“By God, That’ll Do!”: The Battle of Salamanca, 22nd July 1812 (Revised Scenario for Napoleon’s Battles)

Back in the primordial soup of this blog, one of my first Wellingtonic game reports was of a refight of the Battle of Salamanca, played at W.A.S.P. in 2016.

Although that article appears in my list of Napoleonic Scenarios, it really was only the most cursory outline scenario and didn’t even include a map, let alone all the labels and other gubbins that are useful for playing the game, so my remaining reader really does deserve better than that rather poor effort.  I’ve also done more reading since then, so here then, is a rather more refined version of the Salamanca scenario.

As usual, this scenario is designed for Napoleon’s Battles rules, which is a ‘grand tactical’ set, where each unit represents a brigade or large regiment and the man-to-figure ratio is roughly 1:100 (to be exact, it’s 1:120 for infantry and 1:80 for cavalry).  It would however, be relatively easy to convert to similarly-scaled systems such as Age of Eagles or Général d’Armée.

Someone recently asked about meaning of the ‘hieroglyphs’ on the Napoleon’s Battles orders of battle.  My apologies for not explaining these more often, though I have explained them in some past articles.  For example, the code ’16 BrLN [5D]’ means a 16-figure unit of British Line Infantry, which will likely disperse when it reaches a strength of 5 figures.  The stats for British Line Infantry can then be found on the Unit Information Card at the bottom of this article.  I’m sure you can work out the rest.

Generals have a rating (e.g. General Cotton with ‘5″E(7)+2 [1F]’) which shows their command-span expressed in inches, a quality-rating (Poor, Average, Good or Excellent), an initiative rating between 4 and 8 (10 for C-in-Cs), a combat modifier (ranging from -1 to +3) which is added if they are attached to the unit in combat (a ‘D’ indicates that the modifier is only applied in defence) and the formation’s fatigue rating.  The C-in-C has a number with ‘M’; this is the army’s morale rating.

Historical Background

Spring 1812: Wellington Keeps The French Guessing

With the capture of the Spanish border-fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz during the first four months of 1812, Wellington finally had a solid base in Portugal from which to carry the war back into Spain.

Facing him across the border were two French armies; Marshal Soult’s Army of the South was screening the border opposite Badajoz, while Marshal Marmont’s Army of Portugal was already starting to make a nuisance of itself once again around Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida (there were three more French field armies, as well as smaller formations spread around Spain).  While Wellington could just about manage to confront one of the two French armies facing him, there was absolutely no possibility of winning a battle against both armies combined.

However, the two French armies were separated from each other by the River Tagus.  The destruction of the bridge at Alcántara by Portuguese troops in 1809 had removed one of the few crossing points over the Tagus, leaving the bridge of boats at Almaraz (almost half-way to Madrid) as the only remaining practical crossing-point connecting Soult and Marmont (there were also bridges at Talavera, Arzobispo and Toledo, but the first two were impassable to artillery and heavy wheeled vehicles, while Toledo, being very close to Madrid was a very long way upriver and therefore a very long detour).  As a bonus, Marshal Soult’s pontoon train had also been captured at Badajoz, meaning that the French had no practical way to create a new bridge.

With Marmont once again threatening Ciudad Rodrigo and northern Portugal, Wellington needed to remove that threat as a priority, but to do so he first had to remove the possibility of Soult marching north to combine his forces with Marmont.  To that end, Wellington ordered Lieutenant General Rowland Hill (a much-loved and very capable officer known as ‘Daddy’ Hill for his compassionate and caring treatment of his men) commanding the 2nd Division, to mount a lightning raid deep into Spain, with the aim of capturing and destroying the bridge at Almaraz before withdrawing back to the border.

Following an extraordinary march, covering 100 miles in three punishing day-marches and two short night-marches, Hill’s leading units marched to assault Fort Napoleon, defending the southern end of the bridge, at dawn on 17th May.  However, the punishing terrain caused one assault column to be delayed and so dawn broke before the assault forces were in position and surprise was lost.  With the garrison now fully alerted, Hill’s men attempted throughout 17th and 18th May to get guns to the scene, but to no avail.  In desperation, Hill launched a pre-dawn attack on 19th May, first mounting distraction attacks against the nearby castle and a fortified manor-house, which had also been garrisoned by the French.  Fort Napoleon was held by 325 men with nine guns, with a further 250 men in an earthwork at the southern end of the bridge, plus more men defending the other strongpoints south of the river.  Fort Ragusa on the north bank held another 250 men and twelve guns, while the flêche at the northern end of the bridge held another 50 men.

With operational surprise having been lost two days earlier, the assault was a bloody affair, with a reported 189 British troops being lost (mostly from the 50th Foot and 71st Highland Light Infantry).  However, the garrison (being partly unreliable Prussian conscripts from the 4ème Régiment d’Étranger) eventually broke and fled!  With over 500 men attempting to cross the bridge at once, the floating structure apparently collapsed (some sources say that the French engineers cut it loose in panic), tipping hundreds of unfortunate French troops into the river!  Hill quickly had what was left of the bridge burned and the fortifications blown up.  Mission completed, Hill’s jubilant but exhausted column retired back the way they had come, along with 259 prisoners.

With communications between Marmont and Soult severed, Wellington began distraction and deception operations to tie down French formations and to keep them guessing as to his real intent.  To keep Soult busy, a Spanish army under General Ballasteros made a demonstration between Gibraltar and Soult’s base at Seville, winning a victory on 1st June against Conroux’s division at Bornos.  Safely returned from Almaraz, Hill’s 18,000 men also made their presence felt to the east of Badajoz, further convincing Soult that he was about to become Wellington’s target.  In the north, Abadia’s Spanish Army of Galicia and Silveira’s Portuguese Division (reinforced by newly-raised militia regiments) manoeuvred in an attempt to pin down Bonnet’s division (of Marmont’s army) in Asturias, while General Mendizabal’s guerrilla army increased its tempo of operations in an effort to tie up Caffarelli’s French Army of the North.  To add to French woes, the news that William Bentick’s British army in Sicily was preparing to set sail for eastern Spain served to keep Marshal Suchet’s French Army of Aragon busy, watching the coast for any signs of a British invasion fleet.  With the French armies preoccupied, Wellington marched against Marmont in the second week of June.

June 1812: Wellington Advances on Salamanca. Marmont Reacts

Marmont learned of Wellington’s advance on 14th June and ordered the concentration of his army some 20 miles to the north-east of Salamanca.  His Army of Portugal mostly achieved its concentration on 19th June, two days after Wellington reached Salamanca with around 50,000 men.  Marmont now had a little over 30,000 men, grouped into five infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, but was still missing Foy’s and Thomières’ divisions, which would bring the army up to around 43,000 men.  There were also 800 men garrisoning a number of fortified positions within the city of Salamanca.

Wellington therefore had the edge in terms of numbers for the moment, though as the Spanish and Portuguese operations in the north-west had been slow to develop, Bonnet would eventually be able to reinforce Marmont with his 6,500 men.  Marmont had also received a dispatch from Caffarelli, promising another 8,000 men.  King Joseph however, with the Army of the Centre at Madrid and worried about developments elsewhere in Spain, could spare no reinforcements for the moment.

At Salamanca, Wellington had managed to concentrate the majority of his army, consisting of seven infantry divisions, a very large cavalry division, two independent Portuguese brigades and the Spanish division of Don Carlos de España.  However, not everything was going to plan; in addition to the Spanish and Portuguese lethargy in the north-west, Wellington’s most experienced exploring officer Colquhon Grant had recently been captured and his talented Quartermaster-General George Murray had not returned from home-leave.  Most critically, two of his most experienced Lieutenant Generals, Thomas Picton and Thomas Graham had been forced to return to Britain for medical treatment.  Command of Picton’s hard-fighting 3rd Division would therefore pass to Wellington’s brother-in-law Major General Edward Pakenham, while Graham’s role of second-in-command of the army would eventually fall to the Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese Army, Marshal William Beresford (Graham would remain in post until early July 1812 and was present at the start of the Salamanca Campaign).

Having arrived in Salamanca on 17th June, Wellington immediately ordered Henry Clinton’s 6th Division to invest the three forts in the southwest corner of the city, while he marched the rest of the army out to find Marmont.  However, as the army for the moment lacked a siege train, the siege dragged on until the 26th, when at last Clinton ordered a direct assault against Fort San Gaetano, the smallest of the three.  This assault was bloodily repulsed, with General Bowes, commanding one of Clinton’s two British brigades, being killed in the attempt (having already been wounded earlier in the day, he returned to lead his men in a second assault with tragic consequences).  Nevertheless, fresh artillery support arrived on the 27th and by the end of the day all three forts had fallen.

In the meantime, Wellington had formed the rest of the army up in a good defensive position on the heights above the village of San Cristobal (San Cristobal de la Cuesta), some three miles to the northeast of Salamanca.  His right flank rested upon the River Tormes at Cabrerizos, his outpost line was placed forward at the village of Moriscos and the bulk of his army remained hidden on the reverse slope; a classic Wellingtonian deployment.  Marmont’s army appeared on the following day, intending to relieve the forts at Salamanca, but finding the way blocked.  There was a brief exchange of artillery fire and the French made an attempt to wrest control of Moriscos from the 68th (Durham) Light Infantry holding it, but these brief flurries of action did not develop into a more general engagement and at nightfall, Wellington ordered the 68th to be withdrawn.

The two armies remained glowering at each other for another two days.  Wellington for his part, hoped that Marmont would attack him and to that end on the 22nd ordered a thick skirmish-line forward to engage the French at Moriscos, hoping to provoke an attack.  However, Marmont at this point was still lacking the divisions of Thomières, Foy and Bonnet and knew he was considerably outnumbered (roughly 40,000 Allies versus 30,000 French), so had no intention of attacking (though Maucune and Ferey both advocated for an attack).  Wellington, his impatience growing, reputedly exclaimed “Damned tempting!  I have a great mind to attack ’em!”  Fortunately he did not, as Marmont was at that moment reinforced by the 9,500 men of Thomières’ and Foy’s divisions, which almost equalised the two armies.  However, Marmont then received the shocking news that the planned reinforcement of 8,000 men from Caffarelli would not be forthcoming.

Nevertheless, still hoping to relieve the Salamanca forts, Marmont attempted to manoeuvre to the east of Salamanca (on the southern bank of the Tormes) with 12,000 men, though was countered by Graham with the 1st & 7th Divisions.  Early on 27th June, Marmont received word from Fort San Vicente that they would hold out for a further three days.  This news galvanised Marmont into planning a major effort to break through and to that end he ordered his entire army to prepare to cross over the Tormes, thus by-passing Wellington’s position and attacking the city from the southeast.  However, no sooner had the march been planned than it was made obsolete by the news that the forts had fallen that same day.  This meant that Clinton’s 6th Division and the artillery reserve were now free to join Wellington’s main army and Marmont was once again sorely outnumbered.

June-July 1812: Marmont Retreats to the Douro and Turns the Tables

Marmont now had no reason to remain standing in front of Salamanca and therefore, early on 28th June, his army began its retreat to Tordesillas on the River Douro, 50 miles to the northeast.  Both armies reached the Douro without incident and for the first two weeks of July, they simply faced each other across the river while considering their options.  Bonnet’s division finally joined Marmont on 7th July and at last he now outnumbered Wellington, but only by around 3,000 men.  In the meantime, Caffarelli, Soult and Suchet had all written to King Joseph, stating that they could not spare any men to reinforce Marmont.  To Joseph’s credit, he was determined to do something to aid Marmont and to that end managed to scrape up a force of 13,000 men.  However, this force didn’t leave Madrid until 21st July and didn’t reach Marmont in time for the pivotal battle.

At last on 16th July, Marmont made the first move, pushing Bonnet’s and Foy’s divisions across the Douro at Toro, which lies some 21 miles to the west of Tordesillas.  This feint forced Wellington to counter, but to do so he had to march his troops 30 miles in order to march around a large bend in the Douro, while also moving the bulk of his army back to Canizal, in order to protect his lines of communication with Salamanca.  By the time Wellington’s advance guard reached Toro, the French divisions had already withdrawn to the north bank, destroying the bridge as they did so.  While Wellington was on this wild frog-chase, Bonnet and Foy marched back to Tordesillas, where Marmont was already starting his main crossing of the river.

Thankfully, Wellington had cautiously placed a strong rearguard, consisting of Charles von Alten’s Light Division, Cole’s 4th Division and George Anson’s light cavalry brigade at Castrejon under the command of Stapleton Cotton, his senior cavalry commander, who quickly detected the French advance.  As the rearguard withdrew in the face of the French advance, Wellington and Beresford rode out to perform a personal reconnaissance, but came within a whisker of being captured by French cavalry!  Marmont constantly tried to turn Wellington’s right flank, though was countered each time.  Nevertheless, by the end of the day, Marmont had forced Wellington back over half-way to Salamanca.

19th-21st July 1812: The Parallel March

On 19th July, the two armies, exhausted by the hard marching in the high Summer heat, halted facing each other across the River Guarena.  However, at 4pm Marmont’s army set off again, marching southeast along the bank of the Guarena.  Wellington’s army shadowed them on the opposite bank.  On 20th July, Marmont again trying to turn Wellington’s right flank (i.e. the head of the column), crossed over onto Wellington’s side of the river and began marching southwest.  The two armies were now conducting a form of bizarre race, marching parallel to each other and only a few hundred yards apart!  At midday, both armies were converging on a defile at the village of Cantalpino and the French managed to reach it first, deploying guns in an attempt to force a battle.  At last, Wellington was forced to turn west toward Salamanca and took up defensive positions at Cabezabelloso, at last out of sight of Marmont’s army and only a few miles from where his army had been positioned at San Cristobal, a month earlier.

On the 21st, Marmont marched south once again, fording the River Tormes at Huerta, hoping to cut Wellington off from his line of retreat.  This left Wellington with no option but to abandon the city and march south.  Crossing the Tormes at Cabrerizos, his army once again marched south within sight of the French, until they ended the day with both armies running north-south, facing each other across a valley.  Marmont’s army’s left flank rested upon the village of Calvarisa de Arriba, while Wellington’s right flank rested upon the rocky Lesser Arapile Hill (see the map below).  Wellington’s rearguard, formed by Pakenham’s 3rd Division and d’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry brigade, remained north of the Tormes for the time being, covering the withdrawal of the baggage train from Salamanca.

22nd July 1812: The Battle of Salamanca

Following a violently stormy night, the 22nd dawned dry and warm, quickly drying the soaked ground.  Marmont’s army was still in full view of the Allies, camped along the ridge extending north from Calvarisa de Arriba.  On the western side of the valley, only the Light Division and 1st Division were in view of the French, along with Eberhardt von Bock’s KGL Dragoon brigade from the Cavalry Reserve, elements of the 4th Division on the Lesser Arapile and light infantry of Hope’s 7th Division.  Hope’s light infantry were soon engaged in a sharp skirmish with French voltigeurs, as Marmont attempted to drive them back and perform his own reconnaissance.  However, the French skirmishers were driven back and Marmont was unable to glean any information as to the location of the remainder of Welllington’s army.

The 5th and 6th Divisions, along with the bulk of the 4th and 7th Divisions, the Cavalry Reserve, Carlos de España’s division and the two independent Portuguese brigades, were in the dead ground to the rear of the visible Allied positions, around the villages of Carbajosa and Las Torres.  The 3rd Division and d’Urban’s cavalry were still north of the Tormes.

Marmont, encouraged by the sight of dust rising to the west (caused by Wellington’s baggage train evacuating Salamanca and heading back towards Ciudad Rodrigo), was now convinced that Wellington was retreating and that what he could see was merely the rearguard.  He therefore planned once again to turn Wellington’s right flank, hoping to then march west and cut Wellington’s line of retreat.  To that end, he ordered Bonnet to seize the Greater Arapile, possession of which would protect the flank and act as the ‘hinge’ of the turning movement.

Seeing the French begin to make their move to the south, Wellington realised too late that he should have occupied the Greater Arapile.  Lowry Cole was at once ordered to seize the feature, but it was already too late.  The Portuguese 7th Caçadores (from Stubbs’ brigade) dashed across the valley, but Bonnet’s voltigeurs beat them to the crest and following a heavy exchange of fire, the Caçadores fell back to the Lesser Arapile.  With the Greater Arapile in his hands, Marmont ordered the bulk of his army to move south, leaving Foy’s division as a rearguard at Calvarisa de Arriba.

With the advantage of interior lines, Welllington was quickly able to realign his formations in the dead ground to face south.  While the 1st and Light Divisions remained in place, facing Foy, Leith’s 5th Division was brought forward to Los Arapiles village, supporting the right flank of Cole’s 4th Division. Wellington also now brought in his rearguard (Pakenham’s 3rd Division and d’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry brigade), ordering them to march through Salamanca and take position at Aldea Tejada, on the Ciudad Rodrigo road.

As the French divisions moved into an assembly area in the woods to the south of the Greater Arapile, at around mid-day, Marmont climbed the hill to assess the situation.  Still convinced that Wellington was retreating, he ordered his divisions to turn west and to march along the ridge that extended westward via Miranda de Azan.  His intention was to cut the road to Ciudad Rodrigo ahead of the retreating army and force Wellington to attack him.  He was however, concerned that wellington might make another attempt to seize the Greater Arapile from Bonnet, so ordered a large battery to be placed upon it (the battery would grow during the day to 40 guns).

At around 2pm, Marmont’s army marched out once again.  In the lead was Maucune’s 5th Division, with Curto’s Light Cavalry Division covering the open southern flank.  These were followed by Thomières’ 7th Division, then Clauzel’s 2nd Division, Brenier’s 6th Division, Sarrut’s 4th Division and Ferey’s 3rd Division.  Bonnet’s 8th Division would remain in place on and around the Greater Arapile, while Foy’s 1st Division would provide the rearguard and Boyer’s Dragoon Division would remain in reserve.  In the meantime, Pakenham’s British 3rd Division, together with d’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry brigade, arrived unseen at Aldea Tejada at around 2pm.

Seeing elements of Leith’s division deploying behind the village of Los Arapiles, Maucune halted his march and deployed his division to face the village.  As skirmishers clashed, Maucune’s artillery was soon engaged in a sharp duel with Leith’s guns, as well as the two guns that Lowry Cole had placed atop the Lesser Arapile.  However, the guns on the Lesser Arapile were soon silenced by the growing French battery on the Greater Arapile.  As the situation south of Los Arapiles began to escalate, Clauzel also halted his division and formed up on Maucune’s right.  However, Thomières attempted to comply with his orders and pressed on toward the Ciudad Rodrigo road, marching around the rear of Maucune’s division, aiming for the village of Miranda de Azan and consequently isolating his division from the rest of the army.

Wellington, at that moment having a lunch of cold meat and watching from the hills opposite, is said to have thrown a chicken leg over his shoulder and riding forward for a better look, exclaimed “By God, that’ll do!”  Wellington immediately set off at speed toward Aldea Tejada, apparently galloping alone for much of the distance as his staff failed to keep up with him.  Arriving at Pakenham’s position, he gave his brother-in-law the briefest of orders; “Edward, move on with the 3rd Division, take those heights in your front and drive everything before you.”  Shaking hands with his commander-in-chief, Pakenham replied “I will, my Lord.”

As Pakenham’s division marched out to meet Thomières, Wellington rode back to the main position and ordered Victor von Alten’s light cavalry brigade (temporarily under the command of Lieutenant Colonel von Arentschildt) to join d’Urban’s brigade on the flank.  Leith’s 5th Division, Carlos de España’s Division, Bradford’s independent brigade and Cotton’s Cavalry Reserve were also ordered to advance in support of Pakenham (with several brigades having already been detached, Cotton still had direct control of George Anson’s light cavalry brigade and Le Marchant’s heavies).

Marmont, watching from the Greater Arapile, also saw the danger and like Wellington, chose to gallop off in order to personally take control of the situation.  However, as he descended the hill, a shell exploded near by, seriously wounding him.  Brennier, being the closest divisional commander, immediately assumed command of the army, but it was already too late for Thomières.

The first Allied formation to attack was Benjamin d’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry brigade (1st & 11th Cavalry Regiments), supported by the 14th Light Dragoons from Alten’s brigade.  The Portuguese horsemen emerged from dead ground to strike Thomières’ leading companies in the flank!  Some of the more alert companies did manage to fire a volley, emptying several Portuguese saddles, but the leading French battalion (of the 101ème de Ligne) was completely broken.  Worse was to come as Pakenham’s previously-undetected 3rd Division now burst into the open in column formation, only 500 yards from Thomières’ leading units.  The British and Portuguese infantry rapidly formed lines and with Wallace’s brigade leading, advanced rapidly upon the French infantry who, shaken by the destruction of the leading battalion, were unsteadily forming up on the high ground of the Pico de Miranda.

Thomières to his credit, rapidly brought up twenty guns and these now poured a destructive fire into the approaching redcoats.  Curto’s light cavalry also now came up, attempting to launch a charge into Pakenham’s right flank.  However, they were met by Arentschildt’s 1st KGL Hussars and broken.  The 9-pounders of Douglas’ Company also now came into action, providing effective supporting fire to the attacking infantry.  Nevertheless a volley from the French line dropped scores of the 88th Foot (Connaught Rangers), among them their Commanding Officer, Major Barnaby Murphy.

The sight of their slain Commanding Officer being dragged across in front of them by his horse’s stirrup, sent the 88th into an incandescent rage and they could not be held back.  With them went the rest of Wallace’s brigade; the 45th Foot (1st Nottinghamshire) and 74th Foot.  The ferocious charge of Wallace’s brigade utterly destroyed Thomières’ division within minutes.  The 101ème and 62ème de Ligne both suffered 2/3rds casualties, the entire divisional artillery was captured and Thomières himself was killed.  Only the rearmost regiment, the 1er de Ligne, managed to escape the disaster with relatively light casualties, losing around 1/8th of its strength.

As the broken remnants of Thomières’ division fled back eastward, Maucune’s division now became the focus of Allied attention.  Leith’s 5th Division, which had now spent several hours to the north of Los Arapiles under French artillery fire, finally began advancing through the village and across the plain, aiming for the far ridge, topped with Maucune’s infantry.  The French voltigeurs were outclassed by Leith’s skirmish screen and were forced to fall back to the safety of their lines, soon followed by the artillery.  To everyone’s surprise, the infantry also fell back; into a position behind the crest, not unlike the typical Wellingtonian tactic, but almost unheard of for the French!

As the British infantry crested the rise, the French let loose with a devastating volley, killing and wounding many redcoats, among them Leith himself, who fell badly wounded.  Undaunted, the British infantry daunted and delivered their own devastating volley upon their tormentors, before lowering their bayonets and charging with a wild cheer.  Bradford’s independent Portuguese brigade, which had been advancing on Leith’s right, also now charged, striking Maucune’s left flank.  It should be mentioned at this point that Maucune, having withdrawn his infantry behind the crest and having observed the approach of enemy cavalry, had ordered his battalions to form squares.  Now, faced by enemy infantry at close range, his battalion commanders tried desperately to shake out into lines… It was at this moment that Le Marchant’s brigade of heavy dragoons struck…

Although he had no way of knowing what lay beyond the ridge, Le Marchant’s orders had been clear; to ‘charge in at all hazards’ as soon as Leith’s 5th Division engaged the enemy.  Forming his brigade into two lines, with the 5th Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons in front and the 3rd Dragoons in reserve, Le Marchant inserted himself between Leith’s Division on the left and Bradford’s Portuguese on the right.  As they passed over the crest to the cheers Allied infantrymen, the heavy dragoons plunged into the 66ème de Ligne and simply annihilated them.  The 15ème de Ligne were next and they too were soon broken and fleeing in the greatest of panic and disorder.  Behind them, Brenier’s division frantically attempted to form up and did manage to deliver volleys against the rampaging British dragoons, who had now lost all sense of order.  Nevertheless, the ferocious Allied assault eventually succeeded in driving back Brenier, but at some considerable cost, including the tragic and irreplaceable loss of John Le Marchant.

While the drama on the western flank was taking place, Lowry Cole’s 4th Division began its advance across the plain, aiming for Clauzel’s division on the opposite ridge.  However, Cole’s men came under stiff artillery fire, not only from the guns positioned with Clauzel, but also from the large battery now positioned on the Greater Arapile.  Matters only became worse as they closed with the French infantry and the attack soon stagnated into a vicious firefight.

On Cole’s left, Major General Dennis Pack watched with increasing concern as the French artillery positioned on the Greater Arapile chewed up Cole’s exposed left flank.  Having been given orders by Wellington to capture the Greater Arapile if the opportunity arose, Pack now decided that the time had come and ordered his independent Portuguese brigade forward.  With the French guns occupied in engaging Cole, Pack’s Portuguese made good progress across the valley, with the 4th Caçadores deployed in skirmish order quickly pushing back the enemy voltigeurs.  As they pushed on up the steep slope, they finally reached a sheer rocky escarpment, some 5 feet high, right at the top of the slope.  As the Portuguese infantry attempted to climb up, they were met by the 120ème de Ligne, who stepped forward and poured a murderous fire down into the helpless Portuguese infantry.

Pack’s Portuguese were utterly routed, leaving Cole’s left flank now completely exposed.  To make matters worse , Cole had himself been wounded and the time was now ripe for the French to mount a counter-attack.  As Clauzel attacked to their front, Bonnet’s division swept in from the Greater Arapile to drive into Cole’s left flank.

Cole’s Division could take no more and staggered back to the foot of the Lesser Arapile as Pack’s routed brigade routed streamed past.  On Cole’s left, Stubbs’ Portuguese brigade was forced to form squares in order to defend itself as Boyer’s Dragoon Division charged in support of Bonnet’s infantry.  The crisis now engulfing the Allied centre seemed at this point to be undoing all the good work done on the western flank!

One bright spot for the Allies however, was that Bonnet (the current acting commander-in-chief) fell wounded during the counter-attack and so command now passed to Clauzel.  In the midst of yet another change of army command, Wellington now countered the French with a counter-attack of his own.  Henry Clinton’s 6th Division was brought forward from the reserve and attacked frontally, while Marshal Beresford personally brought Spry’s Portuguese brigade from Leith’s 5th Division.  Bonnet’s division now found its firing line overlapped by Clinton and the overwhelming firepower of these fresh brigades threw Bonnet’s regiments back on Clauzel’s division.  Beresford now led Spry’s Portuguese against Clauzel’s left and the French counter-attack was finally repulsed (with Beresford being wounded in the process).

With the failure of Clauzel’s counter-attack, the battle was lost for the French.  All that remained now was to decide the severity of defeat.  Foy’s 1st Division, as the army rearguard, was now slowly making its way south from Calvarisa de Arriba toward the Greater Arapile, shadowed by Charles von Alten’s Light Division.  Seeing this formation isolated, Wellington ordered Henry Campbell’s 1st Division forward to cut Foy off from the rest of the army.  However, Campbell only pressed forward with skirmishers and so Foy was allowed to slip away.  This movement did however, persuade the remaining French garrison to evacuate the Greater Arapile.

Sarrut’s division meanwhile, had been pushed forward to shore up the collapsing left flank of the army and was heavily engaged before slowly giving ground to the overwhelming tide of Allied troops.

Ferey’s division was the only remaining unengaged formation in the French Army of Portugal and as such, formed up on a steep wooded ridge to the rear of the Greater Arapile, covering the retreat of the routed army.  As night began to fall, Ferey and his men sold their lives dearly, cutting down scores of Clinton’s redcoats as they attempted to break through the position.  Clinton’s attack stagnated into a bitter, point-blank firefight for an hour until at last, artillery was brought up to break the impasse.  In a very short time, the gallant Ferey himself was cut in half by a cannonball, yet despite this, his men still managed to throw back a determined attack by Rezende’s Portuguese brigade.  It was only a flank-attack by Leith’s 5th Division that finally drove Ferey’s heroic division from its position.  Nevertheless, the 31ème Légère continued to fight on, doggedly fighting for every yard as they pulled back, as did Foy’s division, still retiring steadily in the face of the 1st and Light Divisions.

As darkness fell, the French fugitives streamed through the forested hills, desperately hoping to find safety at the bridge and fords of Alba de Tormes.  Wellington was reluctant to commit what few uncommitted reserves he had left (consisting only of Hope’s 7th Division, Bock’s KGL Dragoon brigade and Carlos De España’s Division) into a confused pursuit through forest at night, particularly when he knew that Carlos De España had positioned a brigade at Alba de Tormes in order to prevent its use by the French…

However, for reasons that are not clear, Carlos De España had earlier removed the detachment from the ford (probably during the morning, when it looked likely that the army was about to retreat back to Ciudad Rodrigo) and had then compounded his error by not telling Wellington.

23rd July to 23rd October: The Capture of Madrid and the Siege of Burgos

With the fugitive French army having slipped away across the Tormes, Wellington was absolutely furious, though his mood must have slightly improved the following day, when the previously-unengaged cavalry brigades of Major Generals George Anson and Eberhardt Otto George von Bock caught up with the French rearguard at the village of Garcia Hernandez.  As Anson’s light dragoons dealt with the remnants of Curto’s light cavalry, Von Bock’s KGL heavy dragoons achieved one of the most incredible feats of arms of the entire war; breaking two whole battalion squares with cavalry alone!

Nevertheless, with the rate of the French retreat out-pacing the exhausted Allied Army’s ability to keep up, the remnants of Marmont’s Army of Portugal slipped away; initially eastward, but then north toward their base at Valladolid.  Wellington pursued them until 25th July, but was then happy for his exhausted army to follow the retreating French at a more leisurely pace until they reached Valladolid on 30th July.  Wellington then turned southeast, marching to Madrid and entering the city to a rapturous welcome on 12th August.

On 31st August, Wellington handed Madrid over to Rowland Hill and marched back to Valladolid and then to Burgos, where on 16th September he besieged the fortress.  Sieges were never Wellington’s strong suit and this was no exception, as once again Wellington had no real siege train and only three heavy guns.  The 1st Division executed the siege abysmally for five weeks until at last, Wellington gave up and withdrew from Burgos on 23rd October, pursued by a fresh and numerically-superior French army under General Joseph Souham (Wellington was outnumbered 53,000 to 35,000).

23rd October to 19th November: The Retreat Ciudad Rodrigo

Wellington retreated via Valladolid and then Tordesillas, where the wily General Foy successfully captured the bridge before it could be destroyed by Wellington’s rearguard.  Logistics and discipline in Wellington’s army almost completely broke down and those who had experienced the appalling retreat to Corunna described the retreat from Burgos as being even worse.

Wellington retreated all the way back to the scene of his earlier victory at Salamanca, where he united his army on 9th November with that of Hill, who had withdrawn from Madrid.  This brought Wellington’s strength up to 65,000, though Marshal Soult had also now brought his army to join with Souham’s and this combined army numbered 80,000.  There was therefore every chance of a Second Battle of Salamanca being fought in 1812, but on 14th November Wellington retreated once again.  The French army, now suffering from the weather and long lines of communication, gave up the pursuit shortly afterwards and Wellington’s exhausted army arrived back at Ciudad Rodrigo on 19th November.

So despite his great victory at Salamanca, Wellington ended 1812 almost back where he had started the year and it is easy to simply write the year off as a pointless failure.  However, as Wellington started 1813 the major difference was that this time he was starting the year with complete control of his base at Portugal and all of the border fortresses and his army had never been stronger in terms of manpower, logistics, or strategic position.

The events in Russia would also have a major impact on the coming year as Napoleon frantically sourced troops to rebuild his Grande Armée in Germany, but I’ve waffled on enough now, so that’s for another article.  On to the scenario and let’s roll some dice…

Scenario Outline

The scenario lasts for 11 turns, starting with the Allied 1600hrs turn and ending at nightfall, with the French 2130hrs turn.

In reality the battle was over much earlier than that, so if you want to set yourself a challenge, limit the game to 8 turns, ending after the French 1930hrs turn.

In order to achieve total victory, each side must break their opponent’s army.  However, the French can claim a ‘winning draw’ if Wellington fails to achieve this.

The French army is already on a sticky wicket, but if you want to make things even stickier, at the start of the game, roll on the Napoleon’s Battles General Elimination Table and immediately apply the result to Marshal Marmont (Free Roll markers may of course be used).  If Marmont is eliminated or otherwise removed from play, the French army will be without a C-in-C for the first turn.  His chief of staff, Général de Division Louis de Remplacement will take command at the start of Turn 2, with the stats 12″P(10)-1 (in reality, Bonnet took command, followed latterly by Clauzel, but for game purposes a replacement general will always use the lowest possible stats for his level of command, regardless of who they are).

Deployment

The French have been completely surprised by Wellington’s attack, so there is no opportunity for a flexible deployment and all formations are deployed in the locations shown on the map above.  Some units have deployed into Column formation to face the new threat, though the units shown as arrows are still deployed in March Column formation.  No French unit may start the game in Line or Square formation.  All French artillery batteries are deployed in Limbered or March Column formation, except for one battery each with Bonnet’s and Foy’s Divisions, which may be in Unlimbered formation.  The French may not place any Cavalry React markers at the start of the game.

The Allies may use the historical deployment shown on the map above, with units deployed in any formation and artillery being Unlimbered or Limbered, as desired.  Packenham may deploy his lead British infantry brigade 4 inches from Thomières’ leading brigade (i.e. close enough to charge in Line formation).

Alternatively, they may deploy more flexibly, with each formation being deployed as desired within the boxes shown on the map below (though only one of Packenham’s infantry brigades may be deployed within 4″ range of the French).  Note that the deployment of each division from left to right was largely dictated by its position in the order of march, with Packenham being the advance guard and Alten being the rear guard, so there is only limited opportunity to alter the position of each division.

Whichever deployment option is taken, the French deploy first, followed by the Allies.  Once the Allies have deployed, the French player may adjust the facing of any deployed artillery batteries and of Thomières’ leading infantry brigade, in order to bring Allied units within their arc of fire.

Allied Peninsular Army Order of Battle

General Sir Arthur Wellesley, Earl of Wellington
17”G(10)+3D
[6 Free Rolls]
[19M]

Cavalry Reserve – Lieutenant General John Stapleton Cotton                  5”E(7)+2 [1F]
Le Marchant’s Brigade (5th Dragoon Guards and 3rd & 4th Dragoons)      12 BrHC [4D]
G Anson’s Brigade (11th, 12th & 16th Light Dragoons)                                     12 BrLC [5D]
Bull’s ‘I’ Troop Royal Horse Artillery                                                                    Br6#

1st Division – Major General Henry Frederick Campbell                              4”G(4)+1 [2F]
Fermor’s Brigade (1/2nd & 1/3rd Foot Guards)                                                  16 BrGD [5D]
Wheatley’s Brigade (2/24th, 1/42nd, 2/58th & 1/79th Foot)                           24 BrLN [10D]
Löwe’s Brigade (1st, 2nd & 5th KGL Infantry Battalions)                                 16 BrLN [6D]
Gardiner’s Company Royal Artillery                                                                      Br9#F

3rd Division – Major General Edward Michael Pakenham                          4”A(7)+1D [3F]
Wallace’s Brigade (1/45th, 74th & 1/88th Foot)                                                 16 BrLN [6D]
J Campbell’s Brigade (1/5th & 2/5th Fusiliers and 2/83rd & 94th Foot)     16 BrLN [6D]
Power’s Portuguese Brigade (9th & 21st Infantry and 12th Caçadores)         20 PtLN [10D]
V von Alten’s Brigade (14th Light Dragoons & 1st KGL Hussars)                   12 BrKLC [5D]
D’Urban’s Portuguese Cavalry Brigade (1st & 11th Dragoons)                         8 PtLC [4D]
Douglas’ Company Royal Artillery                                                                          Br9#F

4th Division – Lieutenant General Galbraith Lowry Cole                               3”G(8)+1 [2F]
W Anson’s Brigade (3/27th & 1/40th Foot)                                                           12 BrLN [5D]
Ellis’ Brigade (1/7th & 1/23rd Fusiliers and 1/48th Foot)                                  12 BrLN [5D]
Stubbs’ Portuguese Brigade (11th & 23rd Infantry and 7th Caçadores)           20 PtLN [10D]
Sympher’s 4th Company KGL Artillery                                                                   Br9#F

5th Division – Lieutenant General James Leith                                                3”A(6)+0 [2F]
Greville’s Brigade (3/1st, 1/9th, 1/38th & 2/38th Foot)                                     24 BrLN [10D]
Pringle’s Brigade (1/4th, 2/4th, 2/30th & 2/44th Foot)                                    16 BrLN [6D]
Spry’s Portuguese Brigade (3rd & 15th Infantry and 8th Caçadores)              20 PtLN [10D]

6th Division – Lieutenant General Henry Clinton                                           4”A(6)+1 [2F]
Hulse’s Brigade (1/11th, 2/53rd & 1/61st Foot)                                                    12 BrLN [5D]
Hinde’s Brigade (2nd, 1/32nd & 1/36th Foot)                                                      12 BrLN [5D]
Rezende’s Portuguese Brigade (8th & 12th Infantry and 9th Caçadores)       24 PtLN [12D]

7th Division – Major General John Hope                                                          4”G(7)+1 [2F]
Halkett’s Brigade (1st & 2nd KGL LI & Brunswick Oels Jäger)                        12 BrLT [5D]
De Bernewitz’s Brigade (51st & 68th LI & Chasseurs-Britanniques)               12 BrLT [5D]
Collins’ Portuguese Brigade (7th & 19th Infantry and 2nd Caçadores)           16 PtLN [8D]
MacDonald’s ‘E’ Troop Royal Horse Artillery                                                       Br6#

Light Division – Lieutenant General Charles von Alten                                4”G(7)+1 [2F]
Barnard’s Brigade (1/43rd LI, 2/95th & 3/95th Rifles and 1st Caçadores)   16 BrLT [6D]
Vandeleur’s Brigade (1/52nd LI, 1/95th Rifles and 3rd Caçadores)               16 BrLT [6D]
Bock’s KGL Brigade (1st & 2nd KGL Dragoons)                                                  12 BrKHC [4D]
Ross’ ‘A’ Troop Royal Horse Artillery                                                                    Br6#

Spanish Division – Teniente-General Don Carlos de España                      3”A(4)+0 [1F]
Infantry Brigade (Princesa, Tiradores de Castilla, Jaen & 1st Sevilla)            20 SpLN [14D]
Cavalry Brigade (Cazadores de Castilla & Lanceros de Castilla)                      12 SpLC [7D]
Horse Battery                                                                                                               Sp4#

Portuguese Independent Brigade – Major General Dennis Pack           4”G(6)+2 [1F]
Pack’s Portuguese Brigade (1st & 16th Infantry and 4th Caçadores)               24 PtLN [12D]

Portuguese Independent Brigade – Major General Thomas Bradford  3”A(5)+0 [1F]
Bradford’s Portuguese Brigade (13th & 14th Infantry and 5th Caçadores)     16 PtLN [8D]

Allied Order of Battle Notes

1.  Cotton is the overall Allied cavalry commander and may take control of any British, KGL or Portuguese cavalry brigade or horse battery within his command span, even if they are temporarily attached to other divisions at the start of the battle.  Although all British, Portuguese and KGL cavalry are formally part of his command, the detached cavalry brigades are assumed to be a part of the division to which they are attached for Formation Fatigue purposes during this battle.  Although they are not formally part of his command, Cotton may also command the Spanish cavalry and horse artillery if they fall within his command-span.

2.  Victor von Alten’s and d’Urban’s cavalry brigades start the battle attached to Pakenham’s 3rd Division.

3.  Von Bock’s KGL Dragoon Brigade and Ross’ Troop RHA from the Cavalry Division start the battle attached to Charles von Alten’s Light Division.

4.  Le Marchant’s performance as a cavalry brigadier was nothing short of superb and Salamanca was his master-stroke, though resulted in his death.  Le Marchant’s brigade may therefore use a -3 recall modifier instead of the usual -4 for British cavalry.

5.  If desired, a single artillery battery (but not a 12-pounder battery) on each side may be positioned on top of their respective Arapile at the start of the game, having been manhandled there with some difficulty.

6.  The 1st, 3rd & 6th Divisions had their skirmish-screen beefed up by independent companies of the 5/60th Rifles, while the 5th Division was boosted by rifle-armed companies of the Brunswick Oels Jäger.  The 4th Division had companies of both the 5/60th Rifles and the Brunswick Oels Jäger.  The strength of these units is absorbed into the brigade strengths and the strong fire-combat factors of British infantry reflects the inclusion of these specialist marksmen.

7.  Sir Arthur Wellesley was styled the Earl of Wellington from February 1812.  He would be elevated to Marquess in August 1812, but wouldn’t become a Duke until May 1814.

8.  One of the foibles of Napoleon’s Battles is that light and medium foot artillery are not represented in the game.  This isn’t normally a problem in the ‘central’ theatres of war, where the armies were up to their proverbials in 12-pounders and horse batteries, but in the ‘fringe’ theatres, this can mean that some battles are simply too light on artillery.  The use of artillery by both sides in this battle was decisive and I’ve therefore included 9pdr and 8pdr foot batteries (with my own unofficial stats).

9.  Lieutenant Colonel Frederick von Arentschildt of the King’s German Legion’s 1st Hussars was temporarily in command of Major General Victor von Alten’s light cavalry brigade, due to the General catching a voltigeur’s bullet in his thigh during the previous evening.  Von Alten would return to duty on 25th July, having missed the battle.

10.  Wellington may apply the Optional Wellington Rule as described in the main rule book’s optional rules section.  If he does not move during his army’s movement phase, he may alternatively be given a Cavalry React Marker and may then spend this marker to move in any of his army’s Reacting Cavalry phases.

11.  Optional Beresford Rule:  Marshal William Beresford, the commander-in-chief of the Portuguese Army and Wellington’s second-in-command, personally led Portuguese brigades forward during the battle until he was seriously wounded.  Beresford may therefore be represented on table by a single general figure with the rating of 0″E(8)+1.  He does not have a command-span, but may roam the battlefield and attach himself to any single Portuguese unit, who will gain the benefit of his other ratings (in much the same manner as the optional Blücher Rule from the NB rule book).  If Beresford activates an infantry unit to which he is attached, they may perform a full move instead of the usual half-move.  I do however, have to say that the Allies do already have a quite considerable advantage, so this might perhaps be an extra advantage too far.  Perhaps only invoke this rule if the ‘Risk to Marmont’ optional rule is not used or if the short version of the scenario is used.

French Army of Portugal Order of Battle

Maréchal Auguste de Marmont, Duc de Raguse
14”G(10)+1
[6 Free Rolls]
[13M]

1er Division – Général de Division Maximilien Sébastien Foy                      4”G(7)+2 [1F]
Chemineau’s Brigade (6ème Légère & 69ème de Ligne)                                   24 FrLT [12D]
Degraviers-Berthelot’s Brigade (39ème & 76ème de Ligne)                             20 FrLN [10D]

2ème Division – Général de Division Bertrand Clauzel                                 4”G(7)+1 [1F]
Berlier’s Brigade (25ème Légère & 27ème de Ligne)                                          28 FrLN [14D]
Barbot’s Brigade (50ème & 59ème de Ligne)                                                       28 FrLN [14D]

3ème Division – Général de Division Claude François Ferey                       4”G(7)+1 [1F]
Menne’s Brigade (31ème Légère & 26ème de Ligne)                                          24 FrLT [12D]
Arnaud’s Brigade (47ème & 70ème de Ligne)                                                      24 FrLN [12D]

4ème Division – Général de Division Jacques Thomas Sarrut                     4”G(6)+0 [1F]
Fririon’s Brigade (2ème Légère & 36ème de Ligne)                                            28 FrLN [14D]
2nd Brigade (4ème Légère & 130ème de Ligne (absent))                                  12 FrLT [6D]

5ème Division – Général de Division Antoine Louis Popon de Maucune   3”A(4)+0 [1F]
Arnaud’s Brigade (15ème & 66ème de Ligne)                                                       24 FrLN [12D]
Montfort’s Brigade (82ème & 86ème de Ligne)                                                   20 FrLN [10D]

6ème Division – Général de Division Antoine-François Brenier de Montmorand 4”E(8)+1 [1F]
Taupin’s Brigade (17ème Légère & 65ème de Ligne)                                          24 FrLT [12D]
2nd Brigade (22ème de Ligne)                                                                                 16 FrLN [8D]

7ème Division – Général de Division Jean Guillaume Barthélemy Thomières 3”G(6)+0 [1F]
Bonté’s Brigade (1er & 62ème de Ligne)                                                               24 FrLN [12D]
2nd Brigade (101ème de Ligne)                                                                               12 FrLN [6D]

8ème Division – Général de Division Jean-Pierre-François Bonnet          4”G(7)+1 [1F]
Gautier’s Brigade (118ème & 119ème de Ligne)                                                   24 FrLN [12D]
Charles’ Brigade (120ème & 122ème de Ligne)                                                    28 FrLN [14D]

Light Cavalry Division – Général de Division Jean-Baptiste Théodore Curto      3”A(5)+0 [1F]
1st & 2nd Brigades (3ème Hussards and 22ème, 26ème & 28ème Chasseurs) 12 FrLC [6D]
3rd Brigade (13ème & 14ème Chasseurs à Cheval and Escadron de Marche) 12 FrLC [6D]
Horse Battery                                                                                                               Fr4#

Dragoon Division – Général de Division Pierre François Xavier Boyer     3”A(6)+0 [1F]
Boyer’s Brigade (6ème & 11ème Dragons)                                                             12 FrLC [6D]
Carrié’s Brigade (15ème & 25ème Dragons)                                                          8 FrLC [4D]
Horse Battery                                                                                                               Fr4#

Reserve Artillery
Horse Battery                                                                                                                Fr4#
Heavy Foot Battery                                                                                                      Fr12#
Heavy Foot Battery                                                                                                      Fr12#
Foot Battery                                                                                                                   Fr8#F
Foot Battery                                                                                                                   Fr8#F
Foot Battery                                                                                                                   Fr8#F

French Order of Battle Notes

1.  The exact French artillery order of battle is not known for this battle other than the number of guns and men, so the artillery organisation here is speculative, based on the typical organisation for a French corps, as well as the number and type of guns listed as captured during the battle.

2.  The three reserve 8pdr foot batteries and 4pdr horse battery may start the game attached to any infantry division (no more than one battery per division).  The reserve 12pdr foot batteries start the game attached to Ferey’s 3rd Division.

3.  If desired, a single artillery battery (but not a 12-pounder battery) on each side may be positioned on top of their respective Arapile at the start of the scenario, having been manhandled there with some difficulty.

4.  Many of the infantry Générals de Brigade are not known and many of these seem to be single-regiment brigades, so it’s probable that the regimental Colonel was acting as the de facto brigade commander and that there weren’t actually designated Générals de Brigade for those brigades.  In a couple of cases, one of the brigade’s two regiments was absent, so it may be that the Général de Brigade was commanding the detached element.

5.  The 1st and 2nd Brigades of Curto’s Light Cavalry Division were very weak (around 500 and 400 men respectively), so I’ve massed them into a single unit.  The Générals de Brigade are not known.

6.  The 1st Brigade of five divisions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th & 6th) included a light infantry regiment, along with a line infantry regiment.  I’ve therefore arbitrarily designated three of them (the 1st Brigade of 1st, 3rd & 6th Divisions) as light infantry, as well as the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Division, which consisted of a single light infantry regiment.  The French player may alternatively opt to change which divisions have the light infantry.

7.  One of the foibles of NB is that light and medium foot artillery are not represented in the game.  This isn’t a problem in the ‘central’ theatres of war, where the armies were up to their proverbials in 12-pounders and horse batteries, but in the ‘fringe’ theatres, this can mean that some battles are simply too light on artillery.  The use of artillery by both sides in this battle was decisive and I’ve therefore included 9pdr and 8pdr foot batteries with my own unofficial stats.

8.  Brenier’s 2nd Brigade also included a very small detachment from the 4ème Régiment d’Étranger (also known as the Régiment de Prusse), the majority of whom had been given a drubbing by Daddy Hill at Almaraz.  The strength of this tiny detachment is absorbed into that of the 22ème de Ligne.  As it happens, I actually painted these when we re-fought Salamanca ‘In The Grand Manner’ at our second Général de Brigade Wargames Weekend at the National Army Museum in 2003, so here they are (not my best… I seem to remember that they were painted in a spare hour or so before the game):

Terrain Notes

1.  The Arapiles were each topped by a sheer rocky escarpment on the sides facing each other, making them excellent defensive positions, while they sloped away slightly more gently on the opposite sides.  The lower contours provide the defender with a +1 defensive modifier and do not affect movement.  However, the rocky upper contour of each Arapile counts as 2 inches of rough terrain to enter or exit and each has the following restrictions:

2.  The Greater Arapile:  The French eventually managed to mass forty guns on top of this feature, so I therefore suggest that it may accommodate up to five batteries and a single infantry brigade.  The north, west and east slopes give the defender a +4 defensive modifier and are impassable to artillery and cavalry.  The southern slope gives the defender a +2 defensive modifier and is passable to all troop types as 2 inches of rough terrain.  Horse Artillery may not evade either to or from the Greater Arapile.

3.  The Lesser Arapile may accommodate up to three batteries and a single infantry brigade.  The south, west and east slopes give the defender a +4 defensive modifier and are impassable to artillery and cavalry.  The northern slope gives the defender a +2 defensive modifier and is passable to all troop types as 2 inches of rough terrain.  Horse Artillery may not evade either to or from the Lesser Arapile.

4.  Other Hills give the defender a +1 defensive modifier and do not cause any movement penalty.

5.  Woods count as rough going for all troop types.

6.  Villages provide the defender with a -1 cover modifier and a +2 combat modifier.  Most may only accommodate a single brigade, but Los Arapiles village may accommodate two brigades.

7.  Streams were probably simply dried-up gullies at this time of year and are therefore passable to all troop types as 1 inch of rough terrain.  They provide a defender with a +1 combat modifier.  Units in Column, March Column or Limbered formation may cross at fords/bridges with no movement penalty.

Unit Labels

Well as Mrs Fawr always says; that was a big one!