade. It’s been suggested that tanks in Burma, like most in NW Europe, did have a circled star painted on the turret-top or engine deck, even though no star was visible at the sides.
One mysterious marking that is commonly seen on photos of Lees, Shermans and Universal Carriers in India/Burma is a small white rectangle with ’20’ in black, painted at the front-right of the vehicle, usually just above or below the bridging disc. The meaning of this marking is not known, but it has been speculated that it may relate to the capacity of auxiliary water tanks commonly fitted to ‘India Pattern’ vehicles.
Squadron signs were meant to be of the universal type; diamond for RHQ, triangle for ‘A’ Sqn, square for ‘B’ Sqn and circle for ‘C’ Sqn. These were then coloured by regimental seniority; red, yellow, sky-blue or green. However, 19th Lancers had a squadron signs of a completely unique type – seemingly black on a white background, with the troop designation painted in black in the centre. This was in the format ‘HQ, 1, 2, 3 or 4’, so the number ‘1’ within the ‘B’ Sqn square would indicate No.5 Troop (the 1st troop of ‘B’ Sqn). Other regiments used the actual troop number (1-4 for ‘A’ Sqn, 5-8 for ‘B’ Sqn or 9-12 for ‘C’ Sqn) or an individual tank number (between roughly 1 & 63, including the Recce Troop scout cars).
Anyway, enough for now! Next time I’ll cover the XV Corps Armoured Group, 254th Indian Tank Brigade and 255th Indian Tank Brigade.